Non-Hostile Casualties in These Kinds of Wars from the Korean War to Operation Iraqi Freedom by Henry, Hugh William
Georgia Southern University 
Digital Commons@Georgia Southern 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies, Jack N. Averitt College of 
Spring 2008 
Non-Hostile Casualties in These Kinds of Wars from the 
Korean War to Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Hugh William Henry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Henry, Hugh William, "Non-Hostile Casualties in These Kinds of Wars from the Korean War 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom" (2008). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 589. 
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/589 
This thesis (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies, Jack 
N. Averitt College of at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia 
Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu. 
NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES IN “THESE KINDS OF WARS” FROM THE 
KOREAN WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
by 
HUGH HENRY 
(Under the Direction of Emerson Thomas McMullen) 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a detailed study of the non-hostile deaths of the Korean War, the 
Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  This document 
examines the causes of the non-hostile deaths, from illnesses, accidents, friendly fire, and 
other injuries, as well as the trends in each war and the impact that these casualties 
exerted at the time they happened.  In addition, this thesis explores the lessons the Armed 
Forces leaders applied between the wars in an effort to reduce non-hostile losses for the 
next war.   
 
 INDEX WORDS: Spring 2008, Master’s Thesis, College of Graduate Studies, 
Hugh Henry, Master’s Degree, Georgia Southern University  
 
 
 
 1
NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES IN “THESE KINDS OF WARS” FROM THE 
KOREAN WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
 
by 
 
HUGH HENRY 
B.S. North Georgia College and State University, 2002 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
STATESBORO, GA 
2008 
       
 
 2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2008 
Hugh Henry 
All Rights Reserved 
 3
NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES IN “THESE KINDS OF WARS” FROM THE 
KOREAN WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
by 
HUGH HENRY 
 
 
 
 
      Major Professor:  E. Thomas McMullen 
Committee:  Alan C. Downs 
   Lisa L. Denmark 
 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved 
May 2008 
 
 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
          Page 
LIST OF TABLES AND CHARTS..…………………………………………..6 
CHAPTERS 
 1.  INTRODUCTION...………………………………………………..7 
 2.  THE KOREAN WAR……………………………………………..13 
 3.  THE VIETNAM WAR……………………………………………55 
 4.  OPERATION DESERT STORM…………………………………94 
 5.  OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM……………………………….133  
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………...178 
APPENDIX I: MAPS OF THE KOREAN WAR..………………………….185 
APPENDIX II: MAP OF IRAQ………………………………………..……186 
 
 5
LIST OF TABLES AND CHARTS 
          Page 
Table 2.1: U.S. Aircraft Losses in Korea……………………………………..52 
Chart 2.1: U.S. Aircraft Losses in Korea Trends……………………………..54 
Table 3.1: Non-Hostile Casualties in Vietnam NA…………..........................89 
Table 3.2: Non-Hostile Casualties in Vietnam DOD………………………...93 
Table 5.1: Hostile Casualties in Iraq by Province………………………..…169 
Table 5.2: Non-Hostile Casualties in Iraq by Province………………..……172 
Table 5.3: Non-Hostile Casualties in Iraq by Type………………………....175 
 6
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES IN “THESE KINDS OF WARS” FROM THE 
KOREAN WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
      Monuments and shrines throughout the United States pay tribute to the men and 
women who fought in a foreign war.  Some databases and rolls of honor list the names of 
the dead and pay tribute for the sacrifices they and their families made.  Next to most of 
the names, a brief description accompanies, for example, “killed in action in a small-arms 
firefight.”  Next to some names, however, the record is strangely blank.  The note may 
tell that the serviceman is survived by his wife and the infant child he never met, but the 
compiler of the honor role left scarcely a clue as to the manner of the soldier’s death.  
These losses are usually deaths from non-hostile means: vehicle accidents, illnesses, and 
assorted other causes that merit very scarce mention at the time in press reports.  Some 
lists of the dead from Operation Desert Storm report the causes of all of the hostile deaths 
from combat operations completely and provide almost no causes of death for non-hostile 
losses.  Few historians have thus far explored the trends of how these soldiers died and 
what lessons the Armed Forces learned from their deaths. 
      For present purposes, “non-hostile causes” refers to accidents, diseases, aircraft 
crashes, and friendly fire.  “Casualties” is a term restricted to deaths because the records 
of wounds are long, debatable, and rather too varied for a concise examination.  
Moreover, only deaths appear on the metaphorical radar screens of the Generals who 
develop strategic and tactical plans.  Trends that lead to deaths prompt commanders to 
rectify the situations in a way that wounds do not.   
 7
      Although the United States has not declared war officially since the Second 
World War, common usage relegates the American campaigns in Korea and Vietnam to 
the status of wars.  The two campaigns in the Persian Gulf region are referenced by their 
operation names: Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Common usage 
also conveys on Operation Desert Storm the titles “The Gulf War” and “The First Gulf 
War.”   T. R. Fehrenbach’s book, This Kind of War, inspired the title of this study 
because the four major wars since World War II have shared common characteristics.  
Attrition wars all, the campaigns in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf region have 
prompted politicians, Generals, journalists, and ordinary citizens to calculate the costs of 
each conflict against the apparent benefits that they attained.  In each case, the opponents 
of the current war-related policy presented the possibility of American withdrawal in an 
instant or graduated manner.  The optional nature of each war led critics to measure the 
costs in money, time duration of the conflict, and lost lives and equipment.  Each of these 
four wars altered or threatened to affect the military, societal, and political landscape of 
American society in tangible ways.  Each major war produced problems for the Armed 
Forces to solve and provided a proving ground for learning the last war’s lessons. 
      Shorter and more minor involvements, such as American funding of guerrilla 
fighters in El Salvador, Afghanistan and Nicaragua, as well as the lengthy peace-keeping 
deployments in Bosnia, affected political battles but did not produce American casualties 
in significant numbers.  The very brief military campaigns in Grenada, Panama and 
Somalia likewise consumed so little time and so few resources that the Armed Forces did 
not create and pursue unique strategic objectives.  The four limited wars in Korea, 
Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf region all required the Generals commanding the U.S. 
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Armed Forces to employ the strategic lessons of the past, to deploy large numbers of 
troops overseas, and to fight battles of uncertain outcomes with enemies that opposed 
them in numbers relatively comparable to theirs.  These operations all featured trends in 
deaths over time, changing situations that impacted public opinion, and lessons that the 
Generals used when prosecuting the next war. 
      In all matters public and political, the civilians in charge of approving the major 
military campaigns from the Korean War to Operation Iraqi Freedom evaluated the 
conflicts based on duration in time, the number of servicemen and women who died, and 
what progress the Armed Forces had achieved in exchange for these investments.  The 
heightened importance of casualties in these calculations has proceeded to elevate non-
hostile losses to an unprecedented level of importance.  The concepts of victory and 
defeat have changed over the course of the last fifty-seven years since the beginning of 
the Korean War, giving new prominence to non-hostile casualties.  As politicians, news 
reporters and Generals calculate the costs of the wars, they weigh every death – including 
those from non-hostile means – equally.  An excessive cost in troops can lead to changes 
in policy and a decline in public approval of the war effort.   
      In each major campaign, commanders of troops at every level made and have 
made a concerted effort to reduce the instances of friendly fire.  The Chiefs of Staff of the 
U.S. Armed Forces recognized particular problems with the conduct of the Korean War 
and attempted to address them in the next major conflict.  A large coalition of several 
countries, including British, Turkish, Republic of Korea (ROK) troops and others, 
produced a number of command, communication and control issues.  Close air support, 
(CAS) a tactic still relatively new to warfare, produced the most widespread and 
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devastating source of friendly fire.  Typically, American aircraft pilots who lacked 
adequate communication with the elements on the ground made judgments as to which 
ground forces belonged to the enemy and fired on them.  A lack of communication 
abilities among Coalition nations also contributed to friendly fire when units from 
different countries mistook one another for enemy elements. 
 Soldiers like the pilots in Korea often experience disorientation and clouded 
judgment when their duties require immediate decisions with dire consequences.  The 
limited information available to the soldiers couples with fear of imminent danger and 
uncertainty amidst battlefield conditions that are changing rapidly.  This dangerous, 
uninformed environment that breeds disorientation and snap decisions is called the “fog 
of war.”  Frequently, commanders of units of all sizes make decisions that hindsight 
proves incorrect, costly, or deadly, but the blunders are understandable in light of the 
minimal information available.  The “fog of war” has played a role in many instances of 
fratricide across the various wars. 
      Between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, pilots received excellent training 
that reduced the risk of fratricide from CAS.  As American and ARVN infantry called for 
CAS in Vietnam, very few episodes of air-to-ground fratricide resulted.  In some 
instances, however, the Air Force learned that training in air-to-ground fighting had also 
taken time away from air-to-air combat training.  The general methods of providing 
treatment to casualties also changed dramatically between the Korean War and the War 
in Vietnam.  The helicopter and the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) each made 
their first appearances as a medical evacuation and treatment tools in Korea.  The Army 
had adopted the MASH concept to correct the problem in the Second World War of 
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hospitals located too fat to the rear to provide rapid treatment to casualties.  For one war, 
the Army made its hospitals mobile enough to follow the combat soldiers to areas near 
the front lines while air evacuation remained a rare luxury.  By the time of the War in 
Vietnam, the Army had improved its casualty evacuation procedures so thoroughly that 
the MASH had become obsolete.  Thereafter, helicopters could evacuate troops so 
efficiently that the hospitals did not need mobility.   
      From the War in Vietnam to Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force improved its 
air-to-air combat training and regressed somewhat in the realm of air-to-ground warfare.  
Since the Second World War, Air Force Generals have periodically learned, unlearned 
and relearned the lesson that air power alone cannot stop all or even a majority of enemy 
tactical and logistical operations.  Although command, communication and control 
techniques improved before Desert Storm, the large percentage of fratricide incidents 
from air-to-ground fire highlighted a decline in CAS proficiency.  Once again, some of 
the problems of fratricide derived from confusion over a Coalition with several different 
countries.  Operation Desert Storm also revealed a defect in Armed Forces casualty 
reporting.  The Armed Forces initially reported the victims of friendly fire as having died 
in battles with enemy forces.  Thirty-five families suffered a severe shock in August 
1991, when they discovered that their relatives had died in friendly fire episodes.  
      With one notable exception, the Armed Forces corrected its policy on friendly fire 
reporting and gave accurate initial reports to the soldiers’ families and to the public 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The Generals of Operation Iraqi Freedom also learned 
the lessons from Desert Storm by improving CAS procedures and correcting their 
assessment of the strength of air power to a more realistic estimate.  Infantry soldiers 
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fought the major engagements of Operation Iraqi Freedom and relied relatively little on 
air power after the initial invasion.  As Operation Iraqi Freedom transitioned into a 
lengthy occupation characterized by scattered skirmishing with insurgents, the leaders of 
the U. S. Armed Forces prepared for a long campaign.  Each base adjusted to a garrison-
like environment and company-grade officers enforced policies mandating seatbelts and 
helmets so as to reduce the risks of traffic fatalities.  At some points in the occupation, 
the decline in non-hostile deaths due to safety policies proved large enough that it 
reduced the Coalition death toll over the year as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE KOREAN WAR 
NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES IN “THESE KINDS OF WARS” FROM THE 
KOREAN WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
As the month of June 1950 neared its conclusion, war engulfed the partitioned 
nation of Korea with a speed and ferocity that stunned and panicked the people so 
recently liberated from Japanese colonial rule.  South Korean President Syngman Rhee 
begged for immediate military aid from the United States and from any other allies that 
would contribute, while at the same time reporting that his Republic of Korea (ROK) 
soldiers were fighting tenaciously and might prevail unaided.  Perhaps hoping to match 
the determination of the North Korean invaders, President Harry S. Truman and the 
United Nations Security Council both issued immediate statements of condemnation 
against the aggressors and committed troops to defend South Korea and repel the forces 
of Kim Il Sung.  The President considered the situation so urgent that he pledged the 
troops stationed in Japan under General Douglas MacArthur to fight in Korea before he 
had obtained any sort of Congressional authorization.   
      To the United States, the Korean War amounted to a defense of the free world 
against Communist aggression.  The Russian equipment and weapons that the North 
Koreans used gave significant life to fears that the Communist nations of the world had 
combined their resources to advance a monolithic Communist imperialism in the Far 
East.  Two days after the North Korean invasion had begun, on June 27, 1950, the New 
York Times published a compilation of editorials from several major cities throughout the 
United States.  Of the 17 editorials, 14 mentioned the Soviet Union, Stalin or the Kremlin 
specifically as the driving force behind the North Korean invasion of South Korea and 
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only one described the situation as a civil war between the Koreans.1  The later entrance 
of Chinese troops further supported this view of a determined and unified Communism 
that threatened the democratic countries of the world.  President Truman’s administration 
already smarted from the political scars of “losing” China to Communist control.  The 
President could ill afford another such defeat. 
      Thus, for the first of two times in the second half of the twentieth century, 
American citizens learned that their soldiers were going to fight a war in a distant East 
Asian country that many of them could not have found on a map.  The geographic 
distance of Korea, thousands of miles from the American homeland, prompted the public 
to question the necessity of waging a war in that area.  As General Matthew Ridgway 
pointed out in his memoir, American policy had seldom considered Korea as a critical 
strategic location in previous decades.  Aside from Theodore Roosevelt’s negotiation of 
the peace treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War, the United States had watched passively 
as Korea and land adjacent to it had changed hands among the Russians, Chinese and 
Japanese.2  The Cold War had created a new diplomatic and strategic environment for 
Korea, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union.  In June 1950, Korea represented 
a situation in which the fledgling United Nations (UN) had drawn a national boundary at 
the 38th Parallel and Communist forces were attempting to expand their territory in 
violation of the UN’s decision.  In practice, the Korean War became the military, 
diplomatic, and political proving ground of the new Truman Doctrine, by which the 
United States vowed to defend any democratic country against invasion by Communists. 
                                                 
1 Associated Press, “Comments by Press of Nation on Korean Situation,” New York Times, 25 June 1950, 
A10 (L). 
2 Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, How All-out Asian War was 
Averted: Why MacArthur was Dismissed, Why Today’s War Objectives must be Limited (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1967), 4-6. 
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      Although the Korean War began with a dramatic act of aggression, as had the 
entry of the United States into the Second World War, the invasion of South Korea by the 
North Koreans did not obviously threaten American citizens or assets.  The Truman 
Doctrine made sense to politicians charged with securing the United States against 
foreign enemies, but average citizens proved less willing to endure a full-scale war in a 
place whose strategic significance seemed mysterious to them.  Fundamentally, the 
public was not prepared emotionally for another war so promptly after the titanic struggle 
of the Second World War.  As would be the case in the following three wars as well, the 
public counted the costs in blood and treasure of a war fought in a distant land and 
questioned whether the benefits outweighed the costs.  The political and military 
authorities enjoyed only a limited duration of public approval for the war.  
      The course of the Korean War changed the goals and objectives that the military 
and civilian leaders of the United States pursued in important respects.  After the Chinese 
forces entered the war in the late months of 1950, President Truman and General 
MacArthur, the overall commander of the UN forces in Korea, differed markedly over 
questions of policy.  After China’s entry, President Truman established the policy of 
restoring the border between North and South Korea, whereas MacArthur championed at 
least reunifying Korea under Syngman Rhee’s control and at most launching an air and 
naval war against China.  MacArthur discussed frequently and publicly his view of how 
the United States should conduct its foreign policy, in spite of the President’s order to the 
contrary.  President Truman accused him of insubordination and relieved him in the 
spring of 1951.  Consecutive covers of Time magazine on April 23, and April 30, 1951, 
commemorated the clash, first naming Truman, “The Little Man Who Dared.”  Truman 
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defended his policy, emphasizing his agreement with MacArthur that the primary 
enemies the UN forces faced in the Korean War were Soviet Communists.  He asked 
rhetorically, “What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military 
forces to be committed to a full-scale war in China?”3 
   On the following week, MacArthur’s resolute face appeared on the Time cover 
above his famous quote, “There is no substitute for victory.”  Having lost the political 
battle and his command, MacArthur returned to the States and began the public relations 
fight that sustained his popularity at the expense of the President.  In July 1951, in a 
speech to the Massachusetts General Court, MacArthur decried the concept that, “the 
members of the Armed Forces owe their primary allegiance and loyalty to those who 
temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of government, rather than to 
the country and its Constitution they are sworn to defend.”4  This message contradicted 
MacArthur’s assurances of total loyalty that he had given the President upon his 
assumption of command of UN forces in 1950 and the foundational principle that 
civilians and not generals control the military policy of the United States.   
      Truman’s charge of insubordination, in light of the general’s own words, 
appeared highly credible.  Truman’s decision to replace MacArthur with General 
Matthew Ridgway in 1951 settled demonstrably the questions of allegiance and authority 
that the General had posed.  If MacArthur had seemed invincible in the heady days of his 
early victories before Chinese intervention in Korea, his relief could serve as a warning to 
any military commander hoping to usurp the authority for deciding what goals the United 
States would pursue in the future events of the war.  The responsibilities for waging the 
                                                 
3 Time writers, “The Little Man Who Dared,” Time, 23 April 1951, 23-26. 
4 Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 233. 
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wars, negotiating the terms of peace and determining the ultimate objectives of military 
operations would rest thereafter unquestionably in the hands of the Commander in Chief, 
to whom the Constitution entrusted those duties.  To the military and civilian high 
command, the Korean War represented a test of authority whose verdict came swiftly, 
clearly and decisively.  No general since MacArthur has questioned in such open terms 
the nature of his responsibilities and the loyalty that he owes to the civilians who control 
the United States military.  General Ridgway, who replaced MacArthur, took care to 
execute military operations in close concert with the policies that President Truman 
prescribed. 
      Over the course of the Korean War, over 22,000 American military personnel 
died from various non-battle causes, including over 1,500 who died in aircraft crashes.  
Diseases claimed a considerable share of the lives from non-hostile causes, but the arrival 
of new vaccinations and medical procedures reduced the death toll from disease on the 
UN side to a fraction that of former wars.5  On a seasonal basis, diseases took a toll in 
spite of the best efforts of the medical personnel who established hospitals as near to the 
front lines as possible.  The National Archives Records Administration kept a reliable 
record of aircraft crash deaths, but most other non-hostile losses commanders relegated to 
a single designation, “non-battle deaths.”  Due to a lack of precise records, trends in 
vehicle accidents, weapons accidents, and most other non-hostile causes are difficult to 
identify.  In the area of friendly fire deaths, however, two trends prevailed on the 
battlefield.  The most costly cases of friendly fire involved close air support (CAS) 
missions and many friendly fire incidents occurred between units of different 
nationalities. 
                                                 
5 Paul M. Edwards, The A to Z of the Korean War (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005), 48. 
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   Although the Armed Forces kept almost no records of vehicle accident deaths, 
one incident took a conspicuous toll on the day that the U.S. Eighth Army lost its 
commander, General Walton Walker, in a jeep accident in December 1950.  General 
MacArthur summoned General Matthew Ridgway to command the Eighth Army on 
extremely short notice.  In addition to the non-battle casualties, the UN forces suffered a 
number of deaths in friendly fire incidents.  As would prove true in later wars as well, 
friendly fire often involved fighter and bomber pilots firing on friendly ground troops due 
to inadequate or defective methods of identification.  The well-known problems of the 
fog of war: disorientation, confusion, lack of information, and rash decision-making, 
often multiplied in the heat of battle when a pilot knew that friendly forces on the ground 
required his assistance.  Sadly, the pilots’ zeal at times resulted in fratricide. 
      For the ordinary American soldiers and airmen suddenly called into combat in 
1950, the battlefield presented a spectacle of utter chaos.  In the wake of the North 
Korean attack, South Korean civilians fled south, carrying their few worldly goods on 
their backs.  ROK soldiers differed little in conduct from their civilian counterparts in all 
but uniforms.  Although a few ROK units mounted brief defenses, their instances of 
bravery proved few and isolated.  The tide of North Koreans in Soviet-made T-34 tanks 
overwhelmed, engulfed, and annihilated the meager ROK defenses.  The first Americans 
to reach the scene flew in fixed-wing attack aircraft, equipped to render aid to the 
embattled ROK soldiers, but unable to communicate with them.  In the absence of 
forward air controllers, the pilots of the U.S. Air Force chose whether to watch the 
headlong retreat of the South Koreans or to launch close air support sorties blindly.   
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      Taking the initiative, these pilots dropped ordnance on ground targets that they 
had imperfectly identified from the air.  The pilots attempted to determine which masses 
of troops on the ground were friendly and which belonged to enemy North Korean forces.  
In some cases, their weapons landed harmlessly in rice paddies where no troops of either 
side had taken shelter, but in others, they fired accidentally on friendly ROK troops.6  
This mistaken bombing and strafing of friendly forces by American pilots represented the 
first case of non-hostile casualties on the UN side in the Korean War.  The swift and 
panicked retreat that characterized the early days of the war caused massive confusion on 
the South Korean side of the war and contributed integrally to these first casualties.   
      The problems with tracking statistics on Korean War non-hostile casualties 
involve the multiple intersecting ways that the various units recorded casualties.  Army 
units at the front recorded numbers of battle and non-battle casualties, but seldom did 
they elaborate on the precise types of non-battle incidents that led to casualties.  Their 
fratricide losses fell in the same category with their battle casualties, so the number of 
fratricide casualties remained hidden for most units and most events.  In a number of 
cases, units did not even record non-battle casualties, even though their records contained 
anecdotal stories of non-hostile deaths.7 
      The only non-hostile deaths that the National Archives Records Administration 
recorded during the Korean War came from aircraft crashes, which accounted for roughly 
1,500 of 22,617 non-battle deaths.  Episodic and anecdotal stories in the various accounts 
of the war record some sixteen separate incidents of fratricide, of which only seven gave 
estimates regarding the number of men killed, but at least 13 likely produced fatalities.  
                                                 
6 Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 72. 
7 William M. Donnelly, “Thunderbirds in Korea: the U.S. 45th Infantry Division 1950-52,” The Journal of 
Military History, 64 (October 2000): 1126, 1137. 
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The seven episodes that recorded specific death tolls account for 410 lives, but in a war 
that featured over 33,000 Americans killed in action and over 15,000 captured or missing, 
this number is quite low.  The specific numbers are difficult to calculate.  Sadly, records 
contain only the numbers of casualties that seemed significant at the time.  Instances of 
fratricide in Korea, a war following rapidly on the heels of the brutal Second World War, 
did not, for the most part merit recording in the estimation of the Armed Forces 
commanders at the time.  Instead, most commanders lumped together their fratricide 
casualties along with hostile losses under the heading of “battle losses.”8 
      The deaths by aircraft crashes followed a predictable pattern in keeping with the 
rise and fall of air traffic in and out of Korea.  Fewer than 10 American servicemen died 
in aircraft crashes in June 1950, but the death toll rose steadily to its peak at 42 deaths in 
November 1950 when the flow of American troops into Korea had recently peaked.  The 
many aircraft crash deaths during the first six months of the war reflected the operations 
to reinforce the Pusan Perimeter, to supply troops preparing for the Inchon landing, and 
to establish and solidify systems of supply for the Eighth Army after the Inchon landing.  
The logistical operations for the Inchon landing accounted for the considerable leap in 
losses from August to September 1950, but aircraft crash losses continued to mount after 
the largest troop concentrations had finished arriving in Korea.  Losses exceeded 20 
deaths and twice exceeded 30 deaths for the four months following the Inchon operation.  
This trend reflected the heightened tempo of logistical aircraft during that stage in the 
                                                 
8 Paul M. Edwards, The A to Z of the Korean War (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005), 48. 
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campaign.  High operations tempo under stressful circumstances can hinder the efforts of 
aircraft maintenance crews and decrease the safety of pilots and passengers.9 
      There is another possible explanation for the particularly large peaks in aircraft 
crash losses in November 1950 and April 1951.  As shown in Table 2.1, the death toll for 
these two months nearly doubled the losses of the previous month.  It is possible that a 
few large aircraft crashes could have affected the entire month’s losses 
disproportionately.  As later happened in Operation Iraqi Freedom, during which one 
Chinook helicopter crash multiplied the total non-hostile losses of the entire month, a few 
large crashes in Korea might have done the same.  This single catastrophic crash 
explanation might suffice for April 1951.  The losses of November 1950, coinciding with 
the advance of large numbers of Chinese troops, likely reflect the high mission demand 
of an Air Force flying extra combat missions in addition to supplying logistical support to 
UN forces that had nearly reached the Korean border to the north.  For the most part, 
aircraft crash death numbers mirrored the tempo of operations for the Eighth Army at 
large.10 
      The 11 losses of February 1951 represented a low number of casualties as the UN 
forces retreated south to escape the Chinese advance and winter weather likely permitted 
few flights.  At this time, UN supply lines were shortening, so it is reasonable to suppose 
                                                 
9 Having extended friendly battle lines deep into hostile territory at Inchon, the Eighth Army needed rapid 
and abundant supplies in order to set up bases from which to conduct major combat operations.  The 
available ground assets could not supply friendly forces as far forward as Inchon for a few months because 
remnants of the retreating North Korean forces lay between Pusan and Inchon.  Therefore, the Air Force 
carried out an unusually high operations tempo until ground supply centers resumed the primary supply 
mission. National Archives and Records Administration, “War/International Relations: The Korean War,” 
Access to Archival Databases, available from http://aad.archives.gov/aad/display-partial-
records.jsp?f=519&mtch=1524&q=aircraft&cat=WR27&dt=194&tf=F&bc=sl,sd; Internet, accessed 21 
August 2007. 
10 National Archives and Records Administration, “War/International Relations: The Korean War,” Access 
to Archival Databases, available from http://aad.archives.gov/aad/display-partial-
records.jsp?f=519&mtch=1524&q=aircraft&cat=WR27&dt=194&tf=F&bc=sl,sd; Internet, accessed 21 
August 2007. 
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that logistical concerns demanded fewer flights. Deaths increased considerably over the 
following several months, however, as General Ridgway directed the construction of 
defenses and prepared for his incremental offensive to drive the Chinese and North 
Koreans out of South Korea.  Aside from the large spike in losses in April, aircraft crash 
deaths followed a relatively stable pattern from March to July and increased steadily until 
October 1951, when they peaked and began to decline.  In that month, the UN forces 
achieved one of President Truman’s chief objectives: the Communists agreed to convene 
peace talks for a negotiated end of the war. 
      After October 1951, crash losses decreased gradually throughout 1952 and the 
first half of 1953.  The front was stable during these months, supply lines were not 
lengthening, and the operations tempo had grown predictable for the pilots and the 
maintenance crews charged with keeping aircraft in working order.  The decreasing 
losses of the period from November 1951 to June 1953 followed the exact trends that one 
would expect considering the UN tempo of operations.  Ridgway’s 1951 strategy of 
incremental advance had slowed to a tactical strategy of taking one hill or ridge at a time, 
which fostered a very predictable environment for aircraft operations.  True to form, 
aircraft crash losses again increased from six to 37 from June to July 1953, as the Air 
Force began returning soldiers to the States following the ceasefire agreement.  For the 
first time, in August 1953, the American Air Force lost no lives to aircraft crashes, but 
relatively low losses returned in September and October of that year and increased again 
in November. 
      The largest spike in aircraft crash deaths reporting came in December 1953, when 
the Armed Forces reported 254 fatalities from aircraft crashes.  This number neared the 
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combined total reported losses of the last eighteen months, and officials reported the vast 
majority of the December aircraft losses on December 31, 1953.  Presumably, this 
phenomenal death toll resulted from Armed Forces officials’ adhering to a deadline for 
reconciling their numbers of losses.  In a few hundred cases, the Air Force had listed 
pilots and air crewmen as missing pending further investigations.  December 31, 1953, 
seemed to be a logical date for terminating search and rescue operations or updating 
numbers of pilots and air crewmen whose deaths such missions had confirmed.  
Additional reports in January and February 1954 also reflected unusually high death 
numbers, each exceeding 100.  It makes sense that in December, officials extended some 
investigations of missing and presumed dead airmen for one or two months so that the 
high death reports for January and February represented additional reconciliations of 
these numbers.  In March, the 44 aircraft crash deaths nearly doubled the totals of each of 
the two succeeding months, so the death reports for March may well have included a few 
numbers reconciliation cases in addition to deaths from crashes that actually happened in 
March. 
      This phenomenon of the enormous spike in the casualty numbers from December 
1953 to February and possibly March 1954 reveals the limitation of the National 
Archives records.  By tracing aircraft losses by when Armed Forces officials reported the 
crews dead, rather than when the incidents occurred that caused their deaths, the database 
throws into doubt the numbers for the preceding months.  All things assumed to be equal, 
however, the difference between the reported numbers for each month and the true 
numbers made a negligible difference in reflecting the trends of aircraft death numbers.  
Although some deaths went unreported until the end of 1953, thereby artificially reducing 
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the death toll for some preceding months, it is safe to assume a relatively even 
distribution of these under-reported deaths.  Factoring in this trend of under-reporting, the 
numbers of aircraft crash deaths for each month should be larger, but the trends likely 
remain predictable.  Thus, as the trends in the available data show increased deaths as 
logistical operations increased and vice versa, the trends make sense even if the total 
number of monthly losses at times did not reflect the full number of deaths. 
      Equally difficult to determine are the numbers lost to disease.  The hospitals 
recorded what percentage of all of their patients - both battle and non-battle - survived 
treatment and in some cases documented how many of their patients suffered from 
disease rather than bullet wounds.  The 1st Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) 
reported treating 3,000 patients for all causes in May 1951.  Two-thirds of the patients 
had suffered combat-related wounds, but the MASH did not record the numbers of dead 
distinguishing between hostile and non-hostile causes.  The hospitals seldom specified 
how many of their patients they lost to illnesses.  During the winter of 1950-1951, the 
121st Evacuation Hospital reported a death rate of only 0.2 percent for all of its patients, 
including disease and combat-related injuries.11  The rates and numbers of losses to most 
diseases remained small and few hospitals recorded them precisely.  
      The Army Medical Corps improved its battlefield casualty treatment tactics by 
developing the MASH concept, improving casualty evacuation methods, employing 
modern drugs, and organizing preventive medicine campaigns.  During the Second World 
War, the best facilities for treatment seemed to congregate far behind the lines of battle at 
a time when the Army lacked rapid evacuation methods.  The MASH units provided the 
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soldiers a cohesive, coordinated, and swift system for casualty evacuation and treatment, 
employing helicopters in small numbers for the first time.  Most importantly, the MASH 
could follow advancing troops better than had any hospitals in past wars.  Not only did 
soldiers receive treatment promptly near the front, but their treatment included major 
surgeries that saved countless lives.  During the Second World War, 4.5% of all wounded 
men who reached medical installations died.  In Korea, the MASH units cut this figure to 
2.5% in 1951 and 1.8% in 1952. 
      The Army Medical Corps proved adept at preventive medicine, setting in place 
standard procedures that the Army would use in future wars as well.  In addition to 
vaccinating soldiers against smallpox and other contagious diseases, the Medical Corps 
sprayed DDT and thereby reduced the instances of malaria among the soldiers.  When the 
soldiers contracted the disease, the chloroquine tablets that medical personnel prescribed 
initially for malaria did not kill the malarial parasites.  Evacuated soldiers took malaria 
with them to Japan, where the rate of malaria increased as the rate in Korea declines.  In 
1953, new primaquine treatments managed to kill the malarial agents so that evacuated 
troops did not carry the disease abroad with them.  The primaquine doses cut the 
instances of malaria among American military personnel from 10,000 in 1952 to 878 in 
1953, so that malaria no longer took a toll on mission readiness.  The anti-malaria 
campaign represented one of the most significant medical victories of the war.12 
     Although typhus and typhoid ravaged the Chinese Communist Forces, (CCF) the 
Americans observed almost no cases of these among their troops.  The worst mass 
outbreak that the UN forces faced occurred in 1950 as the 24th Infantry Division defended 
the Pusan Perimeter.  Diseases related to defective water purification tablets at one time 
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incapacitated one fourth of the men in the 24th Infantry Division at a time when the few 
defenders needed every man as health as possible.  Medical personnel responded quickly 
and administered vaccines against encephalitis, among other ailments, and produced 
better water treatment methods.13  A few soldiers contracted smallpox, diphtheria, 
dengue, relapsing fever and meningitis, but all outbreaks remained at manageable levels 
and few resulted in deaths.  One American soldier died of polio and another from tetanus, 
but for the overwhelming majority of units and personnel, disease proved mostly a 
nuisance and not a serious threat to manpower.14  
        The early summer months of 1951 brought an unusual disease that frustrated 
the best efforts of the Army Medical Corps on a semi-annual basis for the duration of the 
Korean War.  Sudden outbreaks of epidemic hemorrhagic fever hospitalized nearly nine 
hundred soldiers and took over 300 lives during the year 1951.  Following its policy of 
specialization, the Medical Corps assigned the 8228th MASH to find the cause and cure 
of the disease, but the unit did not succeed in so doing.  Based on the rates of infection 
and death that the 8228th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) recorded, epidemic 
hemorrhagic fever claimed 327 lives in 1951 and 46 lives in 1952.  Although the doctors 
never found the vector or a cure for this deadly seasonal disease, the nurses succeeded in 
developing standard operating procedures for treatment that cut the death rate 
enormously between 1951 and 1952.15  By monitoring and treating the patients’ 
symptoms attentively, the nurses managed to increase the recovery rate enormously and 
reduce the impact of epidemic hemorrhagic fever.  For the following two years, soldiers 
came down with the disease during every spring and autumn season, but the Medical 
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Corps managed to cut the mortality rate to 7% from its initial 20% through attentive 
nursing and close monitoring of the patients’ symptoms.16   
During the Second World War, American physicians experienced a mortality rate 
of 11-15% during neuro-surgical operations.  The 121st Evacuation Hospital, which 
specialized in neuro-surgical operations, managed a mortality rate of 8.5%.  Another 
particularly impressive innovation was the deployment for the first time of an artificial 
kidney machine to a forward area.  Employing this device, the 11th Evacuation Hospital 
in Wonjin, Korea cut the Second World War death rate of 90% for kidney patients to 
66%.17  While still a majority, this casualty rate nevertheless represented a significant 
improvement over previous wars. 
Another medical improvement from the Second World War concerned the 
treatment of venereal disease (VD), with the new “miracle” drug penicillin.  After the 
adverse experiences with VD during the Second World War, medical personnel ensured 
that they maintained ready access to the drug.  Conveniently, the rate of VD always 
reflected inversely the combat activity of any given military unit.  In other words, very 
few soldiers contracted VD while actively engaged in combat operations.  When soldiers 
had more free time away from combat, they tended to contract venereal diseases in larger 
numbers.  Even during the calmest periods of the war in terms of combat activity, the rate 
of hospitalization due to VD never surpassed 5% however, so venereal disease exerted a 
relatively minimal influence on the UN war effort.18    
  As a result of the Medical Corps’ efforts, the UN forces never suffered truly 
devastating epidemics throughout the war.  These trends affected peace negotiations, as 
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the Chinese repeatedly demanded that the Americans admit to committing acts of germ 
warfare.  The Chinese justified the charge by pointing out that epidemics had devastated 
the Chinese and had not done the same to UN forces.19  The MASH concept emphasized 
specialization in every area of treatment.  In particularly difficult cases, an entire rear-
echelon medical installation studied only one disease or other ailment and sought to solve 
problems that plagued the entire Army.  Through the MASH concept and air evacuation, 
the Army corrected some of the troubles of the previous war, employed new technology, 
and set the stage for the innovations of the next war.  
      As has been the case with other wars as well, fratricide statistics for the Korean 
War can prove difficult to substantiate because they fall by classification in neither the 
hostile nor the non-battle realms.  Generally, units included their fratricide losses with 
hostile deaths under the classification “battle casualties.”  The instances in which allies 
from different nations fired on one another could also create difficult diplomatic and 
political international situations.  As is usually the case, the fog of war that naturally 
accompanies rapidly moving military formations fostered fratricide by UN troops of 
different nationalities in adjacent units. 
      The first year of the Korean War involved enormous displacements of troops of 
both sides, as the ROK troops retreated south to the Pusan Perimeter, turned the flank of 
the North Korean Peoples’ Army (NKPA) at Inchon, and drove into North Korea.  The 
front lines changed their locations repeatedly and rapidly, so that aircraft pilots 
attempting to furnish close air support sometimes could not distinguish between friendly 
and enemy troop formations.  The multi-national composition of the UN forces further 
complicated the target identification process.  After the Chinese entry into the war and 
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the retreat from North Korea south to the vicinity of the 38th Parallel in 1951, the front 
stabilized tangibly.  General Ridgway’s strategy for his offensive in 1951 called for 
incremental advances to take well-defined and limited ground objectives during the final 
two years of the war.  Consequently, the rates of fratricide incidents declined 
considerably in this final phase of the war.20  
      The ROK and American retreat in the summer of 1950 created a great deal of 
confusion that led to multiple instances of fratricide.  The first instance happened largely 
because the aircraft had no forward air controllers (FACs) to direct them to ground 
targets.  Knowing the severity of the situation, however, the pilots assumed a high level 
of risk by deploying their ordnance on unidentified troop formations.  This first case of 
air-to-ground fratricide on June 29, 1950, involved Republic of Korea (ROK) troops and 
American airplanes as the ROKs crossed the Han River near Seoul.  The bombs, napalm 
and bullets cost the South Koreans a number of lives, but the air strikes also signaled that 
the Americans had committed to fight for the security of South Korea.21  A few days 
later, aircraft again fired on ROK forces in multiple episodes, killing an estimated two 
hundred soldiers and destroying thirty ammunition trucks on the July 3.  A few days la
the American Far East Air Force (FEAF) fired on American troops of the 21st Infant
Regiment as they retreated from the positions they had occupied in Taejon on the Kum 
River Line of defense.  In the latter instance, the 11th Field Artillery also fired on the 
friendly formations.  The lack of FACs for the aircraft and forward observers (FOs) for 
ter, 
ry 
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the artillery did not pose a problem this time.  Rather, the FOs and FACs had both 
identified a friendly element as a hostile target and directed fire onto it.22  
      Panic contributed materially to friendly fire episodes, particularly in a case on 
July 7, 1950, as the 3rd Battalion 34th Infantry Regiment attempted to fight a delaying 
action against the oncoming North Koreans.  The Regimental Operations Officer, Major 
Dunn, moved forward of 3rd Battalion’s defensive position with one rifle company and 
the battalion’s scout platoon to gather intelligence about the enemy dispositions.  
Suddenly, as he returned from the reconnaissance, his own mortar operators began firing 
on his small band.  Upon arrival in the battalion command post, Major Dunn found the 
entire battalion in retreat and could not find the commander or executive officer.  He took 
charge of marching the battalion back to its defensive position, but he and part of his 
battalion suffered capture in the ensuing battle.  Upon investigation, it appeared that the 
battalion mortar operators had decided to fire upon any troops in front of them, and the 
battalion commander and his staff had chosen to retreat personally even before a general 
engagement had begun.23 
      After the UN forces had consolidated their defenses around the Pusan Perimeter 
in 1950, two American units suffered from friendly fire due to misidentification of the 
front lines by air and ground forces.  The 19th Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion 29th 
Infantry Regiment endured salvos from both the air and the ground as they attempted to 
hold their positions on the Pusan Perimeter and called for supporting fires from artillery 
and air assets against the attacking NKPA units.  In each case, the fires from friendly 
units failed to hit the enemy units exclusively.  The 1st Marine Brigade arrived from 
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Japan in August 1950 to help consolidate the American and Republic of Korea positions 
around Pusan.  The Marines served as a mobile reserve, termed the Fire Brigade, but in 
some cases also carried out missions to seize key terrain features then held by the NKPA.  
  In one such instance, one of their commanders forbade the use of close air support 
because of previous friendly fire episodes.  Captain John Stevens, commander of A 
Company 1st Battalion 5th Marine Regiment, argued successfully that he would lose more 
men from enemy fire without an air strike than he might lose from friendly fire if the air 
strike proceeded.  The Marine Corsair pilots performed a careful bombing raid, sending 
pilots on dry runs over the target area before making their bombing runs.  Even so, they 
killed one of their own men by dropping a bomb too near the Marine positions.24  As the 
front along Pusan stabilized, the friendly fire episodes dwindled, and the Americans 
prepared for the next stage of the war. 
   General MacArthur designed a bold flank attack that could cut off the North 
Korean supply lines, seize a key piece of terrain, and turn the tide of the war strategically.  
The port city of Inchon satisfied all of these goals because of its location near the capital 
city of Seoul, behind enemy lines and near enemy supply routes.  The Inchon landing 
remains one of the best-executed amphibious operations in the history of the United 
States Armed Forces.  The terrain dictated that the invading forces land in two phases to 
be executed several hours apart in order to coincide each phase with a period of high tide.  
In the first phase, Marines would take the major external terrain feature of the port, 
Wolmi-do Island, so that the second phase could supply additional ground troops for the 
invasion of the mainland portion of Inchon.  The Marines tasked with taking and holding 
Wolmi-do Island expected strong resistance and planned and rehearsed accordingly.  The 
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naval gunners on the landing craft, likewise, expected to engage a number of North 
Korean defenders on the island as the Marines fought for control of the critical feature of 
the port.  However, the North Koreans had not assigned a large force to defend Inchon, so 
the Marines took the island quickly with little resistance.  Sadly for the Marines, a 
number of gunners on naval vessels showed excessive zeal for their support-by-fire 
mission and fired into their own men as the Marines consolidated control of the island.  
The 20 Marines killed by friendly fire outnumbered the few men that the North Koreans 
killed during that battle.25  
      The relatively easy seizure of Inchon gave the UN forces the initiative in the 
Korean War as they drove the NKPA forces north of the 38th Parallel and deep into their 
own territory.  Victory over North Korea appeared imminent as lead elements of the 
American and ROK units reached the Yalu River, which formed part of the border 
between China and North Korea.  Chinese entry into the war in overwhelming numbers 
in the late months of 1950, however, forced the UN troops to retreat south.  In some 
units, a spirit of panic reminiscent of the summer retreat of 1950 contributed to additional 
friendly fire episodes.  The ROK troops repeatedly failed to defend their positions, 
fleeing in complete disorder before the attacks by superior numbers of Chinese troops.   
On November 26, 1950, the II Corps of the ROK Army fled so rapidly that the 
Turkish Brigade assigned to defend a portion of the UN front lines mistook them for 
attacking Chinese Communist troops.  As the Turks fired into the ROKs, adjacent UN 
commanders heard jubilant reports on the radio that the Turks were defeating and 
destroying their “attackers” with heavy losses.  Before the ROKs had convinced the 
Turks of their fratricidal error, the pursuing Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) arrived in 
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overwhelming numbers and began over-running the Turkish positions.  The numbers of 
UN troops killed by hostile fire versus fratricide are impossible to calculate because the 
ROK II Corps and the Turkish Brigade ceased to exist as effective units in the onslaught 
of the CCF.  Nearly all of the UN soldiers present in that engagement suffered death or 
capture.26  
      Over the following several months, the UN forces retreated to defensive positions 
south of the 38th Parallel, preparing to relinquish Seoul to Communist control again.  As 
the American 2nd Infantry Division and a large force of ROK infantry advanced south on 
the road between Sunch’on and Kunu-ri, CCF troops attempted to cut off and surround 
the units.  The Chinese had established a road block at the south end of a mountain pass 
four hundred meters long.  Fifty-foot cliffs lined both sides of the pass, termed the 
“gauntlet,” and its seizure appeared essential to the survival of the UN forces in retreat.  
An ROK infantry unit assaulted the cliffs, but suffered a setback when American tanks in 
support fired on them.  Subsequent attacks cleared a path out of the gauntlet, but 
American aircraft fired on friendly forces twice more as the battle for the high ground 
intensified.  American troops chose in a number of cases to abandon their equipment and 
save their own lives. 
      The Air Force established the policy of never allowing abandoned equipment to 
fall intact into enemy hands.  Instead, the aircraft would destroy the abandoned 
equipment to prevent the Chinese from using it and obstructing the progress of the 
Chinese pursuers.  In the most tragic such case, medics of the 2nd Medical Battalion, 2nd 
Infantry Division came under fire in the gauntlet and leaped from their vehicles to return 
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fire against the CCF on both sides of the road.  They had left 180 wounded men in their 
trucks, whom they had been evacuating south.  After a period of inaction on the part of 
the trucks, the American pilots overhead decided to destroy the apparently abandoned 
vehicles.  The largest single case of friendly fire in the Korean War resulted, as the pilots 
dropped napalm and killed all 180 wounded men on the trucks.   
      As the 2nd Infantry Division fought for the gauntlet, the invading Chinese troops 
had simultaneously attacked the American 1st Marine Division in the Chosin Reservoir 
and surrounded Marine units in three separate locations.  The besieged Devil Dogs fought 
a desperate battle and called frequently for close air support (CAS), including napalm 
strikes on Chinese formations.  Most of the CAS missions succeeded in targeting only 
enemy units, but one napalm canister killed two Marines.  Friendly fire from the air also 
took the life of a medic one month later after the Red Cross emblems fell off of the roof 
of his ambulance.  As he moved to re-fasten the panels, a pilot fired on him.  The ground 
commanders did not complain about these mistakes through official channels, for like the 
earlier Pusan Perimeter incident, the air strikes definitely saved more lives than they 
took.27   
      By the beginning of the year 1951, the infantry units in the UN forces had 
identified the dangers of CAS and had begun attempting preventive measures.  As UN 
forces retreated in early 1951, the British Brigade held a salient in the UN lines as the 
ROK troops retreated on their flanks.  The British called on the radio for CAS missions 
that could prolong their stand by destroying Chinese ground units.  While the pilots 
sought visual confirmation of their targets, the British troops threw smoke grenades to 
                                                 
27 Albert E. Cowdrey,  The Medics’ War: United States Army in the Korean War, Volume 4, (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 121, 161. 
 34
mark targets for the aircraft.  In subsequent wars, ground troops adopted the technique as 
a standard operating procedure for marking both friendly and enemy positions in the 
course of CAS missions.  The technique to prevent fratricide succeeded, but tragedy 
waited later in the day as the British troops tried to reach friendly lines.  When they 
approached the new front line, American tanks fired into them, killing at least 6, and 
wounding several others.28  This episode in April 1951 was the last recorded fratricide 
incident, as the UN forces consolidated their defensive positions south of the 38th 
Parallel.  In the following months, General Ridgway planned attacks with limited goals 
and maintained tight control on his units.  This technique sometimes caused commanders 
to make piecemeal attacks, but it minimized the instances of units mistaking friendly 
elements for the enemy.   
Unlike the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the Armed Forces did not 
conduct formal investigations of friendly fire episodes in the Korean War and generally 
reported the victims of friendly fire along with other battle casualties.  Commanders 
expected and tolerated a certain amount of friendly fire as long as it did not appear 
intentional or due to negligence.  The United States government did, however, issue an 
official apology to the Turkish government for the destruction of the Turkish Brigade by 
the North Koreans.  Reportedly, the Turks did not understand the apology because they 
expected to take casualties in war – even the near annihilation that their men suffered in 
November, 1950.29 
      Aside from fratricide, the only other non-hostile casualties that happen on the 
battlefield involve accidents with ordnance, which the soldiers of the Korean War 
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experienced in small numbers.  Very few units recorded specific cases, but the fatal 
episodes involved failure to adhere to basic safety regulations.  The Army mandates 
specific methods for the safe disposal of unexploded ordnance and the deployment of live 
ordnance, but two cases of carelessness cost the concerned units in lives.  The 45th 
Infantry took over control of one portion of the UN lines in December, 1951, relieving 
the 1st Cavalry Division.  Although they manned a line facing hundreds of thousands of 
enemy combatants, the first casualties of the 45th Infantry occurred because of unmarked 
friendly minefields.  The 1st Cavalry units had simply not identified the minefields that 
they had set up to their relieving units.30  In another series of incidents, in October and 
November of 1950, fires where the soldiers burned trash cooked off unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) munitions.  The simple negligence of soldiers placing garbage in disposal places 
with UXOs endangered several lives and cost a few.31 
          While the soldiers in Korea fought against the Chinese troops, diseases, and the 
cold weather, the Generals and politicians charged with prosecuting the Korean War 
debated the nature, goals and significance of the war.  What General MacArthur saw as 
an epic battle against all of the Communist governments in Asia, President Truman 
viewed in much more limited terms.  At the outset of war, MacArthur’s military 
calculations concerning the significance of Korea in light of Japan’s security mirrored the 
political and diplomatic thoughts of President Truman and his cabinet.  In 1950, both the 
President and the General agreed that the American forces in Japan should drive the 
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North Koreans out of South Korea, but the final goal of an invasion of North Korea was a 
point of contention.   
      The first major decision would set a tone that made future negotiations between 
the two more difficult.  MacArthur’s famous charisma and contagious confidence that 
had persuaded President Roosevelt to invade the Philippines instead of Formosa during 
the Second World War again served him well as he persuaded President Truman to 
authorize a very risky amphibious landing.  Inchon, a port city whose proximity to Seoul 
gave it strategic and political significance, was militarily the most difficult location for an 
amphibious operation that any American commander had ever chosen.  The extreme tides 
rendered a beachhead inaccessible for several hours during low tide every day, but, 
MacArthur argued, the very difficulty of the operation would preserve the element of 
surprise for the UN invaders.  Inchon, located far behind enemy lines, possessed 
enormous logistical significance to the UN troops as they could use a landing there to cut 
the North Korean soldiers off from their supply lines in the north and pursue them across 
the 38th Parallel.  According to General Ridgway’s memoir of the war, MacArthur argued 
during his August 6-8 meeting with Truman that the severe Korean weather would claim 
a number of lives if the war were allowed to last through the winter.  His Inchon landing, 
then, would prevent non-hostile losses due to cold weather by ending the war before 
winter began.  Thus, the possible toll of non-hostile casualties first played a part in the 
arguments and decisions of the American Armed Forces high command.32 
      The American Armed Forces executed the Inchon amphibious operation with 
such unqualified success that MacArthur began to appear invincible both on the field of 
battle and in conferences on strategy.  A headline in the New York Times on October 30, 
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1950, took ultimate victory for granted and rendered the credit to MacArthur.  Hanson 
Baldwin’s story “MacArthur’s Success in Korea Analyzed,” credited MacArthur’s 
brilliant Inchon operation with winning the war, prematurely as the Chinese proved.33  
General MacArthur’s clash with President Truman partly resulted from MacArthur’s 
attitude of superiority and partly from disagreements over strategy.  President Truman 
had determined that the UN forces would pursue no objective beyond the protection of 
South Korea and would not enforce a blockade on China or support Chiang Kai Shek in 
an invasion there, as MacArthur had advocated.  Upon assuming command of the UN 
Forces in place of MacArthur, General Ridgway proved more willing to execute the 
wishes of his superior regardless of his personal opinion about policies.  For diplomatic 
and political reasons, Ridgway waged a cautious campaign calculated to minimize United 
Nations casualties and assist the negotiations of the representatives of the United States 
and South Korea at the peace talks.   
      The expansion of the Korean War brought demands for additional manpower in 
all military specialties, combat and support.  The military draft targeted not only young 
men of military age but also physicians for service in the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
Medical Corps.  When recruiting doctors and nurses for the war, the Medical Corps 
sought personnel skilled in treatment regardless of their military backgrounds.  Hoping 
above all to attract the best possible doctors, the Medical Corps emphasized the medical 
experience that doctors would gain through service and targeted certain specialties.  
Army recruiting campaigns portrayed Army doctors as simply doctors who put on green 
uniforms when they had left surgery.  Medical Corps recruiting efforts minimized the 
dangers and deprivations of Army life, and, unfortunately, the training program for 
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medical personnel reflected the same attitude.  As a result, a number of medical personnel 
arrived in highly dangerous forward areas without more than a casual knowledge of field 
living conditions, treatment of wounds peculiar to battle, and weapons employment in 
case of an emergency.34  The new draftees learned the harsh realities of war first hand the 
hard way. 
      When a number of hospitals came under fire from the Chinese forces and 
American medical personnel manned the perimeter of their bases to return fire, the 
Chinese soldiers killed a number of them who had completed only minimal training on 
the proper use of weapons.  Major General Harry Armstrong, the Surgeon General of the 
Army, reacted to this problem of minimal field training after Chinese troops killed his 
son-in-law in exactly these conditions.  Commanders of medical units thereafter adopted 
programs of field training lasting between three and eight weeks to teach field craft and 
medicine in forward area conditions to draftees and doctors newly initiated into military 
life.  The Korean War re-taught the age-old lesson that every soldier in uniform might 
come under fire and need to be able to defend himself. 
      According to a number of reports, often the Chinese and North Koreans appeared 
to target intentionally medical personnel and evacuation vehicles with Red Cross 
emblems painted on them.  In a number of cases, medics covered the Red Cross emblems 
on their ambulances so as to prevent the Chinese from concentrating fire on them.  The 
Western tradition, enumerated in the Geneva Conventions, that combatants regard 
medical personnel as neutral entities, had no place in the war that the Chinese and North 
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Koreans fought.35  Whether or not the Chinese had developed specific procedures for 
targeting medical vehicles is difficult to ascertain, but they did not withhold their fire.  
The red and white panels on the sides of ambulances made them easy targets.  The 
medics chose to cover the panels because the enemy troops had obviously decided on a 
routine basis not to respect the conventions of civilized warfare.  In the next war, the 
North Vietnamese likewise fired on medical evacuation helicopters so frequently that 
some commanders refused on multiple occasions to send their Red Cross-marked Huey 
helicopters into hot landing zones.36 
      The Army attempted to prepare its soldiers for facing the weather conditions in 
Korea, but faced similar problems to those of the Medical Corps as it tried to prepare its 
own personnel.  Anticipating the severe temperatures typical of Korea before the winter 
of 1950-51, the Far East Command distributed to the troops a pamphlet titled, “Cold 
Facts for Keeping Warm.”  Accounts from the Marines’ operations in the Chosin 
Reservoir reported that the cold caused as many casualties as did the enemy.  The winter 
foot gear, items called “shoe packs” contributed to the many cases of frostbite that cost 
toes and lives.  After the Marines had made the trek out of the Chosin, 200 suffered 
severe enough conditions to merit hospitalization, but the Armed Forces did not record 
the precise numbers of deaths caused exclusively by the cold.37  One estimate places the 
total number of cold weather injuries at 7,285 for the entire war, with white Southerners 
and African-American soldiers more susceptible to injury than their Northern 
counterparts.  By the third winter of the war, the Army had developed better winter shoes 
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and improved warming facilities for the soldiers.  The lessons of 1950-51 proved costly, 
but the Armed Forces did learn from them. 38  
      The most alarming case in which the threat of disease affected the policy of the 
UN forces began in February 1951, when an agent reported that some Chinese soldiers in 
North Korea had contracted and were dying from the Bubonic Plague.  American doctors 
feared this news for its deadly implications and the plausibility of the report.  Rumors 
held that rats in Manchuria carried the Black Death and that the Chinese soldiers might 
have brought it with them as they marched through Manchuria to North Korea.  The 
Army Medical Corps had very few vaccine doses for the disease on hand and even the 
best vaccine lasted at most four months.  The Black Death can spread easily, and the 
mortality rate among those infected approaches 100%. 
      General Crawford Sams, the 8th Army public health and welfare chief, embarked 
on a secret mission by sea to investigate the accounts of Black Death, arriving outside the 
blockaded port of Wonsan, North Korea, on March 9, 1951.  In the following days, Sams 
slipped ashore and managed to question the agents who had initially reported the disease 
in which bodies turned black in death.  The agent, an educated chemist, gave very precise 
symptoms reports that convinced Sams that the Chinese had not contracted the Black 
Death.  General Sams concluded that the agents for South Korea had observed soldiers 
experiencing the final stages of smallpox; subcutaneous bleeding gave the victims their 
black skin coloring.39   
      This false alarm, which discovered pervasive epidemics on the Communist side of 
the battle lines, foreshadowed a particularly unpleasant period during the negotiations at 
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the peace table.  After the front had stabilized and the two sides had agreed to peace talks 
in 1951, the Chinese representatives made repeated demands that the Americans admit to 
engaging in germ warfare.  Citing the epidemics of smallpox, malaria, and typhus that 
ravaged their soldiers but not those of the UN forces, the Chinese alleged that the Far 
East Air Force was dropping bombs that contained germ agents.  In the daily propaganda 
lectures that the Chinese delivered in POW camps, they announced that air raids had 
brought the current typhus outbreak and exacted some penalties on American POWs who 
had served in air crews.40  The reasons for the shift in Chinese policy from mass ground 
attacks to propaganda campaigns came to light in time. 
      The Chinese leaders had developed an accurate perspective on the Americans’ 
situation in relation to casualties, which they attempted to exploit.  A dictator who did not 
face voters for approval at the ballot box, Mao Zedong could wage the war in Korea for 
as long as he desired, using conscript troops drafted from his enormous population and 
equipped, at least in part, with arms from Soviet Russia.  President Truman, by contrast, 
faced a skeptical public that grew weary of the war with the passage of time and the 
increase in casualties.  Whether caused by hostile or non-hostile means, casualties in 
Korea hurt the Truman administration’s agenda for the prosecution of the Cold War.  
After the Chinese entered the war, Truman realized that the complete reunification of 
Korea under Syngman Rhee would prove excessively costly in casualties.  Therefore, 
Truman sought an opportunity to negotiate a conclusion to the conflict as soon as 
possible. 
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      In 1951, General Ridgway, who assumed overall command from the relieved 
MacArthur, understood his two missions: to gain ground at low cost in casualties and to 
inflict as many casualties on the enemy as possible.  By minimizing American casualties 
in his operations, Ridgway would buy time for negotiations to proceed.  By gaining 
ground and maximizing enemy losses, Ridgway’s army hoped to force the Chinese to 
agree to a settlement of hostilities favorable to the Americans.  Victories on the field of 
battle would give ammunition to the negotiations efforts.  Gains in ground would also 
demonstrate tangible progress in the war effort to maintain the morale of the American 
public.41 
      The Chinese agreed to peace talks after their decisive failure to capture territory in 
their offensive in May 1951.  The great advantage that the Chinese had always enjoyed 
was the unreliability of the ROK troops, who often fled at the outset of hostilities, leaving 
weapons and equipment behind.  Throughout the war, the Communists focused every 
major offensive on the ROK units, planning to break through the UN lines and wreak 
havoc with their hordes of infantry.  In 1951, however, the strongly interlocked UN 
defenses employed very effective artillery and air attacks that halted, decimated, and 
repulsed the Chinese attackers after they had initially broken through the ROK 6th 
Division.  The offensive in May 1951 gained no ground and cost Chinese forces dearly in 
manpower.42  Thus, a successful battlefield strategy by the UN forces compelled Mao to 
recognize limits in the amount of land he could seize and the number of casualties he 
would allow in a war that he might not be able to win.  The loss of a total of 345 Soviet 
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MIG fighter aircraft, in addition to 224 Chinese MIGs reminded Mao that he also faced 
limits on the material resources that the Soviet Union provided.43  
      The peace talks consumed nearly two years’ time in part because, at that stage of 
the war, both sides had lost more men than those for which their plans had originally 
allowed.  The Chinese Commander, who insisted on the title, “Commander of the 
Chinese Volunteers,” adopted a defensive strategy for the ground war following the 
failed offensive in 1951 in the hopes that the Americans would lose the stomach for war 
and withdraw from the Korean peninsula.  Mao Zedong had calculated a significant role 
for casualties to play in the war from the beginning.  He estimated that 50,000 casualties 
would drive the Americans from Korea.  Later, he revised that estimate to 100,000, but 
his armed forces had lost exorbitant numbers of men in early 1951 to epidemics and the 
unsuccessful Chinese offensive that the Americans termed the May Massacre of 1951.44 
      As matters stood in the summer of 1951, an estimated 700,000 Chinese and North 
Korean troops faced a combined UN force of 500,000, but the effective American 
artillery and air power more than evened the odds.  The Communist leaders realized that 
they could not conquer the entire Korean peninsula by force of arms.  Therefore, the 
Chinese representatives at the peace talks attempted to score propaganda points by 
accusing the UN of violating the laws of war.  Time at first appeared to favor the 
Communists, who walked out of the peace talks for dramatic propagandistic effect in 
October 1951, but a series of successful UN operations drove them back to the table a 
few months later.  For the final year of negotiations, the Chinese sought principally to 
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save face.45  The death of Stalin and a decline in the Chinese economy – non-hostile 
factors of a different sort than usually considered – contributed materially to the Chinese 
decision to end their stalling tactics and come to terms in 1953.  The threat of the new 
American 280mm nuclear cannon might have persuaded them as well.46 
     On the American side, Ridgway’s strategy of minimizing casualties bore fruit.  
American losses in the first year of the war, June 1950-June 1951, exceeded the 
combined losses of the final two years of the war, July 1951-July 1953.47  Desiring 
minimal casualties, General Ridgway rejected a series of plans by the 8th Army 
Commander, General James Van Fleet, calling for bold offensives.  Instead, the UN 
forces gradually took small parcels of ground and held them while peace negotiations 
proceeded.  Simultaneously, Ridgway allowed a more aggressive air campaign on North 
Korea directed at their civilian infrastructure in addition to military targets.  In a scene 
foreshadowing the military politics of the Vietnam War, political considerations --- 
namely the fear of direct Soviet involvement --- caused President Truman to place the 
airfields and bases of supply in Manchuria off limits for bombing.48  Once the high 
command had furnished the best battlefield strategy they could manage under the 
direction of President Truman, the President depended on the degree of indulgence the 
public would show for a long war.  Truman found that the public lacked the tolerance for 
a long war and his political opponents exploited his weakness.  Former General 
Eisenhower campaigned successfully in 1952 with promises to end the Korean War. 
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      Public support for the Korean War experienced a number of specific fluctuations 
based on the events happening overseas.  The zeal that prompted swift action from the 
UN after the North Koreans invaded across the 38th Parallel likewise motivated the 
American public.  On June 27, 1950, the New York Times printed an Associated Press 
(AP) compilation of editorials from newspapers throughout the United States.  Of 17 
editorials printed, 14 blamed Soviet influences for the Korean War and only one called 
the conflict a “civil war” between the Korean people.  The Honolulu Star-Bulletin 
recommended the use of nuclear weapons against the North Koreans and two major 
newspapers compared Stalin’s Communism to Hitler’s Nazism.  The Portland Oregonian 
invoked a hypothesis akin to the “domino theory” of the Vietnam era and the Milwaukee 
Journal mentioned the appeasement of Munich by name.49  Judging from the presses of 
the United States, the editors and publishers at least did not lack determination for victory 
at the outset of the Korean War. 
   Two days before the invasion, the New York Times had published a story on the 
front page, “Soviet Uses ‘Liberation’ Bait in Americas to win Foothold,” warning of 
attempts by the Soviets to exert influence in South America.50  The warnings about the 
threat that Communism posed to the free world seemed to come to life as the public saw 
pictures and heard stories of the North Koreans’ invasion.  In the early stages of the war, 
which President Truman termed a “police action,” the American public accepted the idea 
of American troops protecting the borders of the free world, which the United Nations 
had guaranteed.  Both the need to make good the reputation of the United States and a 
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desire to protect the freedom of the people of South Korea motivated overwhelming 
support for the war in its early stages.  The American news media assisted in the war 
effort in part by failing to report the aggressive steps Syngman Rhee had taken to remain 
in power.  The South Korean leader essentially ruled as a dictator and repressed his 
political opponents.  Public ignorance of his machinations aided the Truman 
administration’s efforts to maintain public support for the war effort.51 
      All of the conditions of the war changed abruptly, however, when Chinese troops 
swarmed across the Yalu River to attack the Americans in late 1950.  It became clear at 
that moment that the war would prove neither militarily easy nor short in duration nor 
inexpensive in casualties.  As the American public began counting the costs in men, the 
growing time the Korea War consumed, and the lack of major strategic achievements of 
the operation; support for the effort declined.  Early in October 1950, reporters wrote 
enthusiastic stories of MacArthur’s brilliant victory in Korea and exulted in his call on 
the North Korean People Army to surrender.  The entire free world had won a victory 
against Communism, the print media proclaimed.52  China’s entrance caused a significant 
decrease in the popularity of the Korean War, as Americans faced the prospect of a global 
war against Communism, for which they had not prepared.  Given the heightened stakes, 
an increasing number of people considered the cause of self-determination for South 
Korea one not worth the risk of a large-scale war with China or the Soviet Union.  As the 
people of America confronted the situation, most important was the fact that the Second 
World War had ended less than a decade earlier.  The public desired a return to normalcy 
and a time of rest from the emotional and financial hardships of war.   
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      A series of newspaper surveys measured the public support for the Korean War 
over time.  As is always the case with opinion polls, the wording of the questions affected 
the attitudes of the responders.  When the questions cited casualties, approval numbers 
declined, especially as the numbers mounted.  Survey questions that mentioned halting 
aggression by Communists, garnered higher support for the war effort.  In a pattern that 
would foreshadow the Vietnam situation, however, the public did not react either way to 
the suffering of the Koreans.  Saving South Koreans from their suffering condition at the 
hands of North Koreans did not influence the public to support the Korean War in greater 
numbers. 
      The trends in public support followed an event-based pattern with baseline 
numbers on both sides.  All other things being equal, a certain percentage of the public 
will oppose any war and a certain percentage will support any war, providing a baseline 
of roughly 20% at each end.53  Rather than a gradual decline as time and casualty 
numbers increased, support for the war suffered a drastic blow when the Chinese entered 
the fray, but stabilized later.  Support for the Vietnam War followed a similar pattern 
years later.  The Korean War ended in a stalemate with very few territorial gains to speak 
of and a total of 157,000 casualties, including wounded, on the American side.  The 
estimated two million casualties on the Communist side did not make a difference in the 
perceptions of the public.  The lack of decisive victory and the extremely tedious 
deliberations at the peace table hurt President Truman’s popularity, persuaded him not to 
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seek a second full term, and provided fodder for criticism by Presidential campaigns by 
candidates from both parties in 1952.54   
 The publishers who had celebrated President Truman as “The Little Man who 
Dared,” in April 1951, turned against the war within less than one year.  Time magazine 
expressed the desire for fewer casualties and troop level reductions in January 1952.  An 
article explained that the most sensible course of action would be for the Truman 
administration to withdraw the majority of American troops and to threaten a retaliatory 
attack against China.  Plainly, the Time staff saw no good reason for American soldiers to 
continue dying on the ground in Korea.  Two months later, Time introduced Truman’s 
primary challenger, pro-peace Democrat Estes Kefauver, proclaiming, “The Rise of 
Senator Legend.”55  On the Republican side, Senator Robert Taft attacked the Truman 
administration for waging an endless war in Korea and promised, “Liberty, Peace, 
Solvency.”  The editors agreed with Taft.  Where the publishers had seen victory one 
year and a half earlier, Time saw only disaster in June 1952, declaring, “a more enduring 
fact: the Korean War, long in a mess, is falling into a worse mess day by day.”56  Truman 
decided not to seek reelection and General Dwight Eisenhower exploited the weakness of 
the Democrat Party to regain the White House for the Republican Party for the first time 
in 20 years.57 
      The final year of the Korean War brought one specific inconvenience from which 
the public desired relief.  Civilian medical spokesmen complained that the draft of 
doctors was taking a toll on civilian hospitals and facilities, prompting a strong 
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movement in Congress to return doctors home early.  As Dean Acheson documented, 
casualties of the first year exceeded the combined casualties of the two final years.  
Presumably, doctors should have become available as hostilities continued at a reduced 
operations tempo.  News reports in the spring months of 1953 celebrated advances in the 
negotiations at the peace table that would culminate a few months later with the cease 
fire.  Upon receipt of the first encouraging reports, civilian medical personnel began 
petitioning Congress for early return dates for doctors and, if possible, an end to the 
doctors’ draft.  Congress exerted pressure on the Armed Forces to bring doctors home 
early, and the Secretary of Defense responded with a change in policy in May, 1953.  The 
Armed Forces would thenceforth be allowed three doctors for every 1,000 troops, which 
reduced the strength of both of the major branches of service.  The Army rate had been 
3.5 per 1,000 so the adjustment would be minor.  Naval vessels maintained a 4 to 1,000 
ratio of doctors to troops, so their personnel cuts would reach a rate of 25%.58 
      The overall effect of non-hostile casualties on the public and the reaction of the 
public to non-hostile losses remained minimal throughout the war.  Casualty reports did 
not include mention of fratricide; instead they simply distinguished between losses in 
battle and non-battle events.  The decline in the number of casualties for the final two 
years of the war assisted materially in the Armed Forces High Command’s effort to 
maintain public support for the war.  As far as support was concerned, the public reacted 
to the time consumed and the scope of the conflict more than to the number of casualties.  
The petitions against the doctors’ draft probably represented the only major episode in 
which the public actively attempted to influence policy in the realm of non-hostile 
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casualties – and these petitions concerned only treatment and did not come in reaction to 
deaths.   
     The Korean War taught the Armed Forces several lessons that military personnel 
implemented in future conflicts.  The Armed Forces adopted the systems of preventive 
medicine and air medical evacuation that the Army Medical Corps developed in Korea.  
By increasing the availability of vaccinations and air evacuation assets in future wars, the 
Medical Corps put the lessons of Korea to practice on a full scale.  The pitfalls of Close 
Air Support in Korea led to the systems of marking and communications that soldiers on 
the ground have employed in Vietnam, Iraq and every other theatre of modern war.  
Finally, the Korean War identified to Generals and politicians the need for obtainable 
political and military goals.  The politicians and Generals have dealt with conflicts over 
command issues and disagreements over objectives in every one of “these kinds of wars.” 
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       Table 2.1 shows the aircraft losses by month in Korea, along 
with the very few vehicle accidents noted by the National Archives. 
This chart reflects when the U.S. military officially reported the 
casualties, so many appear later than they actually happened.  
"Misc." refers to months before June 1950 and after July 1954.
Table 2.1: US AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN KOREA
Month Vehicle Accident Aircraft Crash Other
Jun-50 7
Jul-50 13
Aug-50 15
Sep-50 29
Oct-50 22
Nov-50 42
Dec-50 28
Jan-51 37
Feb-51 11
Mar-51 23
Apr-51 41
May-51 19
Jun-51 22 1
Jul-51 21
Aug-51 26
Sep-51 33
Oct-51 42
Nov-51 23
Dec-51 29
Jan-52 35
Feb-52 22
Mar-52 2 29
Apr-52 23
May-52 28
Jun-52 18
Jul-52 20
Aug-52 15
Sep-52 28
Oct-52 21
Nov-52 16
Dec-52 17
Jan-53 6
Feb-53 14
Mar-53 10 1
52
Apr-53 6
May-53 12
Jun-53 6
Jul-53 37
Aug-53 0
Sep-53 4
Oct-53 10
Nov-53 38
Dec-53 254
Jan-54 105
Feb-54 122
Mar-54 44
Apr-54 26
May-54 26
Jun-54 15
Jul-54 14
Misc 17
Total 2 1521 2
53
54
Chart 2.1: U.S. Aircraft Losses in Korea Trends
Chart based on the raw data of Table 2.1
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CHAPTER 3: THE VIETNAM WAR 
NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES IN “THESE KINDS OF WARS” FROM THE 
KOREAN WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
      A little girl counted pedals as she tore them one by one from a daisy in a black-
and-white television ad.  When she reached the number “ten,” the camera zoomed into a 
close shot of her face as she looked up to the sound of a voice counting down from “ten” 
to “zero.”  Suddenly, a nuclear explosion filled the screen and the viewer heard the 
warning of what would happen if Barry Goldwater became President.  The narrator’s 
words were indistinct at times, but the dramatic visual image achieved the desired effect.  
Republican Senator and presidential candidate Goldwater had stated that a war of 
Communist aggression raged in Vietnam and that the American government should 
deepen its involvement in the war.  In the hands of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the 
senator’s statement became an overture to nuclear war, as Goldwater received the 
indelible brand of “warmonger.”  So lasting was this cowboy and warmonger image that 
seven years later, a satirical deck of political cards depicted Goldwater riding a nuclear 
missile after the fashion of Slim Pickens in “Dr. Strangelove.”  If the decisively slanted 
election results of 1964 gave any indication of the public’s opinion of fighting a war in 
Vietnam, the people of America stood squarely against it.  Soon after the 1964 election, 
Republicans began telling the grim joke, “They warned me that if I voted for Goldwater 
we would escalate the war.  I voted for Goldwater and, sure enough, we did escalate the 
war.” 
            President Kennedy had inherited from the Eisenhower administration in 
1961 a situation with eight hundred advisors on the ground in Vietnam.  Kennedy 
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increased the total number ten fold in the two years before his death.  Johnson doubled 
that number again to sixteen thousand before the end of the 1964 presidential campaign 
and increased the number to twenty-three thousand by the middle of 1965.  Although he 
spoke of restraint, avoided precise statements of policy, and never requested a formal 
declaration of war from Congress, Johnson had assigned to the United States Armed 
Forces an ever-increasing share of the responsibility for the survival of the regime in 
South Vietnam.1  President Lyndon Johnson feared the political defeat his party would 
sustain if he “lost” Vietnam to Communism the same way that the Truman administration 
had “lost” China in 1949.  The images that the Korean War had created for the American 
public about Cold War policy all plagued Johnson: the domino theory, the Munich 
analogy, the 1946 elections that had brought a Republican majority in Congress after the 
loss of China.2   
      President Johnson, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, and General William 
C. Westmoreland presided over the critical period of American involvement in the 
Vietnam War from the first major escalations of troop numbers in 1965 to the turning 
point of the war with the Tet Offensive of 1968.  By the time the Nixon administration 
and General Creighton Abrams had replaced the original architects of the war, the 
American news media and both major political parties had already resolved that the 
United States should withdraw from Vietnam.  Nixon presided over the gradual 
withdrawal of American troops as his administration attempted, ultimately 
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unsuccessfully, to accelerate the transfer of authority for South Vietnam to the Army of 
the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).   
      The commanders at the highest levels of the American military structure viewed 
the war in Vietnam as a limited campaign reminiscent of the latter stages of the Korean 
War.  Both the American interests at stake in and commitment to the war occupied a 
position of limited importance.  The American public and the civilian political leaders 
who ordered and in some cases, directed military action therefore tolerated minimal 
friendly casualties and pursued limited objectives.  Political concerns and fear of Chinese 
or Soviet intervention prevented serious consideration of a conventional invasion of 
North Vietnam or Laos or Cambodia for the first several years of the war.3 
      The military commanders had reconciled themselves for the most part to the Cold 
War as an era in which they did not pursue the surrender of the enemy as a manifest 
objective in wars.  Instead, they expected to fight several small attrition conflicts to 
maintain a fragile status quo of territorial spheres of influence between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  Some of the most respected leaders of the previous two wars 
published literature at the time that elaborated this new military attitude.  General 
Maxwell Taylor, a decorated veteran of World War II, had penned The Uncertain 
Trumpet, in which he explained the strategies of counterinsurgency in lieu of large 
conventional commitments of troops.4  Taylor championed flexible and varied responses 
to aggression rather than the massive retaliation strategy that the Eisenhower 
Administration had adopted.  Taylor’s work so impressed President John F. Kennedy that 
he used it to craft the early stages of the American advisers’ campaign in Vietnam.  
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Kennedy promoted the new elite Special Forces, the fabled Green Berets, in response to 
the principles Taylor espoused in The Uncertain Trumpet.  
      Adding to the dialogue, General Matthew Ridgway’s book about the Korean War 
even contained in its subtitle the strong insistence on limited strategy.  The sub-title of 
Ridgway’s book, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, How All-Out Asian War 
was Averted: Why MacArthur was Dismissed, Why Today’s War Objectives Must be 
Limited, revealed a number of his conclusions on the nature of war at that time.  Full-
scale war would bring a nuclear apocalypse or a protracted meat-grinder experience akin 
to the First World War.  In Korea, President Truman’s policy against the use of nuclear 
weapons had prevented the former and General Ridgway’s tactic of incremental advance 
had prevented the latter.  Ridgway stated emphatically that his campaign of incremental 
advance geared toward minimizing friendly casualties should serve as a blueprint for 
future war objectives.5  The generals of the post-Second World War era resigned 
themselves to campaigns like those of the Korean War, in which they pursued the 
objectives of minimal friendly casualties, low material losses, maximum enemy 
casualties, and fighting for as short a time as possible.        
      The books by Generals Taylor and Ridgway and Secretary McNamara’s theories 
of casualty analysis influenced American policy enormously.  All casualties, friendly and 
enemy, influenced the civilian leaders in Washington as they decided what steps to take 
in escalating or de-escalating the American forces in Vietnam.  Across the battle lines, 
General Vo Nguyen Giap, the commander of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), 
pursued the strategy of guerrilla warfare followed by parity with his enemies, followed by 
                                                 
5 Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, How All-out Asian War was 
Averted: Why MacArthur was Dismissed, Why Today’s War Objectives Must Be Limited (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1967), 239.  
 58
a massive conventional invasion.  Throughout the war, the government in Hanoi directed 
the NLF operations in the South skillfully, while championing the NLF as freedom 
fighters waging a war of national liberation from the United States.6     
  Although the terminology of the war of attrition in Vietnam resembled that of the 
Korean War, the realities on the ground revealed a number of key strategic and tactical 
differences between the two.  Both caused massive civilian deaths and domestic 
displacements, but the Korean civilians enjoyed the benefits of a clearly defined front line 
area, unlike their counterparts in Vietnam.  The Korean terrain enabled the American 
forces to establish battle lines running the width of the Korean peninsula, with the ocean 
protecting their vital flanks.  In devastating contrast, Vietnam’s proximity to Laos and 
Cambodia prevented the Americans from strictly isolating the territory they sought to 
defend.  The North Vietnamese exploited the American respect for national borders by 
running a steady logistical stream of traffic through Laos and Cambodia on a series of 
routes, roads and trails that came to be known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  For the last two 
years of the war in Korea, the majority of the fighting transpired north of the 38th Parallel 
in formerly enemy territory, where the Americans chose the places and stakes of each 
battle.  By contrast, nearly all of the ground fighting in the Vietnam War happened in 
South Vietnam, with the Americans trying to defend unfamiliar terrain against a people 
who had lived among jungles and rice paddies all of their lives.  Unforgiving terrain and 
lack of strategic initiative took an enormous toll on the American Armed Forces in 
Vietnam.   
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      Another major difference between the situations in Korea and Vietnam included 
the presence of a guerrilla force native to South Vietnam.  The National Liberation Front, 
(NLF) or Viet Cong as the Americans called them, fought for control of South Vietnam 
in close concert with the North Vietnamese Army, officially called the People’s Army of 
Vietnam (PAVN), throughout the period of the war.  Striking by night and from ambush, 
the NLF rendered the domestic situation in South Vietnam a volatile and dangerous one 
for the American soldiers in all areas of the country.  Unlike the Chinese troops who had 
fought most of the Korean War after the North Korean retreat of 1950, the PAVN and 
NLF forces considered their war one of national liberation from foreign colonizers.  The 
Americans had essentially assumed responsibility for the erstwhile French colony and 
supported non-Communist leaders in South Vietnam who governed as military dictators.  
The territorial gains by the UN forces in Korea had driven the Chinese to the peace table 
in October 1951 and a subsequent decline in the Chinese economy prompted the final 
effort for cease fire terms in 1953. 
      Unlike the Chinese, who fought as surrogates for the North Koreans, their “little 
brothers” in North Korea, the PAVN and NLF soldiers fought to reunify their own 
country and homeland.  In each case, Asian soldiers, aided by military materiel support 
from the Soviet Union, fought to expel foreigners from their land, but the Vietnamese 
showed greater determination.  For reasons of pride, history, and emotional fervor against 
foreign colonizers, the North Vietnamese soldiers and their leaders, both civilian and 
military, determined that they would win the war, expel the Americans, and conquer 
South Vietnam regardless of the costs in men and material.  Ultimately, the North 
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Vietnamese strategy for fighting the war made their casualties irrelevant, whereas the 
American strategy made casualty numbers essential. 
      Robert McNamara, who served as Secretary of Defense for the Kennedy 
administration and most of the Johnson administration, had built his theories of military 
strategy around the number of casualties that each side could inflict.  McNamara agreed 
with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson that nuclear weapons had changed the nature of 
war and created a need for the flexible response systems that General Taylor proposed.  
By McNamara’s reckoning, the gradual increase of American efforts should force the 
North Vietnamese gradually to decrease their military incursions into Vietnam as 
casualties mounted.  Casualties would also dissuade the NLF by measurable degrees from 
fighting against the U.S.-backed government of South Vietnam.  By monitoring the 
introduction of American troops carefully, McNamara hoped to calculate precisely how 
many friendly troops he should commit to eliminate a precise number of enemy troops.  
If his theory were accurate, McNamara could develop the perfect equation for a strategy 
of escalation.7 
      Actually, the North Vietnamese committed troops to the war in direct, rather than 
inverse, proportion to the efforts of the United States.  Amidst the famous body counts by 
which the Americans sought to establish exactly how many of the enemy they killed, the 
People’s Army of Vietnam and the NLF did not allow their casualties to demoralize them 
or deter them from waging the battle.  McNamara’s incorrect calculation of the nature of 
the war in Vietnam contributed to the failure of the American cause, but his obsession 
with casualty numbers resulted in a relatively accurate and precise record of American 
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losses, both hostile and non-hostile.  The National Archives and Records Administration 
database, “War/International Relations: The Vietnam War,” housing these records, 
supplied specific information, including the dates and precise manner of death.  Unlike 
the Korean War, in which the National Archives recorded only aircraft crashes, the 
database of Vietnam War non-hostile casualties differentiated among various causes, 
including vehicle accidents, illnesses, and aircraft crashes, thus enabling a researcher to 
assess the non-hostile casualties of the American war effort in very precise numbers.  The 
strategy of the conventional clash in Korea required few records of non-hostile deaths, 
but casualties played a much larger role in Vietnam.8 
      Under the McNamara strategy, the secretary counted non-hostile casualties from 
accidents, aircraft crashes, and illnesses as part of the natural attrition that accompanied 
the deployment of American forces overseas.  When calculating the proper equations for 
escalation, then, McNamara planned to consider the number of Americans committed to 
the war effort, the number of enemy soldiers they were able to kill and the amount of 
enemy war materiel they destroyed within a given length of time.  Against these numbers 
he hoped to calculate the costs in military equipment and lives, both those lost to enemy 
fire and to non-hostile causes.  As a result of McNamara’s emphasis on the numbers of 
casualties, the Department of Defense kept unusually accurate records on the manner of 
death of the American soldiers in Vietnam.  So accurate were its methods of tracking 
personnel that when the Armed Forces decided to inter one unknown Vietnam casualty in 
the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington Cemetery, the Armed Forces made the 
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decision by default.  Only one set of American remains confounded the efforts of the 
Armed Forces mortuary units in their identification attempts.9 
      The Department of Defense (DOD) produced a complete report on casualties for 
the entire war, reflecting 10,700 deaths from non-hostile causes and 47,322 from hostile 
causes.  The DOD database supplements the National Archives (NA) database in several 
areas.  The National Archives database did not include casualty numbers from murders, 
drowning, accidental homicide or weapons accidents, which accounts for the discrepancy 
of approximately 3,000 lives.  There are, however, other discrepancies between the two 
sources.  Strangely, the National Archives reported more deaths from aircraft crashes 
than did the DOD records, including hostile and non-hostile causes.  The same trend 
affected the National Archives numbers regarding illnesses.  Some National Archives 
database entries listed both “illness” and “other accident” as the cause of death, and the 
final tally of accidents proved greater in the DOD records by several hundred.  
Apparently, the casualties to whom the National Archives gave a mixed designation of 
“accident” and “illness,” the DOD classified as accident deaths. 
      The NA database compilation statistics reflect American losses over time, 
whereas the DOD documents merely record final statistics.  The NA numbers reflect 
expected trends: very low numbers of casualties from the late 1950s through the early 
1960s.  During the three-month period from November 1963 through January 1964, non-
hostile casualties eclipsed ten for the first time, with nine reported killed in aircraft 
crashes.  The non-hostile losses exceeded one hundred first in the May-July quarter of 
1965, just after the Marines came ashore in Da Nang, the first large wave of ground 
troops, in March.  
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      The numbers of aircraft crash deaths experienced more erratic number variances 
owing to the smaller number of crashes and the ability for one crash of a large aircraft to 
affect the total count for the quarter.  On August 24, 1965, for example, 52 American 
servicemen all died in aircraft crashes at sea.  Statistically, only one in eight servicemen 
who died in an aircraft crash perished at sea.  The evidence appears strong that one 
transport aircraft en route to Vietnam crashed at sea, killing 52 personnel.  The total of 87 
aircraft crash losses for August through October 1965 exceeded those of the following 
two quarters and nearly doubled the losses of the immediately previous quarter.  The 
following quarter also featured a very large crash, leading to a total aircraft loss figure of 
77.  Thereafter, the crash numbers for the February-April 1966 quarter returned briefly to 
a lower number of losses, 47, comparable to May-July 1965.  As American combat 
operations accelerated in the middle of 1966, including massive numbers of aerial 
missions, the aircraft loss figures exceeded 100 for the first time in May-July 1966 and 
never fell below 90 in a quarter from November 1966 until May-July 1971.  Non-hostile 
aircraft losses in the NA compilation exceeded 200 twice.  The first such instance 
occurred in November 1967-January 1968, while the second occurred in August-October 
1969, the quarter in which all American non-hostile casualties peaked.  The Nixon 
administration policies of Vietnamization and gradual withdrawal caused the aircraft 
crash numbers to fall below 100 for the summer quarter of 1971, and they never 
increased over the 100 milestone again.10 
      The NA database statistics for illness and accident fatalities closely mirror the 
numbers of American troops in Vietnam.  The illness statistics reveal a steady increase 
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during the early escalation of the war, punctuated by fourteen straight quarters of losses 
above 50, peaking with five straight quarters above 70 in 1968-1969.  Compared to the 
aircraft crashes, the vehicle accident and illness numbers held to a steady course with few 
peaks and troughs.  Vehicle accident losses experienced trends similar to those of 
illnesses, with one other noteworthy trend.  The vehicle accident losses tended to peak in 
the spring and summer quarters, February-April and May-July, likely reflecting a greater 
number of missions during those relatively dry months.  In every year of large American 
ground operations, a period running from May 1965 to April 1972, either the February-
April or the May-July quarter proved the most costly in vehicle accident deaths.  Illness 
and accidental death rates responded immediately to the withdrawals of troops and began 
sharp declines earlier than did aircraft crash deaths.  By the beginning of 1972, the 
combined death tolls for illnesses and vehicle crashes had fallen below 40, whereas only 
two quarters earlier each rate had exceeded 40 deaths.    
      The Americans suffered their highest non-hostile casualties in the late months of 
1969 due to the large number of troops involved in missions in Vietnam after the Tet 
Offensive and before the Nixon Administration began major withdrawals.  The aircraft 
crash numbers and other non-hostile casualties maintained relatively steady declines 
throughout the withdrawal of 150,000 troops from March 1970 to March 1971.  During 
the next year, an additional 100,000 American troops departed the Vietnam theatre, and 
the declining non-hostile losses reflected the smaller number of troops.11  Total non-
hostile losses in the NA compilation numbers fell below 300 in the August-October 1970 
quarter, dipped below 200 in May-July 1971, and declined below 100 in February-April 
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1972.  After each milestone in decline, the numbers recorded in the National Archives 
database never returned to the heights of previous levels.12   
      The DOD casualty documents offer a more comprehensive database of overall 
casualty losses than do the numbers from the NA.  The ground combat service branches 
experienced trends in non-hostile deaths that differed markedly from those of the Air 
Force, Navy, and Coast Guard.  The Coast Guard made a statistically insignificant 
impression in Vietnam, losing a grand total of seven men, two to “other accidents,” and 
five to hostile fire.  Other trends that appeared among the various branches reflected the 
environmental, physical, and psychological toll that Vietnam service could take on the 
soldiers as individuals.  In a few cases, the disposition of non-hostile casualties followed 
the proportions of personnel in theatre for each branch, but many times the nature of the 
missions proved a better predictor of death rates than the number of troops that the 
branch had in theatre. 
      The environment to which the troops’ duties exposed them took a toll in the types 
of sicknesses that the various branches reported.  Of the 117 American servicemen who 
died of malaria, all but two served in the Army or Marine Corps, conducting missions on 
foot in wet jungle terrain.  Naturally, the Navy and Marine Corps lost the greatest number 
of men to aircraft crashes at sea; over three fourths belonged to their branches.  The Air 
Force lost by far the fewest men to drowning; its 24 losses barely one eighth the 167 of 
its nearest competitor, the Marine Corps.  The Air Force also lost twice as many men to 
heart attacks as did the Navy and Marine Corps despite a smaller number of men in 
Vietnam than these two branches.  This figure most likely reflects the particular stresses 
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that flights in high-performance aircraft place on the human body.  The sheer number of 
Army soldiers in Vietnam caused nearly all casualty tolls to skew toward the Army by a 
large margin.  The frequent use of transport by both fixed and rotary wing aircraft led to 
an Army death toll from non-hostile aircraft crashes on land of 2,234.  This figure tripled 
the combined losses of all other branches.  The vehicle losses in the Army nearly 
mimicked this slanted proportion, as 864 deaths out of a total of 1104 belonged to the 
Army.13 
      Dr. John A. Parrish, who practiced medicine for the Marine Corps for one year in 
Vietnam, which included the Tet Offensive of 1968, wrote about a few Marines in the 
infantry who developed serious psychological problems and grew homicidal.  Some 
suffered trauma from fear of enemy attacks at night.  Others had seen too many of their 
friends tortured, killed, and sometimes beheaded by the NLF or PAVN soldiers.  One 
episode involved a Marine acquitted of murder after he killed an unarmed fellow Marine 
with his firearm in a bar fight.14  The casualty numbers for homicide and suicide 
quantified the trends that Dr. Parrish described.  During the course of the war, while no 
Navy personnel of any rank committed suicide, five airmen took their own lives.  The 
Marine Corps lost 23 men to suicide, while the Army lost a staggering 354.  Intentional 
homicide rates revealed similar trends, as the Army lost 199, the Marine Corps 22, the 
Air Force five, and the Navy four.  The casualty statistics for accidental homicide and 
ordnance accidents also placed the Army and Marine Corps disproportionately far above 
their fellow branches.  Aside from aircraft losses at sea, the Navy topped the casualty lists 
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in only one area; “other causes,” which included 154 deaths out of 258 for the entire 
Armed Forces.  Most likely, the fire that one Navy pilot reported on board the USS 
Oriskany fit into this category.  Two aircraft workers had been playing with flares and 
managed to blow up the entire flare locker, in the process killing 44 sailors.15  Overall, 
the environmental and mission conditions exerted a devastating effect on the Army a
Marine Corps troops in Vietnam that extended far beyond the immediate dangers of the 
battlefield. 
nd 
                                                
      The experience of the Korean War had revealed close air support to be a 
significant fratricidal risk.  Air-to-ground fire caused the majority of fratricide losses in 
Korea, but the introduction of more sophisticated Forward Air Controller (FAC) systems 
significantly reduced incidents of air-to-ground fratricide.  The Department of Defense 
produced extensive records of every American casualty, arranged according to several 
demographics, but did not include fratricide among the causes of death.  As had been the 
case in Korea and would be the case again in Operation Iraqi Freedom, record keepers 
mixed fratricidal deaths into the categories of enemy fire, intentional homicide, and 
accidental homicide.  As was the case with the casualties in Korea and later conflicts, the 
figures on fratricide prove to be more episodic and anecdotal than specific and definitive.  
The stories of combat in Vietnam detail extensive interactions between ground forces and 
the awesome firepower of artillery and attack aircraft, but tales of fratricide remain 
surprisingly uncommon.  In the area of close air support, the Air Force and Army in 
Vietnam appeared to have improved their accuracy in response to the lessons of the last 
war.   
 
15 John D. Sherwood, Afterburner: Naval Aviators and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University 
Press, 2004), 98. 
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      The basic strategy ground units employed in Vietnam required very precise 
coordination with their various supporting elements of both air power and artillery.  As 
soon as the infantry units came under fire, they established as strong a defensive posture 
as they could manage and called for support, either from artillery in fire support bases 
(FSBs) or from attack aircraft.  Typically, the infantry marked their own positions with 
smoke and used radio to describe exactly where the enemy units had taken cover.16  The 
Air Force typically sent FACs in unarmed single-engine Cessna “Bird Dogs” to mark the 
targets for Huey or Cobra attack helicopters or the AC-47s, nicknamed “Puff the Magic 
Dragon” because of the numerous deadly and multiple types of rounds they could fire 
into the enemy.  The propeller-driven airborne FACs fired smoke rockets into the areas 
where ground units had reported enemy contact as markers for the napalm, mini-guns, or 
rockets that the attack aircraft carried.17 
      The tactic of standoff held the key to preventing fratricide in this kind of 
engagement.  As long as the American ground forces kept a safe distance from the North 
Vietnamese and NLF forces and marked their friendly areas effectively, the aircraft 
providing support could target the enemy accurately and safely.  On the other side of the 
battle lines, the PAVN and NLF soldiers attempted to overrun the U.S. and ARVN 
positions and fight at close quarters to eliminate standoff as a factor.  A comparison of 
the battles for Hill 823 and Lang Vei clearly illustrated this principle.  Even in the 
absence of FACs, the American soldiers holding Hill 823 marked their own positions 
with smoke grenades and directed the aircraft above them to pummel all of the landscape 
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around them with ordnance.  The fire from friendly artillery wounded two Americans, but 
the aircraft completely defeated the PAVN attack and avoided inflicting any fatal losses 
on friendly troops.  When the PAVN forces attacked Lang Vei during the Tet Offensive, 
by contrast, they closed with the Marines so quickly that the Marines were not able to call 
for air support until the PAVN troops had nearly overrun them.  This outpost near Khe 
Sanh fell in one all-night fight, so that the surviving defenders called for air support to 
destroy everything in the camp as they attempted to escape out of the base.  Air strikes 
wounded two Americans at Lang Vei, where a failure to maintain standoff resulted in 
poor air support and an American defeat.18 
      In the most dangerous areas, such as the skies over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 
Laos, the Air Force employed F-100 Super Sabres as “fast FACs,” instead of propeller 
craft, to mark convoys of trucks, supply and anti-aircraft sites, and hostile vehicles for the 
Air Force F-4s and F-105s to bomb.  On these missions, they faced a negligible risk of 
fratricide because there were few friendly units involved on the ground.  The only 
fratricide reports from Laos involved an outpost of Laotian and Thai troops who received 
support from the CIA at Skyline Ridge.  Because the 1962 Geneva Agreement had 
forbidden foreign troops from operating in Laos, the Americans withdrew their six 
hundred sixty advisers; however, the North Vietnamese completely ignored the terms of 
the agreement.  The CIA retained a small number of clandestine operatives in Laos, and 
the United States gave funding and air support from aircraft based in Thailand to the Thai 
and Laotian troops.  During the battle for Skyline Ridge in 1971-1972, when the Pathet 
Lao and PAVN forces attempted to overrun a Thai, Hmong, and Lao defensive position, 
American aircraft provided cover.  One errant pilot dropped a bomb directly on the CIA 
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compound in Long Tieng, one of the bases on Skyline Ridge, and killed one Hmong 
inside the base.  Overall, the CIA lost only eight operatives over a ten-year campaign in 
Laos, four to hostile fire and four in aircraft crashes.19 
      For the last four wars, air-to-ground fire has been the most likely to result in 
fratricide, but the toll the close air support missions took in Korea dwarfed the American 
losses in Vietnam.  In addition to the bombing that took one Hmong life in Laos, 
accounts of the battles for the Ia Drang Valley, Mount Ap Bia, Hill 875, a patrol skirmish 
near Dong Ha and the defense of Lang Vei produced six anecdotal stories of air-to-
ground fratricide.  An attack helicopter unit near Dong Ha once mistook a squad of 
Marines for enemy troops and wiped out nine Americans.20  The worst instance of air-to-
ground fratricide involved one errant Air Force pilot, who dropped a 500-pound bomb on 
the top of Hill 875, which the 173rd Airborne Brigade had already occupied.  The bomb 
killed thirty infantrymen; yet this was a far cry from the fratricide incidents in Korea that 
at times inflicted body counts in the hundreds.21 
      The commander of the units tasked with taking Mount Ap Bia reduced his calls 
for air support after one air strike killed two of his soldiers.  The reaction of Lieutenant 
Colonel Hal Moore in the Ia Drang Valley after a misplaced napalm canister killed two 
Americans was more typical, however.  Moore immediately radioed the pilots of the F-
100s that had killed his men and told them to forget about their unfortunate miss.  As his 
troops fought for their lives in a desperate defensive struggle, he wanted the tempo of air 
support kept as high as it had been.  Like the Marine commander at the Pusan perimeter 
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in South Korea who insisted on artillery support despite fears of fratricide, Moore 
recognized that close air support saved more lives with its high tempo of fire than it cost 
on the rare occasions when a pilot missed his target.22   
      Two reports of artillery fratricide yielded inconclusive numbers, the former on 
Hill 823 wounding two and killing none.  In the second instance, a number of personnel 
sensors near the Cambodian border reported movement, and an intelligence analyst at a 
Special Forces camp attempted to ascertain whether any friendly elements occupied the 
area.  When all reports returned in the negative, he called on his nearest fire support base 
to fire on the suspected infiltrators of the border.  Sadly, the personnel whom he targeted 
were Cambodians with an American adviser.  They had embarked on a secret mission, 
possibly with the CIA, that excluded the Special Forces intelligence sources from 
authorized knowledge.23  The precise numbers of friendly troops killed in this episode 
were not reported, but the toll was light.  Overall, the close air support system had 
improved so thoroughly since the Korean War that this type of fratricide became a rare 
phenomenon.  
      Perhaps the most infamous form of fratricide that gained fame in Vietnam was the 
act of “fragging.”  In the familiar scenario, enlisted infantrymen used fragmentation 
grenades to kill officers to whose judgment they did not want to entrust their lives.  
Although he was not a victim of fragging, Lieutenant Henry T. Herrick of the 1st 
Battalion 7th Cavalry under LTC Hal Moore typified the potential fragging victim.  When 
Moore mentioned Herrick as a possible leader for the scout platoon to his Command 
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Sergeant Major, the non-commissioned officer (NCO), a seasoned veteran of World War 
II and Korea, responded immediately, “Colonel, if you put Lieutenant Herrick in there, he 
will get them all killed.”24  During the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley, Herrick did indeed 
make a costly error that got many of his platoon members killed, including himself, so no 
soldier took action against him. 
      All of the soldiers in Vietnam knew that their missions would consume a set 
length of time before they went home, regardless of whether they performed well.  They 
prioritized, therefore, in favor of keeping themselves alive.  Officers who would endanger 
their lives through reckless risks or bad judgment they might see fit to dispatch.  The 
Department of Defense reported 600 fragging episodes between 1969 and 1971.  Eighty-
two officers died in these fragging incidents and 652 more suffered wounds.25  Judging 
from the disproportionately large suicide and homicide numbers among soldiers and 
Marines, the circumstances of the war certainly took a considerable toll on the ground 
troops who faced the enemy every day of their tours.  
      A final area of fratricide concerned air-to-air combat.  Over the course of the war, 
American aircraft shot down 25 friendly craft by mistake, 7 belonging to the Air Force, 2 
to the Marines, and 16 Navy.  Judging from the total numbers of aircraft that each branch 
lost, the Navy committed much more than its share of air-to-air fratricide, due in part to 
the difficulty of killing MIGs in Vietnam.  The North Vietnamese MIG 17s and 21s only 
appeared for dogfights when they believed the odds to be strongly in their favor.  
Consequently, the Air Force and the Navy each crowned only one ace during the war.  
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Some F-4 and F-8 pilots flew for their entire tour in Vietnam without seeing a single 
MIG. 
      Naturally, a number of pilots grew overly eager, and some squadron commanders 
adopted unsafe policies as a result.  Although pilot training courses had always taught the 
pilots to make a positive identification of suspected enemy aircraft before opening fire, 
some squadron commanders disputed the need for identification.  If the long-range radar 
installations which directed the American aircraft identified another airplane as a hostile, 
they reasoned, perhaps identification was not truly necessary.  The zeal for a MIG kill 
and the accompanying Silver Star medal likely influenced their policies.  In one instance 
recorded by a Radar Intercept Officer on an F-4, a pilot fired four AIM-9 Sidewinder 
missiles at a friendly aircraft because he had not attempted to make a positive 
identification.  Mercifully, the Sidewinders all malfunctioned, which saved two lives and 
two careers.26  All things considered, faulty weapons may have saved the Navy many 
such tragedies. 
      While pilots and infantrymen learned the human consequences of the war in 
Southeast Asia firsthand, the Generals in Washington viewed the situation from a more 
detached perspective.  Equipped with a strategy that amounted to killing as many of the 
enemy as possible while losing few friendly troops, officers at every level implemented 
policies designed to minimize casualties and bolster their soldiers’ morale.  A survey of 
over 100 general officers who commanded the American forces in Vietnam conducted in 
1974 revealed the soldiers’ perceptions.  Of those who responded to the survey, seventy 
percent complained that the civilian officials did not make the military objectives of the 
                                                 
26 John D. Sherwood, Afterburner: Naval Aviators and the Vietnam War(New York: New York University 
Press, 2004), 81, 84. 
 74
United States Armed Forces clear enough for effective execution on the ground.  Only 
eight percent reported clear objectives.  A majority of those surveyed, sixty percent, 
reported that they believed reports from the field inflated the body counts of enemy dead 
by some degree on a regular basis.  A minuscule two percent speculated that the body 
counts might have underestimated the number of enemy dead.27  Beyond doubt, the great 
majority of officers charged with prosecuting the war experienced frustration with the 
lack of clarity in their objectives.   
      Robert Graham, an infantryman in the 4th Infantry Division confirmed the 
rumored “search and evade” missions that his unit performed throughout the year he 
spent in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969.  In a typical day, the company performed search 
and destroy missions all day and assigned each platoon to set ambushes all night.  Instead 
of setting ambushes, the platoons found the safest available place where they could 
defend in case of enemy attack and kept only a few men awake throughout the night.  In 
the morning, almost without exception, the platoons returned to their company assembly 
areas and reported no enemy contact.  Staff officers at the battalion level had selected the 
sites for ambush from maps of areas where they had never set foot and never would go in 
person.  From the sleeping “ambushes,” company commanders received credit for 
multiple missions during the night and thereby padded their resumes.  The phenomenon 
of overestimated body counts that the Generals cited assumed a predictable role in the 
game that officers played in Vietnam.  Like the night ambushes that accomplished 
nothing except to give officers mission reports to send up the chain of command, inflated 
body counts provided metaphorical feathers in the caps of officers, and the higher chain 
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of command would never know the difference between an actual kill and one made up for 
dramatic effect.  As seventy percent of the Generals attested, they had no incentives from 
Washington to do better.28 
      The war from the air assumed a similar nature to that of the ground war, in which 
the pilots and their commanders sought to give positive reports of kills and missions 
whether or not they had accomplished any meaningful goals.  In the course of the 
bombing campaign along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, the bomber pilots sometimes 
reported “destroyed” the same truck or ground asset in multiple missions.  Worse yet, 
some dropped their bombs from high altitudes without confirming whether or not they 
had hit their targets.  The FACs developed a name for pilots who made only half-hearted 
efforts at bombing accurately, calling them “nose-dippers.”  After missing his target 
completely, but not endangering his own life or aircraft, the “nose-dipper” pilot headed 
for home and reported the target destroyed or the bombing mission results inconclusive.  
By the standards of some squadrons, such a mission succeeded because it gave the pilot a 
combat mission, minimized friendly casualties, and credited his commander with another 
mission to report to his higher chain of command.  The guidance from commanders 
became commonplace, “no target in Vietnam was worth the loss of an airplane or 
pilot.”29  Soldiers and pilots resolved to complete their time in country and go home 
t. 
and 
                                                
intac
      The Armed Forces had expressed strong concerns over minimizing casualties 
expenditures in training.  The emphasis on safety and economy of training resources 
 
28 Robert J. Graham, “Vietnam: An Infantryman’s View of Our Failure,” Military Affairs 48 (July 1984): 
138. 
29 Newman, Rick, and John Shepperd. Bury us Upside Down: The Misty Pilots and the Secret Battle for the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail. (New York: Ballantine Books, 2006), 149-151. 
 76
contributed to the losses that the Air Force suffered in air-to-air combat over Vietnam.
The masterminds who wrote the combat doctrine for the F-4 pilots envisioned a long
range war of launching missiles at the Soviet-built MIGs that lacked weapons with 
comparable range.  The F-4 pilots learned bombing as well as missile combat procedur
on the mistaken assumption that missiles had made old-fashioned dog-fighting tactics
obsolete.  Throughout the training period, the chain of command stre
  
-
es 
 
ssed safety and 
ma
n 
s 
nt 
s.  
g 
s had taken precedence over the mission of preparing the fighter 
pilots f
g 
y, 
mini l accidents, at times preferring safety over realistic training. 
       The F-4 Phantom’s design compounded the problem of safety because, whe
maneuvered wrongly, the Phantom showed a tendency to go out of control, called 
“departing” in Air Force jargon.  Rather than teaching the pilots how to determine angle
and safe speeds, the training unit commanders forbade turns over certain speeds during 
air-to-air training sorties.  This policy sacrificed the element of realistic training in the 
name of maintaining pilot and aircraft safety.  Unfortunately, the problem of insufficie
preparation through unrealistic training enabled the commanders of the pilot training 
units to amass favorable records by minimizing their installations’ accidents and injurie
The training units reported no multi-million dollar aircraft lost in plane crashes and no 
serious injuries to the pilots who had trained on their bases.  The mission of minimizin
non-hostile casualtie
or combat.   
After an abysmal record in air-to-air combat, the Air Force improved its trainin
beginning in 1972.  After the additional dog-fight practice, the Air Force managed to 
improve its F-4 kill ratio in the closing months of the war to nearer a 3:1 ratio.  Ironicall
the aerobatic skills that the pilots developed from the additional dog-fight training also 
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reduced the number of non-hostile aircraft lost in crashes.  Thus, the Air Force learned 
the hard lesson that the safest training in the long run is tough but realistic training.30  F
all of the branches of the Armed Forces, training bases and installation
or 
s emphasized 
ad 
 
nd 
 
d. 
 
etnam 
                                                
tough but realistic training in the years following the war in Vietnam. 
      Throughout American history, almost every previous war had ended when the 
losing side surrendered, usually after the winning side captured a key city or piece of 
terrain or defeated the losing side’s army.  In Korea, the original objective of the war h
included the usual criteria for victory.  The U.S. and U.N. troops fought to free South 
Korea from the hold of North Korea and afterwards to conquer North Korea as far as the
Yalu River.  The entrance of Chinese forces into the war caused President Truman a
General Ridgway to change their strategy from one of territorial conquest to one of 
attrition.  Although the Korean War ended on relatively favorable terms for the United 
States, the public discontent with mounting casualties had caused a significant decline in
the popularity of the Truman Administration.  For several strategic and tactical reasons, 
the U.S. effort in Vietnam faced a similar but steeper decline in popularity as a result of 
the conflict’s long duration and the casualties that the American Armed Forces suffere
   President Johnson believed that a strategy of attrition could achieve the same 
stalemate in Vietnam that the U.N. forces had preserved in Korea and thereby halt the
expansion of Communism in Southeast Asia.  Therefore, he prescribed a strategy of 
attrition upon his commitment of large numbers of U.S. troops to South Vietnam in 1965.  
General Westmoreland established a three-phase strategy of first securing South Vietnam 
militarily, defeating the National Liberation Front (NLF) and People’s Army of Vi
(PAVN) forces in large areas, and finally driving the NLF and PAVN from South 
 
30 Ibid., 94, 99. 
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Vietnam entirely.  All three phases of his plan, however, involved holding terrain that the
Americans and their ARVN allies theoretically already controlled.  The citizen at home 
watching the war on his television news or reading of military clashes in the newspaper 
could not observe major benchmarks of American success.  During the Korean War,
the two final years of attrition combat, Ridgway’s Army had followed an offensive 
strategy of taking enemy territory north of the 38th Parallel at places newspaper repo
nicknamed Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge.  No such news of territorial gains 
reached the United States during the
 
 in 
rters 
 Vietnam War because the Americans fought the 
orces 
ition 
 
, 
ism.  
 
 
n 
                                                
entire war on a defensive footing.31 
      General Westmoreland had learned the lesson from Korea that American f
could win a war of attrition, but the Korean War had begun with victory through 
territorial gain as its goal and the President and his generals had only adopted an attr
strategy after the Chinese invasion.  For one of the only times in American history, 
President Johnson, Secretary McNamara, and General Westmoreland attempted to 
persuade the American people to accept a war of attrition for which they could only 
achieve victory by maintaining the status quo.  The key handicap that the architects of the
war faced was the pervasive presence of casualties in the minds of the American public
who perceived American lives buying South Vietnamese freedom from Commun
News reports carried nightly updates on each American aircraft which the North 
Vietnamese managed to shoot down, so that the losses of pilots remained foremost in the
minds of Americans.  Just as the public had not expressed support for a war in Korea to
rescue the South Koreans, it showed little concern for the South Vietnamese people i
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response to poll questions.  Even a hypothetical best-case scenario resolution of the 
Vietnam War offered few points on which the American people could applaud a gallant 
 
, 
esident 
 
 gain a 
s to 
rall, which coincided approximately with the proportions of American 
upport of 
                                                
effort in a war worth fighting.32 
      Two other major public perceptions of casualties in Vietnam divided the 
American soldiers along race and class lines.  For a number of reasons, a disproportionate
number of black soldiers became casualties in Vietnam during the early years of the war
a trend a number of Civil Rights leaders decried.  Having desegregated under Pr
Truman, the Armed Forces at the beginning of the war offered relatively equal 
opportunities for young men of all racial categories.  A young man with only a high
school education could rise to high non-commissioned officer rank, particularly in 
combat units.  Consequently, early in the war, a greater than proportional number of 
black soldiers died in Vietnam just as the Civil Rights Movement was beginning to
following in the United States.  Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. called attention to the 
inequities of casualty numbers, which contributed to a decline in approval for the war 
among African-Americans.33  The Armed Forces corrected the inequities of casualties, 
and by war’s end, had managed to reduce the share of African-American casualtie
12.5% ove
society.34 
      The second public perception about casualty patterns that reduced the s
the American people for the war held that soldiers from lower classes died in 
 
32 John E. Mueller, “Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam,” The American 
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disproportionate numbers.  One study in 1992 examined the evidence of the “victims o
class war” paradigm and found that a number of affluent areas actually lost a sligh
greater percentage of their sons in Vietnam than the national average.  Measuring 
affluence by the median income of a given municipality, the study found only a small 
disparity between the affluent and low-income groups taken as a whole.  Conventional 
wisdom would have predicted a much larger difference in the toll along class lines.  T
highly visible nature of draft deferments for college students contributed along with 
anecdotal evidence to the perception that almost no wealthy young men died in Vietnam.  
The members of the public mistook the erroneous perception for reality, and the Vietnam
War now stand
f a 
tly 
he 
 
s in collective memory as a race and class war when it scarcely deserves 
r l
math 
iled 
 had 
e 
unconditional American withdrawal from the Vietnam War.  Johnson decided to refrain 
                                                
eithe abel.35  
      During the Korean War, popular support decreased sharply when the Chinese 
forces entered the fray in 1950.  A similar plummet in support accompanied the after
of the Tet Offensive of 1968.  Although the massive NLF and PAVN attacks fa
militarily, Tet delivered a crushing blow to the political morale of the Johnson 
administration and the American public.  The sheer size of the offensive proved to the 
president that Secretary McNamara’s strategy of attrition through graduated pressure
failed to defeat the Communist forces fighting for control of South Vietnam.  In his 
politically weakened condition, Johnson nearly lost the New Hampshire primary to th
underdog Senator Eugene McCarthy, the leading voice at that time for complete and 
 
35 Barnett, Arnold, Timothy Stanley, and Michael Shore, “America’s Vietnam Casualties: Victims of a 
Class War?” Operations Research 40 (September-October 1992): 858, 864. 
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from running for re-election shortly thereafter.  The Tet Offensive thereby influenced the 
succession of the presidency.36 
      General Westmoreland had expressed strongly optimistic opinions of the status of 
the war prior to the Tet Offensive, but afterward, he issued a request for one quarter of 
one million additional troops.  The President, the American news media, led by Walter 
Cronkite’s grim assessment of the outcome of the Tet Offensive, and the American 
people, who had begun to resent the military draft, would not permit further escalation of 
the war.  In a number of cases, the news media actually exaggerated the strength of the 
Tet Offensive to influence President Johnson to withdraw the United States from the war.  
The stories covering the NLF attack on the American embassy in Saigon included several 
false stories of NLF fighters making their way into the building itself, when in actuality 
all had died in a firefight with the three Marine guards in the courtyard.  One 
photographer for the AP reported bodies strewn in several rooms inside the building.  He 
did not send any photographs of those bodies, however, because his story was not true.37  
The press stories hastened the American public’s disenchantment with the Vietnam War, 
but the faulty strategies of Johnson, McNamara and Westmoreland had already 
positioned the United States and South Vietnam for failure.  President Johnson had 
originally escalated the war in Vietnam in part to avoid the politically damaging 
appearance of weakness, but he ironically sustained serious political injury in his own 
party because he waged a war that ultimately made the United States appear weak. 
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      For a number of reasons, the public turned against the Vietnam War in numbers 
larger than had opposed the Korean War.  As a general rule, the public will tolerate an 
attrition war fought overseas until the war has consumed more time or more personnel 
than it finds acceptable.  The lack of perceivable progress that the United States had made 
in Vietnam hastened the onset of discontent.  By the summer months of 1968, the war in 
Vietnam had consumed more time and nearly as many men while accomplishing less 
than had the Korean War.  The higher casualty numbers and the draft had caused the 
Vietnam War to grow personally significant to the American people and fueled the anti-
war movement that confronted the Democrat party during its convention in 1968.  Anti-
war protesters, including the newly active group Vietnam Veterans against the War 
(VVAW), invoked the total number of casualties in a march on Washington in 1969, 
carrying body bags and signs reading, “43,419,” the number of casualties to that date. 
      The costly battle for Mount Ap Bia, in which the 101st Airborne lost 70 men 
killed, coincided with the VVAW march and the June 27, 1969, issue of Life magazine.  
Life readers opened the magazine to view the faces of the 241 Americans who had been 
killed in one week in the Vietnam War, fueling the anti-war feelings of the populace.38  
The VVAW called for an end of hostilities in Vietnam, diplomatic negotiations, and a 
coalition government in Vietnam including NLF representatives.  Along with Veterans 
for Peace, an organization of Second World War and Korean War veterans, the VVAW 
united war opponents across a broader political spectrum than had existed prior to 1969. 
      By 1972, the United States Armed Forces had ended the draft and begun 
withdrawing from Vietnam, so the membership of the VVAW dwindled.  Even so, the 
VVAW continued its anti-war, pro-veteran work by highlighting two other non-hostile 
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casualty areas: the poor conditions of Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals, and the 
slow bureaucracy that made VA disabilities difficult for veterans to obtain.  In the late 
1970s, the VVAW supported veterans who sought VA disability for exposure to the 
herbicide Agent Orange.  The Veterans Administration had not cooperated very 
efficiently with the soldiers who sought disability, but the VVAW had been publicizing 
the effects of exposure to Agent Orange since the Winter Soldier Investigation in 1971.  
The public had heard little about the substance during the war, so the news of soldiers 
developing adverse reactions to a chemical herbicide that their own Armed Forces had 
used proved disconcerting.39   
      Immediately upon his assumption of power, President Nixon began a program of 
“Vietnamization” to train and equip the ARVN troops to continue the fight for control of 
South Vietnam, but his administration recognized the necessity of eventual withdrawal.  
In steady increments, American soldiers left Vietnam after training the ARVN units 
tasked with replacing them.  In the revealing survey of general officers taken in 1974, a 
small majority, fifty-three percent of the generals responded negatively to the question of 
whether the war had been worth the costs.  In answer to another question, sixty-five 
percent of the generals expected the ARVN to succeed in defending South Vietnam.  
Therefore, although nearly two thirds of the generals believed that their mission had 
succeeded, a majority still held that the results of the war had not been worth the costs in 
manpower.  American casualty numbers had exceeded acceptable limits even for the 
Generals who commanded troops in Vietnam.40   
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      The disappointing end of the Vietnam War yielded a multitude of consequences 
that influenced U.S. policy for several decades.  Public support for the Vietnam War 
eroded at a far greater pace and to a far greater degree than had support for the war in 
Korea, even before the casualty numbers of Vietnam had reached those of Korea.  The 
American people did not, in the long run, approve a long war of attrition with no 
possibility for conventional victory.  During the future campaigns in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, the Reagan Administration, reflecting the influence of Vietnam, limited U.S. 
involvement to funding and arming one side of the conflict.  As soon as Hezbollah 
terrorists in Lebanon inflicted casualties, the Reagan Administration withdrew the 
Marines from Lebanon.  The invasions of Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1990, and Iraq in 
1991 all managed low costs in casualties and very short deployments while avoiding the 
pitfalls of attrition-based warfare.  In each case, American forces achieved a conventional 
victory by driving the Cuban troops out of Grenada, unseating the Noriega regime, and 
driving the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. 
   The Armed Forces adopted the Powell Doctrine of employing overwhelming 
force, defining enemy and creating an exit strategy for many of the small campaigns of 
the 1980s and the early 1990s.  Succeeding presidential administrations fought a number 
of campaigns by proxy and for the most part abstained from sending American troops 
into battle.  Strategically, fifteen years after the fall of Saigon, the Armed forces appeared 
to have learned the lessons of Vietnam that foreign wars should only last a short time and 
cost few lives.41 
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      Tactically, each of the Armed Forces prepared for the future wars with attention 
to training, doctrine, and equipment.  The Army and Navy continued preparing for 
limited engagements like the campaign in Vietnam and never again relied entirely on 
nuclear weapons as the deterrent that would keep peace.  The end of the Cold War in the 
1980s yielded a number of American allies in Eastern Europe that would contribute to the 
future American campaigns.  Both Poland and the Ukraine proved invaluable support 
during the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 21st Century.  The Army 
adopted a number of improved weapons and continued its training programs emphasizing 
small units and training indigenous troops to fight for the United States’ interests in proxy 
wars.  Of all of the Armed Forces, the Air Force completed the most sweeping 
transformations. 
      Having lost 62 fighters in air-to-air combat, and with them several pilots who 
might have survived had they completed realistic training, the Air Force learned the hard 
lessons of Vietnam and improved its training program thereafter.  To affect realistic 
training, the Air Force adopted the tactic of dissimilar opposing forces (OPFOR).  
Training during the Vietnam War had pitted F-4 pilots against one another in training 
sorties, both employing American tactics.  To prepare its fighters for future missions 
against Soviet-built aircraft and Soviet-trained pilots, the Air Force established training 
units that would use Soviet-style tactics and aircraft designed specifically to resemble the 
Soviet-built MIGs.  The realistic OPFOR training problem corrected, the Air Force 
moved on to doctrine and design challenges.42 
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      During the Vietnam War, the F-4 had proven an effective fighter to some extent, but 
the engineers had also designed the F-4 to carry bombs as a dual-purpose attack aircraft.  
Designed for two purposes, the F-4 had performed neither with outstanding success.  The 
F-4 Phantom’s tendency to “depart” under adverse aerobatic conditions the designers 
corrected with a computer for the new F-15 and F-14 fighters for the Air Force and the 
Navy.  The computers would control the aircraft in order to prevent the pilot from 
steering into a turn of excessive G-force.  The Air Force employed a final new 
improvement to fighter pilot training with the T-38, an aircraft designed to introduce 
pilots to the F-15 style of flying.  The 200 hours of training a fighter pilot spent in the T-
38 prior to setting foot in the F-15 paid dividends as the Air Force reduced its accident 
rate to historic lows.  The F-100 Super Sabre had earned the greatest Vietnam-era 
reputation for accidents.  The pilots, who gave the F-100 the nickname “Widow-maker,” 
watched a film of a catastrophic F-100 crash as part of their introduction to the aircraft.  
After watching the warning film, some pilots turned in their wings immediately.43  The F-
15, by contrast, became the first aircraft in Air Force history to remain accident-free 
throughout its first five thousand hours of flight time.  The improved design elements, the 
pre-fighter training in the T-38, and the realistic OPFOR training at Redland improved 
the safety of the pilots and their aircraft in training and in combat. 
During Operation Desert Storm, the F-15 achieved a 34:0 kill ratio against the 
Iraqi pilots, but other countries’ air forces were also flying the “Strike Eagle.”  In its 
history of air-to-air combat missions, the F-15, in the service of the U.S., Israel and Saudi 
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Arabia had as of 2002 amassed a kill ratio of 95:0.44  The aircraft born from the 
disappointments and hard lessons of Vietnam restored the American Air Force to full air 
supremacy and simultaneously maintained a better safety record than her predecessors 
had enjoyed.  In this scenario, the Generals managed to reduce hostile and non-hostile 
losses at the same time. 
      The major wars of the 1990s and early 2000s revealed the extent to which the 
American Armed Forces had improved to meet the challenges of future wars.  Tactically, 
American forces had achieved near invincibility in the air and strong dominance on the 
ground.  The campaign in 1991 to free Kuwait from the grasp of Iraqi forces succeeded in 
a short time period and maintained minimal casualties.  In the first major action since the 
Vietnam War, the United States generally fought in a manner that the public would 
tolerate.   
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       Table 3.1 shows the National Archives statistics divided quarterly 
by cause of death.
Table 3.1: Non-Hostile Casualties in Vietnam NA
Month Vehicle Aircraft Illness Other Accident Total
Aug-Oct 1957 1 1
Aug-Oct 1960 1 1
Nov 60-Jan 61 0
Feb-Apr 1961 1 1
May-Jul 1961 1 1
Aug-Oct 1961 0
Nov 61-Jan 62 1 1 2
Feb-Apr 1962 2 1 3
May-Jul 1962 2 2
Aug-Oct 1962 7 7
Nov 62-Jan 63 1 1 1 3
Feb-Apr 1963 1 4 5
May-Jul 1963 2 1 3
Aug-Oct 1963 1 4 5
Nov 63-Jan 64 2 9 11
Feb-Apr 1964 1 7 4 12
May-Jul 1964 3 2 5
Aug-Oct 1964 1 7 8
Nov 64-Jan 65 13 1 14
89
Feb-Apr 1965 2 6 5 13
May-Jul 1965 35 47 20 102
Aug-Oct 1965 18 87 18 5 128
Nov 65-Jan 66 23 77 27 4 131
Feb-Apr 1966 37 47 16 100
May-Jul 1966 52 116 35 4 207
Aug-Oct 1966 65 68 31 1 165
Nov 66-Jan 67 55 118 39 5 217
Feb-Apr 1967 72 130 38 10 250
May-Jul 1967 60 154 48 14 276
Aug-Oct 1967 69 165 53 9 296
Nov 67-Jan 68 89 205 50 14 358
Feb-Apr 1968 115 123 55 15 308
May-Jul 1968 126 94 77 22 319
Aug-Oct 1968 112 168 81 24 385
Nov 68-Jan 69 98 103 74 10 285
Feb-Apr 1969 133 133 77 13 356
May-Jul 1969 150 138 73 32 393
Aug-Oct 1969 86 214 69 29 398
Nov 69-Jan 70 130 117 62 27 336
Feb-Apr 1970 101 194 69 23 387
May-Jul 1970 111 145 56 24 336
Aug-Oct 1970 93 102 58 16 269
90
Nov 70-Jan 71 78 98 51 16 243
Feb-Apr 1971 78 107 33 11 229
May-Jul 1971 56 27 40 8 131
Aug-Oct 1971 35 64 40 4 143
Nov 71-Jan 72 15 68 28 5 116
Feb-Apr 1972 9 40 9 58
May-Jul 1972 15 58 8 3 84
Aug-Oct 1972 4 13 5 1 23
Nov 72-Jan 73 4 8 2 1 15
Feb-Apr 1973 1 1 2
May-Jul 1973 1 6 1 8
Aug-Oct 1973 6 1 7
Nov 73-Jan 74 6 6
Feb-Apr 1974 0
May-Jul 1974 2 2
Aug-Oct 1974 2 2
Nov 74-Jan 75 2 2
Feb-Apr 1975 7 7
May-Jul 1975 1 1
Aug-Oct 1975 0
Nov 75-Jan 76 1 1
Feb-Apr 1976 2 2
May-Jul 1976 0
Aug-Oct 1976 0
Nov 76-Jan 77 0
Feb-Apr 1977 0
91
May-Jul 1977 1 1
Aug-Oct 1977 0
Nov 77-Jan 78 1 1
Feb-Apr 1978 6 6
May-Jul 1978 4 4
Aug-Oct 1978 16 16
Nov 78-Jan 79 3 3
Feb-Apr 1979 5 5
May-Jul 1979 1 1
totals 2140 3363 1364 351 7218
92
h m e n
      Table 3.2 shows the DOD numbers for the entire war by cause of death.  This roster includes a number of causes of death 
absent from the NA database, including drowning, weapon and ordnance accidents, murder, accidental homicide, and suicide.
Table 3.2: Non-Hostile Casualties in Vietnam DOD
Vehicle Aircraft Cras Illness Drowning Suicide Burns Acc. Ho Other Acc Weapon, Ordnanc Murder Unknow Other Total
1104 3247 935 1020 382 147 943 1367 841 230 224 258 10698
Malaria 117
Hepatitis 22
Heart Attack 270
Stroke 42
Other 484
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CHAPTER 4: OPERATION DESERT STORM 
NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES IN “THESE KINDS OF WARS” FROM THE 
KOREAN WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
        In the wee hours of February 17, 1991, a Squadron Commander arrayed three 
AH-64 Apache helicopters to furnish close air support (CAS) to a ground unit.  Having 
boasted that he would spill the first enemy blood, he took his place alongside two 
subordinate pilots in support of the 1st Battalion 41st Infantry of the 1st Infantry Division 
and received his instructions from the operations officer on the ground.  The operations 
officer gave him his left and right limits of fire and his azimuth for the direction the task 
force would move during the mission.  Ground elements had reported two Iraqi BMP 
armored personnel carriers due north of their Scout Platoon’s position.  Rather than 
moving his focus from his right limit to the center of his sector, however, the Squadron 
Commander remained focused at his right limit.  The chopper pilot, thinking he was 
looking straight ahead instead of at his right limit, picked up the heat signatures of two 
American Bradley armored personnel carriers and reported visual contact with the enemy 
elements.  What he had seen was part of the Scout Platoon, which covered the flank of 
the battalion in an arc-shaped formation. 
        Attempting to confirm the sighting as enemy elements, the operations officer gave 
the estimated grid coordinates of the enemy vehicles to the pilot.  The Apache pilot either 
misread the graphics on his computer screen or simply recited back to the ground officer 
the coordinates of the hostile elements and continued focusing on the Bradley vehicles, 
having neither checked his azimuth nor confirmed his place on the map.  When the 
operations officer heard the correct grid location from the pilot, he granted clearance for 
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the Squadron Commander to open fire.  Owing possibly to dust and the 30 mile-per-hour 
winds of that night, or to the hot exhaust of the Bradleys, the pilot could not establish 
positive identification on his thermal sight.  Switching from 30mm cannon to Hellfire 
missile, he obtained a lock, but still proved unable to identify the suspected enemy 
vehicles.  The doubt in his voice showed over the radio as he remarked, “I hope to God 
they aren’t friendly,” and fired the Hellfire, one of the most destructive air-to-ground 
missiles in existence, into an American Bradley Fighting Vehicle.  Moments later, he 
fired a second Hellfire into the M113 armored personnel carrier beside the Bradley.1   
      Incidents such as this tragic error caused the deaths of thirty-five American 
personnel during Operation Desert Storm.  Friendly fire actually killed more Marines 
than did weapons in the hands of Iraqi troops during the war.  The fateful Hellfire 
missiles that Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Hayles fired killed two American soldiers and 
wounded six, a death toll that in light of the destructive power of the Hellfire seemed 
miraculously low.  Out of a total deployed force of 540,000, the United States lost fewer 
than three hundred total servicemen and women from all causes during Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm.2 As instances of fratricide and other casualties occurred, the 
Generals commanding the higher echelons of the U.S. Armed Forces made a number of 
assessments that led to decisions about how they would present the casualties to the 
public and the families of the deceased. 
      In every attrition war, each time a soldier sustains a mortal wound, the members 
of his chain of command from his squad leader to his Commander in Chief will need to 
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explain to the powers above them the reasons behind the wound.  While the President is 
not familiar with every individual incident, he and his press spokesmen will confront a 
growing figure – a number of casualties – which they will need to justify to the Congress 
in greater detail as it grows larger.  The superior officers of every fatally wounded soldier 
will assess the reasons behind his death and adopt measures to reduce the risk of another 
such death.  In response to non-hostile casualties, the Army Department of Training and 
Doctrine (TRADOC) will identify trends and produce literature geared toward redressing 
problems in the current system that permit accidents to happen.  TRADOC will develop 
training and add the new pieces of literature to presentations that the officers will 
demonstrate to every soldier in the theatre. 
      The Armed Forces formed its policy for reporting the casualty information during 
and after Operation Desert Storm on the basis of drawing the least possible attention to 
the news that some of the troops were killed by friendly forces.  This policy led to a 
degree of awareness among members of the news media and the general public that, at 
times, differed somewhat from the facts of the situations, in that the Armed Forces 
initially notified all families of soldiers killed in battle that their loved ones had died from 
enemy fire, even in cases when every level of command knew that the cause of death had 
been fire from friendly forces.  Even after a number of incidents gained notoriety in the 
news media, the strategy of the Brass proved quite effective.  The overall casualty toll 
was so low and the troops returned to American soil so promptly that few Americans 
concerned themselves with the human costs of the war. 
      When politicians, Generals and news reporters evaluated the Gulf War, the largest 
conventional deployment of American troops to that date since the Vietnam War, they 
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principally compared the performance of the U.S. Armed Forces with their expectations.  
The war as it transpired proved wrong a number of the predictions of Armed Forces 
officers and prompted drastically different post-war assessments.  Prior to the war, the 
Army Generals’ Staff expected a costly war, which might produce ten thousand total 
casualties, fifteen hundred of them fatalities.3  A number of Air Force commanders 
espoused a pre-war paradigm in direct contrast to this view, in which they predicted the 
ability of air power to destroy half of the Iraqi forces before the introduction of American 
ground units.4 
        The high command of the Armed Forces also eagerly welcomed the Gulf War as a 
testing ground for their weapons and maneuver capabilities.  The scope of the aerial 
bombardment and the simultaneous ground maneuver of Corps-sized elements surpassed 
many of the operations that the Army had attempted even in the course of the Vietnam 
War.  After fifteen years of living in the shadow of the pullout from Vietnam, the military 
commanders at all levels anticipated the opportunity to demonstrate their fighting 
abilities.  The Generals also anticipated the showdown between Soviet-made equipment 
and the superlative weaponry that American forces could bring to bear.  The Cold War 
had never seen a clash between large formations of Soviet T-72 tanks and the new 
American M1A1 Abrams tanks.  Other new weapons included large numbers of air-
launched precision-guided munitions and the debut of the Multiple-Launch Rocket 
System (MLRS), whose awesome bombardment powers would grow legendary.  Many of 
the non-hostile casualties of the Gulf War occurred because of the malfunction of new 
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equipment and the extremely proficient killing ability of the weapons at longer ranges 
than any weapons had before enjoyed in the combat environment.5   
 General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, developed the 
strategy for post-Vietnam wars known as the Powell Doctrine.  Emphasizing 
overwhelming force, clear and defined objectives, support from the public, and an exit 
strategy, Powell designed his strategy to correct each of the major pitfalls of the War in 
Vietnam.  Generals who commanded troops in Vietnam had complained about inadequate 
forces, unclear objectives, and open-ended commitments to the South Vietnamese 
regime.  The costs in American lives and the length of the deployment had prompted a 
significant percentage of the citizens of the United States to disapprove the war effort.  If 
the campaign proceeded according to his plans, which he had briefed to the public and 
the Congress, Powell and his subordinate Generals would annihilate their enemies 
quickly, lose relatively few lives, and return the bulk of American forces to the States 
before the public had grown disenchanted with the war effort.6 
      A number of politicians, such as Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, added a 
perspective more pessimistic than the predictions of the military.  Nunn warned of a 
strong Iraqi Army hardened by the war with Iran and doubted President George H. W. 
Bush’s prediction that the troop commitment would be brief in length of time. This 
paradigm prompted Nunn and a number of other politicians to view the Gulf War as a 
mistake and to predict that the American Armed Forces were doomed to failure or a 
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quagmire of protracted warfare similar to the Vietnam War.7  President Bush, in his 
addresses to the public, stressed the importance of halting Saddam Hussein’s aggression 
and predicted, through his Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, General H. 
Norman Schwarzkopf, a commitment of six months with a few thousand casualties, far 
below those of Vietnam.  Public opinion polls by Time and CNN taken in November of 
1990 showed the American people agreeing more with the expectations of Nunn than 
Bush by a narrow margin, but still in favor of the war.  After the successful operation in 
Panama, President Bush enjoyed generally positive public support in foreign policy.  Its 
vote of confidence in the Gulf War effort could best be termed cautious, but willing to 
make a limited commitment of troops.8 
      In retrospect, historians view the Persian Gulf War principally as an exercise of 
American policy aimed at preserving a semblance of stability in the Middle East.  
Multiple American presidents had sought to maintain the current boundaries and regimes 
in most countries in the Middle East and adopted the secondary objective of opposing the 
most territorially acquisitive regimes.  After the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the United 
States resolved, as a matter of policy, to oppose the next strongman who attempted to 
acquire territory by force.  Saddam chose to take over Kuwait and thereby prompted 
President George H. W. Bush to assemble a coalition of allies to oust him from his 
conquest.  American interests for oil access played a part in the decision to drive Saddam 
out of Kuwait, in tandem with the policy of opposing the most troublesome regime in the 
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Middle East.  President Bush stressed the importance of defeating Saddam, calling it the 
most important development in foreign affairs since World War II.9 
      After the clash of American troops with Iraqis, the dire predictions yielded to 
amazement at the power of American weapons systems.  As the war turned into a rout, 
massive formations of American troops pushed the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait and reports 
of the so-called “Highway of Death” began arriving from news reporters.  Criticism that 
the United States Armed Forces were killing more Iraqi troops than was absolutely 
necessary prompted the Bush Administration to halt the ground war after only one 
hundred hours.  In addition to taking ground and inflicting casualties, the movements 
caused a number of accidents, especially near the boundaries between units, when the 
Americans made a large advance during the night.  The Generals’ “testing ground” 
paradigm would point out that the American tanks annihilated the Iraqi T-72 tanks in the 
night environment, where the Iraqi tanks lacked night vision, but misidentifications of 
targets also caused fratricide incidents.  Before another such deployment, TRADOC paid 
attention to developing new briefings to prevent fratricide, to emphasize armored vehicle 
recognition, and to request improved optics and navigation equipment.10  When 
accounting for the sources of American casualties, the interpretation of the Gulf War in 
terms of its massive troop movements and attempts to control such movements will 
necessarily play a prominent role.   
      For present purposes, the macro paradigm of the Gulf War will consider the 
operation as a campaign to weaken a tyrannical leader while restoring the territorial status 
quo in the Middle East and stabilizing the oil market, while at the same time bearing in 
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mind the micro paradigms of the war.  The Gulf War was a successful weapons proving 
ground for the American Armed Forces, a massive deployment of troops across the 
desert, and a source of lessons learned about troop maneuvers and the controls necessary 
for the prevention of fratricide in the future. 
      To evaluate the causes and effects of non-hostile casualties in the Persian Gulf 
War, one must understand the desire to minimize the impact of fratricide, which 
influences the decisions of military leaders at every level.  The Generals who planned the 
war to drive Saddam Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait strove to minimize both the actual 
instances of friendly fire and the publicity that such instances generated in the public.  
The unusually low number of deaths from all causes aided this effort considerably.  
Public opinion polls published in Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War by John Moore 
showed the low tolerance that the public expressed for American casualties relative to 
previous wars.  The Iraqi forces had neither killed American citizens, nor destroyed 
American property, nor invaded American soil, with the result that many respondents to 
polls expressed the desire that the United States end the war if casualty numbers mounted 
too rapidly.  His work is quite illuminating in the way he casts the political situation and 
the consequences of the war for President Bush and Congress. 
   For military and political leaders, a minimal casualty image was imperative.  True 
to this objective, General Schwarzkopf in his autobiography It Doesn’t Take a Hero gave 
extremely short shrift to reports of friendly fire, except to mention his attempts to 
minimize it.  Michael R. Gordon uses a similar perspective to that of General 
Schwarzkopf in The Generals’ War, in which Gordon gives numerous examples of 
generals making strategic decisions based on the need to prevent friendly fire.  An apt 
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companion to Gordon’s work Air War in the Persian Gulf by Murray and Thompson 
gives the view of the war from the standpoint of the top brass of the American Air Force.  
Michael Lewis’ article “The Law of Aerial Bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War” 
contributes a full analysis of the role the Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers played 
in approving and analyzing the legality of targets for air strikes.  These secondary sources 
furnish excellent accounts of the war from the point of view of the high Military Brass. 
       A fitting counter to these positive reports is Rick Atkinson’s Crusade: The Untold 
Story of the Persian Gulf War.  Atkinson emphasizes the intensity and pain of warfare, 
highlighting the cases of friendly fire and the famously explosive temper displayed by the 
general known to the public as “Stormin’ Norman.”  Atkinson draws attention to the 
Hellfire attack on an American Bradley Fighting Vehicle by Lieutenant Colonel Hayles.  
Hayles joined LTC John Daly as each bore the dubious distinction of holding the position 
of Battalion Commander and firing fatally on friendly troops.  The case of LTC Daly’s 
killing of Corporal Fielder prompted a Congressional investigation, as all evidence 
revealed a cover-up by military authorities.  The Committee on Government Affairs 
report titled “The investigation of a friendly fire incident during the Persian Gulf War” 
and the General Accounting Office’s, “Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident” 
furnish excellent accounts of a worst-case scenario in a friendly fire incident.  A second 
invaluable government compilation is Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to 
Congress.  The report devotes one appendix to friendly fire and provides a number of 
statistics that explain some of the conduct of the Army in the John Daly case.  The 
Department of Defense website contained the document “The United States Navy in 
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‘Desert Shield’ / ‘Desert Storm,’” in which the Navy conducted a formal evaluation of its 
successes and lessons learned from the war with Iraq. 
      One of the most vivid sources of primary material on combat is Otto J. Lehrack’s 
collection of interviews, America’s Battalion: Marines in the First Gulf War.  A Marine 
veteran of the Vietnam War, Lehrack interviewed the Marines from his old battalion, the 
3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, which fought the Battle for Kafji alongside Saudi troops.  The 
3/3 Marines experienced a number of close calls with friendly fire and lost eleven men to 
fratricide.  An excellent contribution to attack helicopter fratricide by an expert in the 
field is James A. Towe’s Master’s thesis, “Eliminating Fratricide from Attack Helicopter 
Fires: An Aviator’s Perspective.”  Towe provides the most comprehensive analysis in 
existence of the cases of fratricide from attack helicopters during the Gulf War.  William 
Garrett recommends new doctrinal measures in his article “Fratricide: Doctrine’s Role in 
Reducing Friendly Fire,” and Henry Larsen adds “Fratricide: Reducing the Friction 
through Technology.”  These theses illuminate the causes of fratricide and recommend 
solutions at the practical level of ordinary troops. 
      In reaction to two servicemen’s deaths from a Connecticut National Guard Unit, 
Senator Christopher Dodd and Representative Christopher Shays requested a General 
Accounting Office investigation into the causes of accidents with unexploded ordnance.  
The GAO produced the report “Casualties Caused by Improper Handling of U.S. 
Submunitions,” examining the explosives carried by the artillery pieces of the Armed 
Forces.  The report discovered that the famous MLRS weapons system had caused a 
number of the casualties due to a parts malfunction.  The Army had known about the 
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problem a few years in advance, but had not corrected the defect fully because of the 
expense of new systems. 
      A few macro-level articles also deserve attention.  Bennett, Lepgold and Unger 
wrote “Burden-Sharing and the Persian Gulf War” to examine the motives of the nations 
involved in the Coalition and to speculate on the chances for future alliances.  In addition, 
a number of online databases, “1991 Defense Almanac,” Gulf War Debriefing Book, and 
Desert Storm.com furnish stories and specific accounts of the deaths of American 
soldiers.  For comparison purposes with Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the statistics at 
icasualties.org stand second to none.  By means of these sources, an observer can 
evaluate what the levels of casualties truly were and whether they compared favorably or 
otherwise with other sources. 
      The Persian Gulf War draws ready comparison with the Spanish-American War 
for a number of reasons, including duration, cost in manpower, and apparent ease of 
battle.  The “splendid little war” to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait generally taxed the 
Americans very little emotionally and left the commanders of all services at every level 
satisfied with the outcome.  The war proved so short and low in casualties that the Army 
could scrutinize every instance of reported fratricide during combat operations and render 
judgment.  The basic numbers are so low that the various sources reporting on Operation 
Desert Storm agree on the numbers with few exceptions. 
      The United States Armed Forces lost 148 soldiers in battle, including 35 from 
fratricide, a rate of 25 percent, and 145 to non-battle causes such as traffic accidents, 
illnesses, and aircraft crashes.11  In its final report to Congress, the Armed Forces 
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identified by name all of the service personnel who died during the campaign to free 
Kuwait from Iraqi control.12  The Iraqi losses, by comparison, seemed astronomical.  As 
General Schwarzkopf confidently touted the over 60,000 prisoners that American forces 
had taken in his post-ceasefire negotiations with the Iraqi generals, even his estimate 
understated the number by over ten thousand. 
      The Department of Defense reported enemy losses at over one hundred aircraft, 
over three thousand tanks, two thousand artillery pieces, two thousand other armored 
vehicles, and nineteen ships sunk, with seventy-one thousand total Iraqi prisoners of war 
turned over to the Saudi government.13  Iraqi deaths at the hands of American forces 
would prove more difficult to calculate, but they certainly numbered in the thousands and 
reflected several Iraqi divisions rendered entirely ineffective for additional combat.  By 
almost any standard, then, the overall assessment of the casualties in the Gulf War 
showed American casualties quite low and Iraqi casualties amazingly high.  The twenty-
five percent share that fratricide claimed in battlefield deaths might be attributed to Iraqi 
ineptitude as much as to American eagerness to fire on ill-identified targets. 
      Although Saddam Hussein promised “the mother of all battles,” his bluster 
quickly evaporated as the Allies commenced an overwhelming assault.14  The American 
air campaign took the desired toll on the morale of the Iraqi Armed Forces, destroying 
significant elements of their combat power and establishing complete air supremacy.  By 
the time the ground campaign began, the Iraqi soldiers had resolved to surrender by the 
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hundreds to the first American soldiers they could find.  An army reputed to be the 
fourth-largest in the world and thought to have been seasoned by the Iran-Iraq War of the 
1980s proved instead to act in many cases as amateurish as an untrained militia.  Fearing 
above all the chemical weapons that Saddam’s regime had used against the Iranians, the 
Allied Air Command placed atop its twelve-item priority list the destruction of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons (NBC) sites.15  Happily for American commanders at 
every level, the worst case scenario threats they had envisioned never materialized. 
      Gordon criticizes the American generals severely for their failure to learn from 
the conduct that the Iraqi troops displayed at the Battle of Khafji early in the war.  As 
soon as they faced superior fire power, the Iraqis fled in panic, which they would do in 
most engagements with the American forces.  General Schwarzkopf, however, did not 
depart from the plans that his staff had made on the assumption that the Iraqis would fight 
a determined resistance.16  Thus, a historian may choose between two perspectives on the 
issue of fratricide.  Either the percentage rate of fratricide deaths appears enormous 
compared to that of previous wars, or the rate of battlefield casualties caused by the 
enemy seems remarkably low next to other figures. 
      Considering the statistic that over seventy thousand Iraqi troops surrendered while 
the Iraqi Armed Forces killed fewer than one hundred fifty Americans, and that 
accidental deaths nearly equaled battlefield deaths, the latter perspective proves more 
consistent with other available information.  Both fratricide and accident rates stood at 
higher levels than previous wars recorded in comparison to combat losses.  The combat 
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death toll can therefore be considered low due to Iraqi incompetence rather than 
American shortcomings causing strangely high rates of fratricide and accidents.  A 
smaller coalition lost similar numbers of troops to accidents in Iraq in the first six months 
of the 2003 invasion, but in that case the Iraqis killed more Americans in terms of 
numbers and percentage.17 
 On a number of occasions, the Allies of multiple nations in the Coalition found 
that they lost more men to their own fire than to that of the enemy.  In the first ground 
combat between the Coalition and the Iraqi troops, on January 29, 1991, the Iraqis made a 
brief attack across the border into Saudi Arabia, seizing the town of Khafji for no more 
than one day.  This first clash would significantly foreshadow later clashes between the 
Iraqis and the Coalition.  The main weapons that the ground forces brought to bear 
against the Iraqis were Coalition air strikes, followed in popularity by artillery fire.  To a 
large degree, Operation Desert Storm proceeded for the first time in history with ground 
elements simply directing fire from the air against the enemy rather than taking the main 
initiative for the fight.   
       A small party of Marines remained in Khafji as the Iraqis captured the town and 
evaded discovery while calling on the radio for artillery fire against the Iraqis.  The only 
wounds this party suffered came from their friendly artillery.  In the course of the Iraqi 
advance, American aircraft misidentified Saudi vehicles and bombed them mistakenly as 
they fled from Khafji.  This incident prompted the nearby Syrian units, also members of 
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the Coalition, to comply with orders to place identifying markers on their vehicles.18  The 
Saudis nearly suffered the same fate from their friends on the ground, as the 3rd Battalion 
3rd Marines narrowly avoided serving them with further fratricide.  Because of vigilance 
and proper visual vehicle identification, however, the commander of the Marines gave the 
order to hold fire.  The Marines sustained the worst episode of fratricide during the war 
as they withdrew in good order and called for air support on the Iraqi tanks near Khafji.  
The multiple Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft destroyed twenty-two Iraqi tanks, but a 
targeting flare that one pilot dropped among the Marines cost seven lives when a 
Maverick missile launched by the American A-10 slammed into a Marine Light Armored 
Vehicle (LAV-25).  In the confusion and multiple maneuvers by both sides that night, a 
TOW missile from a fellow Marine vehicle on the ground disabled another LAV-25 and 
killed four personnel.19  In the case of the Battle for Khafji, confusion and disorientation 
in the night conditions proved the leading factors in contributing to the tragic loss of 
eleven American lives and one Saudi.  If not for the vigilance of the Marines in holding 
fire from the fleeing Saudi armored personnel carriers, the episode could have cost more 
lives. 
      As reflected by this event, the most common episodes of fratricide involved 
armored vehicles.  Of twenty-one soldiers in the Army killed by friendly fire, seventeen 
sustained their mortal wounds while operating armored vehicles, even if those vehicles 
did not closely resemble the enemy vehicles.20  Although most crewmen in armored 
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vehicles and aircraft had undergone significant training in identifying targets, all in time 
found that their optics were also the Achilles’ heels of their arsenal.  The truth proved 
devastating on many occasions that the weapons which Coalition units deployed could 
kill effectively from farther away than their operators could see to identify their targets. 
On the ground, a number of cases involved friendly forces firing before they had 
established clear visual identification.  Air Force pilots in one particular case learned the 
hard way that some of the ground-to-air identification panels which armored vehicles 
carried did not show a signature above five thousand feet.  Viewing British vehicles from 
high altitude, the A-10s deployed a devastating barrage that killed nine soldiers.21  In the 
hardest lesson of that war, the Americans learned the need for better resources for 
friendly forces to identify one another. 
      The other factors that contributed to fratricide included the typical fear that all 
soldiers experience in their first exposure to combat.  This fear and its accompanying 
adrenaline contributed to a, “shoot first and ask questions later” attitude.  In a few cases, 
units fired on friendly adjacent units that maneuvered so close to them that explaining 
their conduct can prove difficult.  One such instance involved two Marine units clearing 
parts of the same minefield.  The renowned “fog of war” factor appeared to combine with 
a trigger-happy nervousness on that part of the Marines to prompt this unfortunate 
episode.22 
      An eagerness for the fray common to soldiers in their first combat situation also 
prompted the swift and deadly engagements of alleged targets that tragically turned out to 
be friendly forces.  Lieutenant Colonel Hayles, the Battalion Commander whose conduct 
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this paper described in the introduction, disobeyed a direct order from his superior officer 
on the night that he fired the Hellfire missiles into two American vehicles.  A swaggering 
Texan whose call sign, Gunfighter 6, speaks for itself, LTC Hayles had boasted that he 
would draw enemy blood first of all the men in his battalion and he assumed the 
unaccustomed position of copilot/gunner on an Apache helicopter flown by a Chief 
Warrant Officer.  Hayles’ eagerness likely contributed to his erroneous reading of the 
display graphics on his targeting computer, a theory proposed by fellow aviator James 
Towe in his Master’s Thesis.  The long range of the Apache’s weapons played a key role 
in this incident, as the Hellfire missile can kill from eight thousand meters’ distance, but 
target identification is difficult from farther away than fifteen hundred meters.  Hayles 
opened fire from a distance of nearly thirty-five hundred meters, from which distance he 
had tried unsuccessfully to establish positive target identification.23   
      The size of the formations and poor weather conditions made notable 
contributions to fratricide episodes.  William Garrett’s study of doctrine and fratricide 
revealed that most incidents occurred near the boundaries between units, early in the 
operations, and under conditions of limited visibility.  LTC Hayles fired his fatal shots 
while enduring winds of twenty knots, which raised dust and reduced the visibility of the 
battlefield.  Although limited visibility could explain his case to some extent, another 
Apache fired on a Bradley vehicle in perfect weather conditions.  Mercifully, this gunner 
had looked through the wrong site aperture and his missile missed its mark.  A third 
attack helicopter fired on the fleeing Saudis during the Khafji battle.  Of these, the only 
three attack helicopter cases of fratricide, all involved target misidentification, but only 
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one happened under poor weather conditions.24  As a reason for faulty identification, 
weather played a minor role, always accompanied by other factors, in contributing to 
fratricide.   
      The eager attitude of the soldiers that contributed to Garrett’s finding that most 
fratricide incidents happened early in the campaign also affected combat support soldiers.  
A small number of U.S. troops retained unexploded ordnance to their detriment.  The 
General Accounting Office investigated the deaths of two Connecticut National 
Guardsmen from ordnance explosions.  The GAO reported that the soldiers had picked up 
submunitions from artillery shells or possibly from rockets.  The submunitions were 
small charges intended to separate from the main warhead on contact with the target and 
detonate against surrounding equipment, personnel, or the ground.  A number of 
submunitions had failed to explode, which the GAO estimated had caused sixteen deaths 
when soldiers picked them up on the battlefield.25   
      The GAO investigated tests the Army had conducted on the M483A1 projectile 
used by the 155mm Howitzers, the M509A1 projectile for the 8-inch howitzer, and the 
rocket projectile used by the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS).  Army 
regulations required that all submunitions for artillery projectiles maintain a 95% first-
time detonation rate.  In its investigation of the conventional artillery shells, which 
dropped up to 180 submunitions each, the GAO found that every lot of submunitions met 
or exceeded the minimum standards for performance, usually experiencing a 98% first-
time detonation rate. 
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        The MLRS, by contrast, distributing a carpet of 644 submunitions from each 
rocket, reflected a different record.  Although some lots of M77 submunitions maintained 
rates for first-time detonation as low as 77%, the Army had issued recalls beginning in 
December 1989 for only a few lots of submunitions.  The Army chose not to recall more 
lots due to the high costs of replacing MLRS rockets.  The MLRS, developed to fight 
against the Red Army during the Cold War, experienced its first major usage in the Gulf 
War.  As such, the failure rate of MLRS submunitions would not have proven a problem 
if only enemy soldiers had been finding them, as would have been the case in a Cold War 
engagement.  During the Gulf War the MLRS, which could fire twelve rockets in five 
minutes and change its position, reloading in nine minutes, proved devastatingly effective 
against the Iraqi Army, earning the nickname “Steel Rain” from its enemy. 
        As to the threat that the submunitions posed to the soldiers on the battlefield, 
every soldier had received briefings as early as Basic Training and heard at least once a 
year renewed warnings to stay away from unexploded ordnance every time he fired 
weapons on a range.  About this one issue at least, no soldier who had fired a weapon 
could possibly claim ignorance of the dangers posed by unexploded ordnance.  The 
eleven soldiers from the Connecticut National Guard Unit who amassed M77 projectiles 
as souvenirs and suffered injury or death deserve the most generous share of the blame 
for their death through their personal stupidity.26  The Army had accepted some risk in 
order to avoid the prohibitive expense of building entirely new rockets and the GAO 
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could measure the toll in sixteen lives.  Thirteen additional soldiers died during the Gulf 
War from improper handling of ordnance, for a total toll of twenty-nine.27   
      The non-hostile non-battle casualties for the United States totaled one hundred 
forty-five, including such causes as illnesses, vehicle accidents, aircraft crashes, 
accidental shootings, and such miscellaneous accidents as the collapse of a wall of 
sandbags.  Although information in databases in print and on the internet about battlefield 
casualties is quite thorough, the same sources show a significant lack of information on 
non-battle deaths.  One single ferry accident on December 22, 1990, killed all of the nine 
sailors who died in non-hostile conditions for the entire campaign.28  Out of the total 
coalition strength of five hundred forty thousand, the one hundred forty-five deaths from 
assorted non-hostile non-battle causes never alarmed the leaders of the military 
sufficiently to prompt investigations.  As a point of comparison, the first seven months of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 yielded a non-hostile, non-battle figure of one hundred 
thirty eight deaths with a smaller coalition.29 
      The causes and types of death showed no discernable pattern for Operation Desert 
Storm, nor did any major shortcoming appear to cause deaths, aside from the 
submunitions problem involving the MLRS projectiles.  Overall, the non-hostile deaths 
during Desert Storm remained relatively low, with only the instance of fratricide 
attracting attention.  Most of those episodes could be attributed to a lack of familiarity 
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with the makes of friendly vehicles and the excessive lethal range of American weapons, 
as well as human eagerness to engage the enemy.   
      The casualty assessments for the top Military Brass began, as always, long before 
the first combat began along the Saudi-Kuwait border.  Clausewitz’s famous quotation 
that war is politics by other means may be overly simplified, but political calculations 
accompany many of the decisions that Generals and political leaders make when waging 
war.  Generals must produce for their political overseers in Congress and the White 
House reliable estimates of the costs in manpower and materiel of executing the current 
mission.  All officers planning wars estimate the degree of determination that their 
citizens possess to fight and win despite the costs involved.  The effects on public morale 
both of friendly and enemy casualties, as well as civilian casualties play some part in the 
plans that the generals make. 
        The Military Brass had employed simulation scenarios estimating the cost of the 
war, predicting fifteen hundred dead and ten thousand total casualties on the American 
side.30  The estimate of thirty to forty pilots killed and one hundred fifty aircraft shot 
down significantly overestimated the abilities of the Iraqi air forces.  In fact, no American 
aircraft fell to Iraqi pilots in air-to-air combat.  The total loss of aircraft for the United 
States only reached seventy-five from all causes, including a few to ground fire.  The 
Navy and Air Force lost a combined total of only twenty-six personnel during the 
campaign, only a few of whom were pilots.31  The phenomenal success of Operation 
Desert Storm, in which a large contingent of American soldiers deployed to the Persian 
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Gulf and returned after only seven months at the cost of fewer than three hundred lives, 
gained a significant public relations victory for the Armed Forces commanders.  The 
officers under General Schwarzkopf’s command could attribute the relatively easy 
victory to the superior training and armaments of the American soldiers and to the 
inferior discipline and equipment of the Iraqi Armed Forces.  Even the Republican Guard 
fared poorly against the onslaught of American fire power and fled in the face of the 
ground offensive.  Michael Gordon in The Generals’ War predicted that the low 
casualties from Desert Storm would cause unrealistically low expectations for future 
wars.  Both the politicians involved and the public would expect easy campaigns and 
tolerate nothing that proved difficult.32  His observation in time proved highly prophetic, 
written eight years before Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his Generals planned the 
invasion of Iraq for 2003.   
      For the air and ground campaigns, the Armed Forces developed a twelve-tier 
targets priority list, with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons facilities 
ranked at the top.  Because Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons against the 
Iranians, American forces naturally feared deployment of NBC weapons.  Scud missile 
sites ranked second, followed by sites performing support, production, and research of 
weapons systems.  Senior leadership and command, control, and communications (C3) 
systems occupied places four and five.  Electrical power facilities, oil facilities, railroads 
and bridges, air fields, and naval ports ranked next.  The strategic air defense system and 
the Republican Guard units represented the final two of the twelve priorities.  These 
priorities revealed the desires of the Coalition commanders to prevent mass destruction, 
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long-range attacks, including those against Israel, and to disrupt command structure and 
finally infrastructure elements with military significance.  Judge Advocate General (JAG) 
officers reviewed target lists to ensure the Armed Forces’ complicity with the law of war 
and to conduct military necessity and proportionality analyses.  In a dramatic change 
since the Vietnam War, when napalm served as an anti-personnel weapon, the JAG 
officers actually made determinations in a number of cases that the recommended 
weapons were excessively large for their targets and suggested smaller munitions.  
Political and public relations concerns led the JAG officers to make every effort to avoid 
approving targets that would inflict civilian casualties even, in one case, when the Iraqis 
essentially used civilians as human shields.33 
      The Generals commanding divisions and corps in the Iraqi theatre at multiple 
times took calculated risks, but more often erred on the side of caution in order to prevent 
casualties from friendly and even from hostile fire.  The air commanders in particular 
took steps to reduce their risks of casualties during missions.  In response to enemy 
ground fire that had damaged a B-52 bomber, Lieutenant General Charles Horner, the 
Joint Forces Air Component Commander, (JFACC) directed that the Air Force cease its 
low-altitude air strikes by January 19, 1991, in order to minimize the risk to pilots and 
airplanes.  After the loss of two F-16 fighter-bombers during a mission code-named 
Package Q, the Air Force cancelled all further conventional daytime raids on Baghdad. 
      The Air Force suffered a public relations setback when a bombing raid on 
February 13, 1991, aimed at destroying command and control bunkers in downtown 
Baghdad reportedly killed a number of civilians taking shelter in the Al Firdos bunker, 
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which also housed enemy intelligence personnel.  Conducting risks versus benefits 
analysis, General Horner concluded that tactical considerations would preclude further 
Package Q bombing raids and political concerns led him to cancel all future raids on 
downtown Baghdad.  Thus, in three instances, the Air Force reduced its degree of 
aggression in response to hostile casualties.  As the ground war began, General Horner 
expressed his willingness for greater risks of casualties, including fratricide casualties, 
reminding his subordinates that he wanted to see aggressive conduct.34 
      The Air Force suffered few non-hostile casualties, but inflicted a number of 
fratricide losses on the Marines at Khafji, on some British armored vehicles, and through 
the employment on three occasions of anti-radar HARM missiles that struck friendly 
radar sites.  Reportedly, the Iraqi radar sites at which the missiles had been aimed shut 
down their operations and the missiles homed onto the nearest radar sites, which sadly 
were friendly.  The Air Force attributed all or nearly all of the fratricide inflicted by their 
aircraft to mechanical failure by the weapons in each situation.35  Although the radar 
homing explanation might explain some incidents, the explanation is so self-serving that 
strict scrutiny is in order.  In the first case, all of the observers of the Khafji incident 
reported that the A-10 pilot dropped his spotter flare in the wrong place, near the 
Marines, and thereby caused the fratricide that his missile inflicted as he passed the group 
the second time.36  His munitions did exactly what he told them to do, which 
unfortunately included taking American lives.  Faulty target identification almost 
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certainly caused the strikes that destroyed the British Warrior vehicles, taking nine lives, 
which further illustrates the weakness of the claim that mechanical failure caused all of 
the air-to-ground fratricide incidents. 
      What appears to be simple passing of the buck underscores the broader strategic 
worldview of the Joint Forces Air Combat Commander.  The policy of the Air Force to 
avoid assigning guilt to their pilots agrees with the doctrinal claims that air power 
enthusiasts, General Horner among them, were making at that time.  In order to improve 
on the Vietnam experience, in which six generals shared responsibility for air missions, 
General Schwarzkopf placed all Coalition air power under the JFACC, General Horner.  
Mindful that the Vietnam War strategy of gradual escalation of air power had proved 
ineffective, Horner’s staff developed an air campaign plan, code named Instant Thunder, 
which called for overwhelming force to cripple the Iraqi Army.  Horner predicted not 
only that air weaponry could destroy half of the total deployed Iraqi forces but also that 
air power alone might win the war against Saddam’s aggression and drive him from 
Kuwait.37  In practice, neither of these predictions proved realistic, but each prediction 
reflected Horner’s worldview concerning air power.  The general who would make 
grandiose predictions of air power capability would naturally attribute every error by a 
pilot to the malfunctioning of his weapons.  Perhaps General Horner was not self-serving 
so much as he was unrealistically enamored with air power. 
      The ground offensive that famously lasted only one hundred hours saw additional 
risks tempered by caution at the highest levels.  General Schwarzkopf, who barely 
mentioned casualties of any kind in his triumphant autobiography It Doesn’t Take a 
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Hero, nevertheless recorded two very tense warnings that he gave to his commanders as 
their campaigns progressed.  A fratricide episode involving American aircraft and British 
surface vehicles near the end of the ground campaign prompted Schwarzkopf as 
Commander in Chief of the operation (CINC) to call General Horner to request greater 
caution before his pilots engaged ground targets.  He also warned his Marine forces 
commander, Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, to avoid fratricide against Saudi forces 
as they attacked Kuwait City in a joint operation.  The CINC saw both tactical and 
international issues at play when the Marines rode alongside Saudi troops.38 
      Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, commander of VII Corps, which 
represented about one third of the total Coalition ground forces, halted his attack on the 
night of February 24-25, in order to prevent fratricide in an armored column twenty miles 
wide and forty miles long.  On a later night, Major General Paul Funk, commander of 3rd 
Armored Division and a part of Franks’ Corps, suspended a night attack for the same 
reason after he lost three men to aerial fratricide.39  As the campaign neared its end, 
Franks twice canceled or delayed a nighttime forward passage of lines maneuver because 
he feared that the confusion might foster fratricide.  In a passage of lines, the vehicles and 
troops of one large unit, a brigade or a division, pass through the formations of another 
large unit in order to assume a new position.40  In his attempts to avoid fratricide, General 
Franks ordered his units not to fire unless fired upon, which seemed to conflict with the 
need for aggressive activity in the face of the enemy, but these orders reflected his 
priorities.  He feared fratricide more than he feared the firepower of the Iraqis. 
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      The most controversial and tactically costly precaution concerned the Fire 
Support Coordination Line.  This line, set by the various ground generals in their sectors 
of operation, communicated the estimated front line trace of Coalition ground units.  To 
minimize the risk of fratricide, the Air Force was forbidden to strike any target south or 
west of the FSCL.  When Lieutenant General Gary Luck, commander of XVIIIth 
Airborne Corps, the westernmost Coalition unit, wanted to enable his helicopter pilots to 
operate without Air Force interference, he chose to move the FSCL north of the 
Euphrates River on February 27, 1991.  In so doing, he allowed several Iraqi units to 
escape from Kuwait without the threat of air strikes until General Schwarzkopf’s staff 
detected the discrepancy and moved the FSCL back to its previous location.  Ironically, 
Luck’s tactical mistake may have aided the Coalition slightly in the public relations 
realm.  The “Highway of Death,” a narrative, in which the American news media 
reported the Air Force slaughtering the hapless retreating Iraqi troops, would have 
involved greater destruction had Luck not moved the FSCL.41   
      A final cause of fratricide involving the military brass concerned the lack of 
devices to enable friendly forces to recognize one another.  Although daytime recognition 
symbols included a painted inverted “V” on every vehicle and orange plastic VS-17 
panels on armored vehicles for air-to-ground recognition, the Armed Forces never 
distributed recognition devices for night conditions.  Battery-powered infrared beacons 
and thermal tape did not make their arrival on the battlefield until February 26, when the 
ground war had nearly concluded.  Even those commanders who managed to install the 
IR beacons found that they improved vehicle identification conditions very little.  
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Lacking the devices for effective recognition at night, the ground force commanders 
provided doctrinal remedies or showed the aforementioned tactical timidity.  Task Force 
commanders instructed their armored units not to engage suspected enemy troops at 
distances greater than two thousand meters.  A number of tank commanders disobeyed 
this instruction and paid the price by inflicting fratricide casualties.42  Although 
regulations had established green and white star clusters as the official pyrotechnic 
signals for units to launch in reaction to taking fire from their own forces, multiple 
ground units never received these devices.43  Both the Center for Army Lessons Learned 
in its newsletter and the Department of Defense in its Final Report to Congress 
acknowledged the need for better anti-fratricide devices for ground-to-ground recognition 
and more Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) devices to prevent units from getting lost or 
disoriented.  In reaction to the phenomenon of weapons killing beyond their operators’ 
ability to identify targets, the Department of Defense also called for better optics on 
weapons systems.44 
      Concerning non-hostile, non-battle casualties, which numbered 145, the various 
branches of the Armed Forces have expressed few reactions.  The Department of Defense 
report makes no mention at all of deaths caused by accidents, except when furnishing the 
names of the dead.  Although the Army made a number of recommendations for 
improved ground warfare recognition, the Navy saw no need to do the same.  The Chief 
of Naval Operations’ report, “The United States Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 
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enumerates lessons learned about interoperability and cooperation among the services, 
but makes no mention at all of casualties.45   
      Even in areas in which doctrine had established safety regulations for several 
decades, negligent conduct at various levels led to non-hostile casualties.  In addition to 
the aforementioned ordnance souvenir collectors, seven combat engineers amassed 
several unexploded munitions in a pile against safety regulations and all died when one of 
the explosives detonated, triggering a chain reaction.46  As reflected in their complete 
absence from after-action reports, these casualties made no impression on the upper 
military brass at all.  The ferry accident that claimed nine lives, the twenty-three total 
servicemen who died from ordnance mishandling, and a number of vehicle accidents 
could be considered, along with non-battle deaths from other wars, as the accidents that 
tend to happen in a deployed force totaling 540,000 servicemen.  Therefore, the upper 
brass saw no need to make specific mention of these casualties. 
      For at least one time in history, the American Armed Forces managed to give the 
public a war that it would tolerate in all of its particulars.  A war in which the enemy had 
neither invaded American soil nor taken American lives, nor threatened the United States 
directly, the Persian Gulf War necessarily had limited evident importance to American 
interests and limited strategic significance relative to the declared wars of previous 
centuries.  The Armed Forces correctly planned for a short span of public indulgence.  
Politicians and news reporters expressed skepticism about whether the United States 
Armed Forces truly needed to fight the Persian Gulf War.  As the Middle East is a part of 
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the world best known for its oil exports, the average citizen might perceive the campaign 
as an attempt to stabilize the price of gasoline, but public opinion polls in August and 
November 1990 showed extremely low approval for a war based on oil or gasoline 
interests; as few as sixteen percent of responders would approve of such a major war.  
The strategic goals of protecting Saudi Arabia, restoring Kuwait’s government, and 
rescuing American hostages commanded similarly low approval for “a major war,” 
although a majority of responders said that these interests justified “military 
involvement.”  The administration therefore knew that the public would only approve a 
short campaign, and promised as much.47 
      Senator Sam Nunn, a highly respected politician in matters of military affairs, 
opposed the war at its outset, citing fears over the casualty numbers and the duration of 
the conflict.  The Georgian openly disputed President Bush’s predictions of few 
casualties and a short deployment, and led a majority of the Democrats in Congress to 
vote against the war.  If the president could not keep his promises about the conduct and 
duration of the war, they planned to place their dissenting voices in the official record.  
President Bush, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and General Colin Powell, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all knew well that the public would support a short 
conflict with a perceivable and attainable goal.  As the casualties mounted and success 
appeared less likely, public support would erode.48  As far as the Bush Administration 
was concerned, they lived on borrowed time where the approval of the public was 
concerned.  Over one decade later, President George W. Bush found a similar public 
relations situation when he led another war effort against Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
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      Hoping to derive support from the unity of several nations, the administration 
crafted a broad-based coalition of several allies from Europe and the Middle East.  The 
public needed to perceive the United States leading several allies who contributed 
tangibly to the effort to complete a worthwhile mission.  In this case, the most acquisitive 
regime in the Middle East was expanding its holdings by force.  Iraq, by invading 
Kuwait, both endangered the supply of oil from the Middle East and flexed a rhetorical 
muscle in an attempt to intimidate the other nations of the region.  As the greatest 
Western power in the post-Cold War era, the United States needed to take on the role of 
coalition leader, supplying sufficient resolve and military forces for victory so that 
smaller nations would contribute as well.  In spite of Saddam’s attempt to divide the 
Coalition by attacking Israel, the Coalition maintained its integrity until Iraq had fled 
Kuwait in defeat.49 
      The approval of the American public for the Persian Gulf War depended 
principally on the numbers of casualties and the duration of the deployment.  Calculating 
accurately the priorities of the public, the Department of Defense kept its word that the 
vast bulk of troops would come home within months of the conclusion of hostilities.  The 
amazingly low numbers of total casualties and the rapid return of the troops ensured 
public approval for the war effort that almost never wavered.50 
      In the months following the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, approximately 
thirty-five families in the United States became aware of a policy that the Armed Forces 
had adopted without informing the public.  For all fratricide cases, the Department of 
Defense decided to investigate the circumstances of the allegations without informing the 
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families of the victims and complete all of its investigations after the troops had returned 
home.  On August 13, 1991, the Department of Defense informed thirty-five families that 
their husbands, sons, or brothers had been killed by fratricide and not hostile fire, as 
previous notifications had maintained.51  By August 1991, with the war long over and the 
troops home safely, the Department of Defense knew that no major public reaction would 
follow the disclosure of the details of fratricide incidents because the war had become 
yesterday’s news.  In this case, the military leaders chose to prioritize the Army’s esteem 
in the public relations realm over the needs of the families of fratricide victims to know 
the truth promptly.  In some cases, a lengthy investigation was necessary, but in cases 
such as the killing of Corporal Lance Fielder, the soldiers on the ground knew 
immediately that fratricide had caused his death.  Even so, his family would not officially 
learn the true cause of his death until August 1991. 
      In a revealing illustration of this course of events, John Mueller’s book Policy and 
Opinion in the Gulf War includes the results of dozens of public opinion surveys, many 
of which tested the tolerance of the public for casualties, but none of which concerned 
fratricide.  In his chronology of the aftermath of the war, ending with the 1992 election, 
Mueller did not include the date that the fratricide cases became public.  Even for a 
political science professor attempting to gauge public opinion about the war’s aftermath, 
the public reaction to the fratricide cases proved so small as to be overlooked.52  So few 
soldiers died from fratricide that the public did not consider them at all when evaluating 
the war.  For the same reason, the news reporters conducting the surveys did not draw 
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attention to the fratricide statistics.  The Department of Defense had succeeded in 
avoiding scrutiny on issues of fratricide. 
      The single public event that made headlines briefly did not come to light until 
four years later.  In 1995, Senator Fred Thompson of Tennessee convened his Committee 
on Government Affairs to hold hearings on a General Accounting Office investigation 
originally begun by Senator James Sasser.  Fielder’s parents received notification of their 
son’s death in August 1991, learning for the first time through official channels that 
soldiers of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, (ACR) instead of Iraqi troops, had killed 
him.  In the early morning hours of February 27, 1991, one squadron of the 3rd ACR 
under Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John Daly advanced to capture Umm Hajul airfield near 
the border between VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps.  The lead troop of Daly’s 
squadron neared the airfield, spying soldiers in what appeared to be entrenched positions 
in front of a large armored vehicle of nondescript shape.  The soldiers were engineers 
from the 54th Engineer Battalion, 1st Armored Division, whose M548 Ammunition 
Carrier had broken down.  Captain (CPT) Bo Friesen, commander of the lead troop, was 
not aware that he had crossed the Corps boundary, but he had been briefed that there 
would be no friendly units for several miles to his front.  He ordered his men to fire 
warning shots, of which some rounds struck the trailer of the ammunition carrier and set 
it ablaze. 
       First Lieutenant (1LT) Kevin Wessels of the 54th Engineers launched a green star 
cluster from an M203 grenade launcher in an attempt to illuminate the area and to 
identify his men as Americans.  It is likely that Captain Friesen mistook this shot as 
hostile fire and cued his order that his men fire a few shots at the troops on the ground.  A 
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following short burst of fire from Friesen’s men wounded Sergeant James Napier, but the 
captain ordered them to cease fire so that he could allow the supposed Iraqi troops to 
surrender.  LTC Daly sped to the scene in a Bradley Fighting Vehicle with his command 
group and ordered his gunner to fire the shots that killed Corporal Fielder as he tended 
Napier’s wounds.  Daly’s arrival caught CPT Friesen by surprise, as did his fatal shots.  
Wessels placed his hands on his head and walked into the line of fire to identify himself 
and his men as Americans.53 
        According to both 1LT Wessels and CPT Friesen, Daly made a number of 
remarks about the “fog of war” and needing to “keep this event under our hats.”  Both 
junior officers received reprimands, but Daly arranged for himself and three other 
soldiers involved in the event to receive Bronze Star Medals with “V” device for Valor.  
The 3rd ACR Commander, Daly’s superior and fellow West Point graduate, Colonel 
Starr, wrote an Officer Evaluation Report calculated to end Captain Friesen’s career.  
Both Friesen and Wessels subsequently resigned their commissions in the Army.  The 
first two investigations that the 3rd ACR conducted into the incident absolved LTC Daly 
of all responsibility for the death of CPL Fielder, attributing his sad demise to the 
confusion that accompanies all military operations.  The General Accounting Office 
found that the investigating officer possessed inferior rank to the officers he was 
investigating, which is against Army regulations, and that he failed to gather evidence 
thoroughly.  Only the persistence of Fielder’s family and the zeal of Senators Sasser and 
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Thompson enabled the case to receive the hearings required for the government to 
ascertain the truth.54 
   Fielder’s family received notice on March 2, 1991, that Iraqi soldiers had killed 
their son in a firefight.  On May 2, one of Corporal Fielder’s fellow soldiers called his 
mother to tell her that he had died from fratricide, although no official Army channels 
confirmed this report until August 13, 1991.  Deborah Shelton, Lance Fielder’s mother, 
expressed enduring sorrow that the Army had told her an initial lie about her son’s death 
and that COL Starr and LTC Daly had covered their lies with valorous tales and medals.55  
In Fielder’s case, like that of LTC Hayles and the vehicles he fired on from his Apache 
helicopter, the men on the scene never doubted that fratricide had taken place. 
   COL Starr’s cover-up along with LTC Daly of his fratricidal shots contrasted with 
the experience of LTC Hayles, whose superiors relieved him of command immediately 
following his fratricide against the American vehicles.56  Although the Armed Forces 
concealed the details about fratricide cases until August 13, the attempt to protect the 
accidental perpetrators of fratricide, such as LTC Daly and LTC Hayles, who held equal 
rank and position but experienced opposite official reactions, was not a matter of broader 
policy.  Clearly, the reaction of superior officers could vary from one incident to another, 
but due to the late revelations of the facts, the public remained unaware of the fratricide 
episodes of the Persian Gulf War.  The public assessment of the war remained 
unanimously positive for the succeeding decades.   
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      American politicians and Generals who wage war in the modern era can remain 
within the brief attention span of the American public when they ensure rapid 
deployment to a hostile area, swift and successful engagement, and above all, few 
casualties and rapid re-deployment to the United States.  As they conducted joint 
operations in Kuwait, the Armed Forces sought to minimize fratricide and confusion by 
the use of boundaries, tactical caution, and a number of recognition devices.  Ultimately, 
however, in 28 separate episodes, the precautions proved inadequate, and friendly fire 
resulted.  Although unethical in view of the rights of families to know the truth about 
how their relatives died, the Army’s policy of withholding information on fratricide 
casualties until August 1991 ultimately won a victory in the information war because few 
Americans outside the military ever found out about these episodes.  As a matter of 
policy, honest, accurate, forthright reporting is always the standard the Army sets for its 
own officers making internal reports.  An organization valuing professional conduct in 
communications with the public, the Armed Forces should demand no less than the same 
honesty and accuracy of their communications with the families of casualties. 
      The victims of this strategy of initial misinformation included bereaved families 
who expressed shocked dismay at the conduct of the Armed Forces.  The discovery that 
the soldier whom they had heard died a gallant death on the field of battle in the face of 
the enemy had actually fallen to fratricide prompted disillusion on the part of some 
soldiers’ family members, most prominently the family of Corporal Lance Fielder.  To 
the public, fratricide notwithstanding, the historically small number of casualties made 
the Persian Gulf War an acceptable investment of military manpower.  For the high 
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Military Brass, non-battle casualties represented an acceptably low number on which they 
did not even concern themselves to report in most cases. 
      In some cases, the question whether soldiers died from fratricide is ambiguous 
and in need of thorough investigation.  Clearly, no investigation into the cause of Lance 
Fielder’s death was necessary, so an investigation should only have sought to assign guilt 
appropriately.  The Army faced strict scrutiny in Senator Thompson’s hearing room over 
Corporal Fielder’s case, and with a few exceptions, the policy of the Armed Forces 
regarding casualty reporting changed markedly in the following thirteen years.  During 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military typically reported deaths by friendly fire 
within two days.  The Army still conducted investigations into the causes of friendly fire 
incidents, but it did not report friendly fire deaths as hostile fire deaths with one notable 
exception. 
   When friendly forces killed former football star and Army Ranger Specialist Pat 
Tillman in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004, the Army initially chose to conduct an 
investigation and reported him killed by enemy fire.  Like the Fielder case, soldiers at the 
scene never doubted that Tillman’s death had come at the hands of friendly forces.  The 
Arizona Republic reported the results of the Army’s investigation nearly one month later, 
which led to several news stories and scrutiny of the Army’s policy.57  For the most part, 
the Army had followed a policy of reporting friendly fire deaths promptly and accurately, 
but some of Tillman’s superiors apparently attempted to avoid the bad publicity that 
would accompany a report that his own forces had killed him unintentionally.  Instead, 
the Army reaped a whirlwind of negative publicity as soon as the press exposed the 
inaccuracy of the initial reports on Tillman’s death. 
                                                 
57 Josh White, “Tillman Killed by ‘Friendly Fire,’” The Washington Post, May 30, 2004, A1 (L). 
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      With the exception of the Tillman case, the leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces 
corrected their policies on fratricide deaths following Operation Desert Storm.  Although 
some observers, including Rick Atkinson and Corporal Fielder’s family, refer to the 35 
fratricide deaths as “many” and observe that fratricide claimed a large percentage of the 
total battle casualties, the 35 deaths made up a larger-than-average percentage of the total 
death toll only because the Iraqi Army did not fight with the determination that the 
American Armed Forces had expected.  In view of the 1500 deaths and 10,000 casualties 
that the Armed Forces expected, the Iraqi Army’s very timid conduct in the face of 
American troops served to minimize the number of losses to hostile fire.  Thus, both 
fratricidal and accidental deaths represented unusually large percentages of losses 
because combat losses fell far short of expectations.  The lack of reaction from the public 
after the revelation of the death of Corporal Fielder and LTC Daly’s cover-up showed 
that the general public considered the fewer than three hundred total deaths an acceptably 
small price for victory, regardless of causes.  
      While attempting to discover the causes of non-hostile casualties, an investigator 
will find very little material on non-hostile casualties that are not related to fratricide or 
ordnance accidents.  Indeed, even comprehensive databases that recorded the exact 
names and causes of death for the soldiers killed in battle generally fail to record what 
exact mode of death befell the 145 soldiers who died from non-battlefield causes.  
Although the 3rd Armored Division recorded every death with precise descriptions of 
causes, no such corresponding database for other units appears to exist.  The occasional 
car accident, helicopter crash, ferry boat accident, or accidental shooting generally 
received no coverage.  The questions still remaining concern the measures that the Armed 
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Forces took to counter ordinary deaths from accidents.  The Navy makes no mention of 
its single most casualty-producing event in its analysis of Operation Desert Storm and 
apparently considers the nine lives lost in the ferry accident on December 22, 1990, a 
minor footnote.  Historians have only just begun to tell the story of the Army Safety 
Program and what changes the Desert Storm experience wrought.   
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CHAPTER 5: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
NON-HOSTILE CASUALTIES IN “THESE KINDS OF WARS” FROM THE 
KOREAN WAR TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
      In the middle of March, 2003, President George W. Bush called on Saddam 
Hussein to abdicate his power in Iraq or face the full brunt of the American forces 
currently massing on the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.  The rapid conquest of 
Baghdad and the remainder of the country, the capture of Saddam Hussein, and the first 
free elections in Iraq’s history now belong to history.  Through the hindsight that comes 
with the passage of time, historians will be able to judge the long-term wisdom and folly 
of the campaign.  The depth of Iranian involvement in supplying the insurgency, the 
actual story of Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs, and the connections between 
Saddam Hussein and terrorist organizations prior to the war remain open questions that 
future evidence may alter significantly.  The adage appears quite accurate that historians 
do not write the first objective histories until one hundred years after the events they 
describe. 
       The collective historical memory of Americans regarding the war will benefit 
enormously from hindsight.  Whether a relatively stable democratic nation or a chaotic 
civil war battlefield emerges from the strife of the current war, observers will imagine 
that the final result had always appeared inevitable.  At present, the timeline of the 
campaign to capture Baghdad, the precise casualty figures of the first five years of 
combat and occupation, and the trends in casualty types, represent some of the only 
quantifiable aspects of the war.   
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      The prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom began just over a year after the 
conclusion of the major combat phase of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  
The campaign in Afghanistan removed the Taliban regime from power in favor of the 
Northern Alliance, a rival tribal group that could assume power relatively quickly.  
American Special Forces, Marines, and Army infantry units coordinated the efforts of 
Afghan and American ground troops with superior American fire power from the air.  As 
a result of their efficiency, the major combat phase of the campaign lasted only a few 
weeks, and the Americans lost so few casualties that few political or media commentators 
complained about the costs in human lives.  Like Operation Desert Storm, Operation 
Enduring Freedom consumed relatively little time and satisfied the desires of the public 
for a quick and seemingly easy war.  As the Bush administration began identifying Iraq 
as the next theatre of the War on Terror, the American public and Representatives in 
Congress expected another short campaign. 
      Militarily, Operation Iraqi Freedom tested the viability of the Powell Doctrine, the 
group of strategic principles that General Colin Powell had outlined prior to Operation 
Desert Storm and had instituted for future campaigns.  President George H. W. Bush’s 
Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Colin Powell, had taken new jobs under President George W. Bush as Vice President and 
Secretary of State respectively.  In a manner of speaking, the architects of the Powell 
Doctrine retained powerful positions and few important faces had changed. 
      The Powell Doctrine emphasized reversing the pitfalls of Vietnam, consisting of 
overwhelming force, clear and regularly reviewed political and military objectives, an 
exit strategy, and the support of the American people.  Until Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
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Armed Forces high command had also sought an exit strategy for every post-Vietnam 
conflict.  In practical terms, these tenets meant that the United States would not fight a 
limited-intensity conflict with undefined or unlimited commitments.  Political objectives 
ensured the United States would not prop up military dictators who repeatedly overthrew 
one another, as the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations had done in South 
Vietnam.  Military objectives required problems with military solutions.  Strong, 
unfettered conventional forces would strike defined military targets and do so in support 
of a democratic regime.1 
      In Iraq, the Armed Forces accomplished their immediate military objectives with 
amazing speed and garrisoned the country to allow time for the political elements of the 
strategy to develop.  The American civilian administration under L. Paul Bremer 
attempted to construct a democratic regime, one in which Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds would 
share power in a Parliamentary government.  The efforts of Bremer and his delegation 
bore fruit when they departed Iraq a few days ahead of schedule and left the country to 
hold its first elections under a new Constitution.  The Powell Doctrine emphasized that 
American soldiers not die in a proxy war with no perceivable political progress.  The 
many Iraqi voters displaying purple fingers that appeared on television assured American 
citizens that the Iraqis were at least attempting a democratic process.2  The armed 
resistance that the United States faced in Iraq, however, did not end with the fall of 
Baghdad, the capture of Saddam Hussein, or even with the execution of Saddam Hussein.  
                                                 
1 John Prados, “Wise Guys, Rough Business: Iraq and the Tonkin Gulf,” in Iraq and the Lessons of 
Vietnam, ed. Lloyd Gardner and Marilyn Young (New York and London: The New Press, 2007), 107. 
2 L. Paul Bremer, My Year in Iraq: the Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2006), 395. 
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Instead, American soldiers fought against a guerrilla enemy while trying to train and 
equip the Iraqi Army to assume responsibility for the security of Iraq. 
   To minimize its commitment and casualties, the Bush Administration 
immediately implemented the tactic that President Nixon called “Vietnamization.”  Over 
time, as the Americans trained Iraqi Army and police to perform occupation duties, the 
Iraqis took over the responsibility for portions of Iraq.  The process proved so time-
consuming that a number of American citizens decided that the benefits did not justify 
the investment in blood and money.  In the absence of an exit strategy, public approval 
declined with passing time and mounting casualties, as had been the case in the attrition 
wars of the twentieth century. 
      In the grand scheme of the war, the coalition has never lost as many as one 
percent of its soldiers killed in any given year.  During the two most costly years to date, 
2004 and 2006, the coalition lost 755 and 751 soldiers to hostile activity, which 
represented almost exactly one half of one percent of the coalition’s strength.  After 
nearly five years in combat, in the early months of 2008, the total casualties of the United 
States, including non-hostile losses, stood just above 4,000 dead.  During the worst six 
months of combat in Iraq, the insurgents inflicted fewer deaths on the coalition than the 
NLF and PAVN caused during a single week of the Tet Offensive in 1968.3  The casualty 
numbers for OIF differ markedly from those of Korea and Vietnam in terms of scale. 
      At the local level of the Iraq theatre, the trends in hostile casualties reveal a fairly 
clear course of insurgent activity.  The regime of Saddam Hussein fought with rather 
feeble efforts, reminiscent of their performance in Operation Desert Storm, against the 
American invasion in March 2003.  In the few places where Iraqi soldiers and Fedayeen 
                                                 
3 John Pimlott, Vietnam: the Decisive Battles (Edison, NJ: Chartwell Books, 2003), 138. 
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paramilitary forces attempted to stage spirited defenses, they managed to defend only for 
a short length of time.  The casualties enemy forces inflicted on the mostly American 
Coalition troops in March 2003 in some cases indicated the last time that the soldiers 
would fight for Saddam Hussein.  Most Iraqi troops retreated in the face of the American 
advance or discarded their uniforms and fled before the American troops arrived.  A 
relatively calm period followed in the early days of the occupation until the waning 
months of 2003.  Insurgent activity began in earnest at that time, making the year 2004 
the most costly year of the occupation’s first four years. 
      Insurgent activity was initially concentrated in Baghdad and the provinces 
adjacent to Baghdad, most notably Anbar Province.  Although the violence declined in 
the other provinces in 2007, the strife in Baghdad continued at a consistently high level 
until a steady decline began in September 2007.  Baghdad’s high level of violence caused 
the total coalition death toll of 2007 to surpass the Coalition losses of 2004 despite the 
decline in Anbar’s insurgent activity.  In November and December 2007, the hostile 
losses of Anbar province declined to none, and hostile losses in Baghdad fell below 10 
for two consecutive months.  The entire Coalition lost only 24 soldiers from all causes in 
December 2007, whereas a mere seven months earlier Baghdad alone had claimed over 
twice that number. 
   In 2007 General David Petraeus assumed overall command of the Coalition and 
implemented a counter-insurgency strategy that involved increasing American troop 
numbers.  Called the “surge,” this strategy included combating sectarian militias and 
defeating insurgents in their strongest areas, principally Baghdad.  Militarily, the “surge” 
definitely succeeded, leaving the political and military high command the task of 
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managing the success of the campaign in Iraq.  General Petraeus and his civilian 
superiors have debated how quickly or gradually the United States should decrease the 
size of its military presence in Iraq.  The current situation of low casualties creates the 
potential for a longer deployment than might have seemed possible in the late months of 
2006, when insurgent activity increased.  
      Thanks to the relatively low number of overall losses, comparable in rate to the 
casualties of Desert Storm, a casual observer can ascertain the precise number of 
casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom with ease.  The Department of Defense (DOD) 
releases official reports of deaths, and icasualties.org, an internet site, categorizes the 
deaths by the date, cause of death, and province or region in which each soldier died.  A 
comparison of the icasualties.org statistics with known information shows the site to 
reflect events accurately.  The 1st Battalion 108th Armor lost three men, Specialist (SPC) 
Joshua Dingler, Sergeant (SGT) Paul Saylor, and SGT Thomas Strickland, to a non-
hostile vehicle accident in Mahmudiyah on August 15, 2005, which the website database 
reports accurately.  On the following day, another soldier, SPC Michael Stokley, died in a 
hostile Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack at an outpost west of Mahmudiyah; the 
database reports accurately that this incident occurred in southwest Baghdad.  Two men 
succumbed to one hostile IED attack on August 31, 2005.  The database records the latter 
two deaths on September 1, the day that the DOD reported the deaths.4   
                                                 
4 1st Battalion 108th Armor patrolled an area south of Baghdad in Babil Province from three small posts in 
Mahmudiyah, Lutayfiyah and Yusufiyah for five months in 2005.  Mahmudiyah and Lutayfiyah lay 
roughly due south of Baghdad, whereas Yusufiyah lay several miles to the west.  The six men that 1/108th 
Armor lost received prompt and accurate accounting in the icasualties.org statistics.   
Joe Shubert, Task Force Rough Rider: Operation Iraqi Freedom III (Atlanta, GA: Press Unknown, 2006), 
12-13. 
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      The database at icasualties.org is accurate, but the creators make no distinctions in 
numbers calculations between hostile and non-hostile losses.  The database counts the 
soldiers who take their own lives or die from natural causes as equal to combat casualties, 
which slightly inflates the number of “casualties” killed by the insurgents.  Over the 
course of the campaign from March 2003 through September 2007, a period of four and 
one half years, a total of 758 Coalition troops have died from non-hostile causes.  This 
sum exceeds the hostile Coalition casualties of the most costly years, 2004 and 2006.  
Essentially, combining non-hostile and hostile losses adds an extra year of perceived 
hostile losses for every four years that the United States fights the war.  For purposes of 
better contextual understanding of the casualties in Iraq, a statistician might separate the 
hostile from non-hostile losses.  Such a method allows an investigator to discover how 
many soldiers the insurgents have killed versus how many have fallen victim to accidents 
or natural causes.  In addition, the trends of losses emerge when the investigator separates 
casualty numbers by type and province. 
      Table 5.1, “Hostile Casualties in Iraq by Province,” reflects the hostile monthly 
losses in each province and relegates the total non-hostile losses of each month to a 
separate column.  The table includes a calculation of the total losses for each month, 
hostile and non-hostile, so as to assure that the table correlates with the icasualties.org 
database.  For each monthly period, the province that experienced the greatest number of 
casualties is reflected in bold type.  On eleven occasions, the total non-hostile losses for a 
month exceeded the hostile losses of the most costly province.  In two other months, the 
non-hostile number equaled that of the most costly province, Baghdad.  Thus, on 13 
occasions, the non-hostile losses of the war in Iraq surpass the losses of the province 
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where the insurgents carried out their most successful missions.  Over the 56 months that 
the war has proceeded, Anbar Province cost the greatest number of hostile casualties on 
24 occasions.  Baghdad follows Anbar with sixteen months of most-costly status, but 
Baghdad had led in hostile losses for six of the seven months leading up to its decline in 
November 2007.  Salah-ad-Din province and Dhi Qar province each led in hostile losses 
once.   
      The data of Table 5.1 suggest that the insurgents have waged their war for control 
of Iraq primarily in Baghdad and Anbar Provinces, and secondarily in Salah-ad-Din, 
Diyala, Babil, and Basra Provinces.  Insurgents in Anbar and Baghdad have each claimed 
over 1,000 Coalition lives by hostile means, but in no other province have they killed 
more than 304.  The 304 hostile casualties in Salah-ad-Din Province represent the third-
highest provincial losses and nearly double those of each of the next nearest competitors, 
Diyala, Babil, and Ninawa, where insurgents have killed between 150 and 175.  Basra, 
where British soldiers patrol, has cost the Coalition 113 lives to hostile means, ranking 
seventh on the list.  The large casualty numbers of the seven most hostile provinces cover 
a land area of just over one half of the total of Iraq, of which half Anbar Province alone 
accounts for a majority of the land.  Six of the seven most hostile provinces combine to 
form one connected land mass.  Baghdad its the four adjacent provinces combine with 
Ninawa to the north of Salah-ad-din reveal the concentration of insurgent activity in the 
central, western and northwestern portion of Iraq.  The eleven provinces with low 
casualty numbers – fewer than one hundred each in over four years’ time – underscore 
the point that the eastern and southern sections of Iraq have experienced relatively little 
insurgent activity.   
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      The total non-hostile casualty numbers compare with hostile losses in individual 
provinces on Table 5.1.  The only province other than the seven most costly provinces 
that ever claimed the largest number of lives in a month was Dhi Qar, where the U.S. 
suffered 36 hostile losses in March 2003.  The majority of these fell in a sharp few days’ 
fighting in Nasiriyah, but those dead surpassed by a wide margin the combined total of 
hostile deaths in Dhi Qar since the completion of the initial invasion operation.  Dhi Qar 
has twice completed an entire year with no hostile Coalition casualties and amassed a 
total toll of 60 dead from hostile causes over the entire course of the war to date.  A 
second province that offered fairly stiff resistance to the Coalition early in the war but has 
declined in recent months is Ninawa, where hostile casualties peaked at 24 in November 
2003 but have not surpassed 10 dead since December 2004.  Strong insurgent activity 
during the fourteen months from late 2003 to the end of 2004 sufficed to rank the hostile 
death toll of Ninawa sixth overall, but clearly war-related violence has fallen into decline.  
To date, insurgents in Ninawa have not killed more than seven Coalition troops in one 
month since December 2004.   
      In November 2003, insurgent activity rapidly increased throughout Iraq, causing 
more than double the hostile losses of October.  The largely Sunni Anbar Province 
became a great source of concern to the occupying troops, as insurgents took 21 lives, a 
number that surpassed all eight previous months combined.  Insurgents in Anbar 
Province claimed a large number of Coalition lives over the following three years, five 
times equaling or surpassing 40 in one month.  Simultaneously, as revealed in Table 5.2, 
“Non-Hostile Casualties in Iraq by Province,” the non-hostile dead in Anbar also peaked 
as the Armed Forces, principally U. S. Marines, increased their numbers of troops and 
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activity in the area.  The non-hostile casualties in Anbar reached their summit with the 34 
losses of January 2005, of whom 31 died in a Chinook Helicopter crash.  After this 
unusually large number, the non-hostile toll of Anbar Province fell to fewer than 10 
deaths per month, and it has remained at this level.  The non-hostile casualty numbers for 
Anbar and Baghdad usually surpassed those of the other provinces, but such trends 
simply reflected the numbers of troops deployed to each province.  Later, as insurgent 
activity concentrated around Baghdad, the province surrounding the capital city began 
costing more lives than the larger Anbar Province on a regular basis. 
      The January 2005 Chinook crash in Anbar underscored another feature of non-
hostile casualties, namely that a single disaster could alter the total losses of an entire 
month.  In the case of January 2005, one tragic aircraft crash sufficed to raise non-hostile 
casualties for the entire province above the numbers of hostile losses for that month and 
to drive the total non-hostile losses of the coalition to historic highs.  The 53 non-hostile 
deaths nationwide in that month stand as the current record, even though one aircraft 
crash accounted for well over half of the total.  One helicopter crash in At-Tamim 
Province took 14 lives in August 2007, this accident accounted for half of the total non-
hostile casualties for the month.  The crash also inflicted more deaths than the military 
had suffered in At-Tamim from hostile forces during any previous six-month period of 
time.  At times, therefore, non-hostile losses did not so much follow trends as reflect 
scattered catastrophic incidents.  The occasional fall of non-hostile losses often depended 
relatively little on individual units conducting safer operations.  Rather, the toll often 
revealed how large the individual deadly accidents were.  A few months without a 
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catastrophe could cause a decline in non-hostile casualties nationwide as surely as a 
helicopter in Anbar or At-Tamim could inflate the numbers. 
      The Marines stationed in Anbar Province, home of Fallujah and Ramadi, two of 
the most hostile cities in Iraq, pioneered a number of civil affairs techniques.  As General 
Petraeus took command of the Coalition, the Marines had already gained the cooperation 
of local tribal leaders in fighting against the largely foreign forces of Al Qaeda in Iraq.  
The six-month period from March to August 2007, in which insurgents killed 72 
servicemen, was the least costly to the Coalition in Anbar since the first six months of 
2004.  This sum, the third-lowest number of hostile casualties for a six-month period, 
reflects marked improvement since the peak in Anbar’s casualties at over 200 in the latter 
half of 2004.  To date, the hostile casualties of Anbar have fallen additionally to six in 
September and only two in October 2007, two months which rank among the least costly 
on record.  From January 2004 until August 2007, the casualties in Anbar Province 
surpassed those of Ninawa, Babil, Diyala and Salah-ad-Din every single month.  Within 
the last two months, each of these provinces has surpassed Anbar at least once in hostile 
casualties, although the smaller provinces have not observed marked increases in 
insurgent activity.  The major decrease in enemy activity in Anbar is entirely responsible 
for the change in Anbar’s status from the most dangerous place in Iraq to the third- and 
fifth-most dangerous province respectively over the last two months.  Considering how 
large Anbar province is, this progress is clearly significant. 
      The Marines’ progress in Anbar Province preceded the “surge” in troops that 
General Petraeus executed in 2007.  Petraeus’ command began after the departure of 
General George Casey and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld near the end of 2006. 
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Casey and Rumsfeld had employed the strategy of pacifying Iraq and supporting the Iraqi 
police while allowing some bastions of militia activity to remain.  Petraeus assumed 
command specifically to curtail such rogue actors as Muqtada al Sadr, whose Shiite 
militias had caused the Coalition a great deal of trouble in the region south of Baghdad.  
Although the militias had killed few Coalition soldiers, they had perpetrated a large 
number of acts of sectarian violence that hurt the Coalition’s overall mission.  Petraeus’ 
plan involved diverting a number of troops from the less dangerous provinces to Baghdad 
in response to the increases in violence there. 
      All provinces in Iraq except Basra and the cluster of Baghdad, Babil, and Diyala 
had declined in casualties in the early months of 2007.  Of the seven costliest provinces, 
Ninawa, which does not connect with Baghdad, was completing a two-year term of 
insignificance where hostile casualties were concerned.  The clear trend of the insurgency 
showed violence centering on Baghdad and dwindling everywhere else except Basrah.  
Salah-ad-Din’s casualty numbers stood below the losses of 2004, so one cluster of three 
provinces and Basra presented the only places where casualties were on the rise.  In early 
2007, the British Armed Forces had begun moving out of Basra in the far southeast of 
Iraq.  The declining numbers of occupying troops there or a greater influx of Iranian 
fighters from across the border might have accounted for the increase in insurgent 
activity.  The rising British losses in 2007 caused Basra to emerge as a larger concern 
than it had ever represented before.  After its worst six-month period on record from 
March through August 2007, Baghdad has experienced a marked decline over the last 
seven months.  Only the passage of time will reveal whether the forces deployed in 
Baghdad will be able to sustain this decline in hostile losses.   
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      The trends in overall non-hostile casualties over the course of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom reflect similar patterns to those of the non-hostile losses of Operation Desert 
Storm.  During Desert Storm, the vast majority of non-hostile losses occurred when the 
Armed Forces were executing the massive flank attack in the hundred-hour ground 
offensive of early 1991.  Vehicle accidents claimed a significant number of lives among 
the non-hostile casualties of Desert Storm.  Comparably, the Coalition in Iraq suffered its 
greatest numbers of non-hostile casualties in the early months of the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq in 2003.  In seven of the first eight and eight of the first ten months of 
the invasion and occupation, the total non-hostile casualties in Iraq surpassed those of the 
hostile deaths in the most costly province. 
      After the initial high death toll of 123 in six months from non-hostile causes, the 
rate decreased until its second spike at 122 in the six months from September 2004 
through February 2005.  For the second spike in non-hostile deaths, one could trace most 
of the blame to the large Chinook crash in Anbar in January of 2005.  With the exception 
of these two spikes and the record-low 47 deaths in March-August 2006, non-hostile 
losses have stood between 60 and 85 per six-month period.  For the most part, non-hostile 
numbers tend to follow the number of troops deployed, with the occasional catastrophic 
accident or lack thereof causing increases and declines.  The “surge” of early 2007 
brought with it additional troops and moderate increases in non-hostile losses. 
      Ironically, the policy of counting hostile and non-hostile casualties equally caused 
an apparent improvement in the situation in Iraq in 2005 and the first half of 2006.  
Although the hostile losses of those two years had not declined markedly, the non-hostile 
casualties fortuitously reached all-time lows in the absence of any large aircraft crashes.  
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Lower non-hostile rates of casualties translated into lower overall losses.  The periods 
from March to August 2005 and from March to August 2006 revealed six-month declines 
over the previous six-month periods each year.  The Coalition lost 556 personnel from 
September 2004 to February 2005, but that figure fell to 405 in the period from March to 
August 2005.  Likewise, the 427 losses of September 2005 to February 2006 fell to 370 
in the period from March to August 2006.  These declines suggested a significant 
decrease in enemy activity.  Actually, the total non-hostile losses of these two periods had 
declined very sharply from 122 to 65 in the first two periods and from 82 to 47 for the 
latter times. 
      Thus, improvements in safety practices and a dearth of major accidents created 
the illusion that insurgent activity had declined, when actually it had continued at the 
same rate.  An increase in insurgent activity in the last few months of 2006 and the early 
days of 2007 restored Coalition casualty numbers to levels comparable to those of 2004, 
but for a short time the Coalition had appeared to make significant progress against the 
insurgency.  Statisticians reporting on the war effort observed major declines in Coalition 
losses, but most of these had actually resulted from such mundane things as improved 
airport conditions and the enforcement of safety-related policies such as seatbelt and 
helmet use for all soldiers riding in vehicles.  The decline in casualties in the late months 
of 2007, by contrast, happened despite moderate increases in non-hostile deaths.  As long 
as the Coalition Armed Forces remain at strengths between 150,000 and 160,000, the 
non-hostile toll on troops will likely remain between 60 and 85 lives every six months.  
      Of all of the lessons from Desert Storm that the American soldiers and their 
commanders hoped to put to good use, few held such a prominent place as prevention of 
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fratricide.  Although the Armed Forces had adopted a policy designed to conceal 
fratricide losses from the public, the fratricide losses of Desert Storm made a significant 
impact in the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The Generals took steps to correct 
both the policies for reporting and techniques for preventing the Coalition from killing its 
own soldiers.  The battle for Khafji, the first skirmish of Operation Desert Storm in 
January 1991, had yielded excellent stories of Marine valor in the face of attacking Iraqis.  
Sadly, subsequent reports had revealed that all 11 Marines killed at Khafji had fallen 
victim to misdirected friendly fire from the air.  At the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
the spokesmen for the Armed Forces spoke of a “shock and awe” campaign that would 
rain destruction upon the Iraqis from artillery and air power.  Although weapon lethality 
from air platforms had improved since Desert Storm, the ground forces in 2003 often 
pressed ahead with their advance and sometimes did not wait for artillery and close air 
support to overtake them.  Arranging for fire missions from artillery or aircraft always 
consumes time while the observer on the ground confirms his location and the grid 
location of the suspected enemy forces.  If friendly units face minimal enemy resistance, 
they advance so as to maintain their forward momentum without halting to arrange for 
fire support. 
      The American Armed Forces had improved their doctrines considerably since the 
Vietnam War, when fire support formed a large part of the strategy by which infantry 
operated.  The open terrain of Iraq and the superior ground fire power of the American 
Armed Forces lessened the dependency of the Army on fire support.  The M1A1 tanks 
and the Bradley Fighting Vehicles that the Americans employed to good effect 
demolished the Iraqi defenses arrayed to halt the Coalition.  In one example of superior 
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ground fire power, a Bradley Vehicle destroyed a Soviet-made T-72 tank with 25mm 
shells that had never before achieved a “kill” on a main battle tank.5  Better weapons, 
better training, and determined execution of the invasion plan enabled the Coalition to 
carry out the vast majority of its missions without fire support of any kind.  This trend 
resulted in fewer incidents of friendly fire, as fire support had always caused the largest 
number of fratricide casualties.   
      Moreover, in early 2003, the Iraqi Army had not massed its divisions on the 
border with Saudi Arabia, where they had been disposed at the beginning of Desert 
Storm.  Saddam Hussein had instead concentrated his forces for the most part in cities, 
hoping to ensnare the Americans in street fighting.  The strategy bore fruit in only one 
place, when the Marines fought a hard battle in Nasiriyah in March 2003, and lost 36 
men.  The most famous and reportedly the most costly instance of friendly fire occurred 
during the pitched battle for Nasiriyah.  For the one time that Iraqi and Coalition forces 
did what Saddam Hussein had hoped each would do, they inflicted a toll equivalent to 
about one infantry platoon and delayed the Americans’ advance in their sector for one 
day.  With that exception, the Iraqi Army fought only briefly before fleeing the battlefield 
and dispersing among the civilian populace. 
      The journalists and historians who have written about the Nasiriyah friendly fire 
incident on March 23, 2003, differ as to how many casualties occurred.  An A-10 
Thunderbolt jet aircraft flew at least one sortie over friendly troops, firing 30mm mini-
gun rounds into the Marines as they advanced toward the town.  Evan Wright, an 
embedded reporter with the USMC First Recon Battalion, occupied the position nearest 
                                                 
5 Walter C. Rodgers, Sleeping with Custer and the 7th Cavalry (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 2005), 152. 
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the action when it happened.  The story that reached his position through the Marine 
chain of command reported as many as ten friendly troops killed.  Rick Atkinson, a 
journalist embedded with the command section of the 101st Airborne Division, recorded, 
“half a dozen” Marines killed by friendly fire in Nasiriyah.  John Keegan, a well-known 
British military historian, recorded at least one Marine wounded by the A-10’s strafing 
run.6  This number proved difficult for any recorders to substantiate because Iraqi fire 
inflicted additional casualties almost simultaneously.  The entire crew of an armored 
vehicle died while under a mixture of friendly and enemy fire as the A-10 completed its 
sortie.  Any number of the nine soldiers who were killed in the vehicle might have died 
from either enemy or friendly fire.  Barring a precise examination of each victim’s 
wounds, a certain conclusion as to which fire killed which Marine could prove illusory.  
The Department of Defense reported all thirty-six men killed in Nasiriyah as hostile 
casualties of enemy fire. 
      In the case of friendly fire in Nasiriyah, the DOD might have appeared to conceal 
an instance of fratricide, but at the same time the DOD was reporting other cases of 
fratricide accurately.  Perhaps the most significant policy improvement that the DOD 
made over Desert Storm in the area of non-hostile casualties concerned its reporting 
system for fratricide cases.  During Operation Desert Storm, the DOD completed formal 
investigations of fratricide incidents before reporting fratricide as the soldiers’ causes of 
death.  In the meantime, families learned erroneously that their relatives had died from 
enemy fire and suffered a shocking realization months after the war had ended when the 
DOD reported the truth.  Unlike the Desert Storm policy, the DOD during Operation Iraqi 
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Freedom reported fratricide victims as such to their families immediately and announced 
that the chain of command had commenced formal investigations for assessments of 
guilt.  In the month of March 2003, the DOD reported nine soldiers killed in fratricide 
incidents, including six British soldiers and three Americans.   
      In April 2003, the DOD added an additional six Americans to the fratricide 
ledger, including the name of Captain Edward J. Korn, whose own unit killed him during 
a clash with Iraqi infantry and a tank.  Korn’s death came in a firefight with enemy 
forces, when the Captain left his vehicle and got into the middle of a cross fire.  The 
chain of command of his unit could plausibly have recorded Korn’s death as the result of 
enemy fire, but chose to file an honest report instead.  On a later date, soldiers of the 1st 
Battalion 506th Infantry of the 101st Airborne Division reported a fratricide episode to 
troops in the 1st Battalion, 108th Armor, whom they had replaced in Mahmudiyah.  On 
November 4, 2005, two American convoys approached one another during the night and 
failed to establish proper identification.  After allegedly firing warning shots, one of the 
convoys opened fire with an M2 .50 caliber machine gun and killed Staff Sergeant Jason 
Fegler of C Company 1st Battalion 506th Infantry.  The DOD reported his death from 
fratricide accurately as well. 
    To date, the DOD has reported 21 cases of fratricide officially, including a total of 
9 soldiers from nations other than the United States.  The 21 fratricide deaths reported 
over a period of 55 months are similar in quantity to the number of fratricide casualties of 
the much-shorter Operation Desert Storm.  At all levels of the chain of command, the 
Armed Forces performed a better service to the families of fratricide victims during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom than they had provided during Operation Desert Storm.  The 
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Marines who died from fratricide in Nasiriyah and the fratricide death of Pat Tillman in 
Afghanistan appear to represent exceptional rather than typical cases. 
      For a number of reasons, environmental, tactical, and strategic, the Armed Forces 
have decreased the rates of fratricide in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) considerably 
when compared with previous wars.  In the Korean War, poor communication techniques 
between air and ground units at times resulted in fratricide as the UN forces retreated in 
the face of North Korean and Chinese advances.  The environment of panic and 
desperation created in these retreats contributed principally to the hundreds of friendly 
soldiers that American pilots targeted mistakenly.  The Air Force improved its air-to-
ground fire training considerably during the Vietnam era and achieved a low rate of 
friendly fire in the jungles of Southeast Asia.  The new smart weaponry of the late 
twentieth century forced the Air Force to re-learn a number of the lessons from the 
Korean War, as air-to-ground missiles caused a plurality of the friendly fire in Operation 
Desert Storm.  Just as Korea had revealed the need for better training to the Vietnam-era 
Air Force, so did Desert Storm serve as the dress rehearsal for Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
During OIF, American forces have trained well for the conditions under which they fight 
and have not suffered fratricide casualties as great as those of Operation Desert Storm.  
Since Vietnam and Desert Storm, the improvement of realistic training has saved many 
lives. 
      At the tactical level, the ground forces during OIF significantly reduced their 
reliance on fire support from the levels of ground forces in the Vietnam War and Desert 
Storm.  Strategically, the ground units in OIF benefited over those of Vietnam and Desert 
Storm because they sought principally to take land rather than to destroy the enemy 
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elements arrayed against them.  In Desert Storm, the strategists emphasized destruction of 
the Republican Guard and the defeat of the other Iraqi divisions occupying Kuwait.  In 
Vietnam, the entire American strategy consisted in the destruction of NLF and PAVN 
troops in South Vietnam.  The tactical superiority, speed, and lethality of the ground 
forces in OIF enabled them to seize land quickly at extremely low costs in casualties and 
reduced the importance of fire support to the campaign.  The decline in the employment 
of fire support and improved fire support training brought with them a decline in the rate 
of fratricide throughout OIF. 
      For a number of reasons, non-hostile casualties surpassed the hostile losses of 
every individual province for seven of the first eight months of the war and eight of the 
first ten.  Not only did this trend result from relatively small numbers of hostile 
casualties, but also the non-hostile losses accumulated at higher-than-average levels in a 
few categories.  The rapid deployment and occupation of Iraq taxed the soldiers as they 
attempted to acclimate to the environment of the Middle East.  The Coalition lost 22 
personnel to illnesses during the first six months, a number that peaked at eleven for the 
month of August 2003.  No other full year’s worth of illnesses has taken such a toll as the 
period of these first six months. 
      Accidents involving weapons operations and ordnance malfunctions also peaked 
in the first six months.  Weapons and ordnance accidents claimed more lives in the first 
year of the occupation than in the remainder of the occupation combined.  Predictably, 
eleven of the 33 fatal ordnance and weapons accidents of the first six months happened in 
April 2003.  At this time, the soldiers were adjusting to a lower-intensity environment 
than they had experienced during the invasion.  The mental and physical stresses that the 
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soldiers had endured throughout the invasion and the battles for control of Iraq remained 
for a time.  Evan Wright reported one Marine shooting himself in his sleep and two 
others using firearms to threaten or commit violence in fits of hysteria.7  The high 
numbers of deaths from illness and weapons accidents caused the uncharacteristically 
high death toll of the first six months of the invasion.  
  Vehicle accidents claimed a slightly above average 39 lives in this period, 
including 13 in May 2003, a sum never surpassed in any other month.  Aircraft crashes in 
non-hostile conditions took a moderate 13 Coalition lives in the first six months.  As the 
soldiers adapted to unfamiliar electrical configurations of their newly-constructed bases, 
electrocution claimed eight lives between March 2003 and February 2005.  No service 
member has died from electrocution since that time.  Finally, drowning claimed an 
unusually large number of Coalition lives early in the occupation.  Five troops died in the 
first six months and ten in the first year, out of a total of seventeen drowning deaths 
reported to date by the DOD. 
      In all of these major areas of unusually high losses early in the occupation, the 
major cause of high casualty numbers related in some way to the troops’ adjustment to 
the theater of operations and the mission.  The climate and local diseases contributed 
materially to increased illness deaths until American medical assets could establish 
effective treatment facilities.  In time the soldiers learned how to operate in terrain so 
dominated by irrigation canals in some areas that mounted elements could only operate 
on roads.    
      As the invasion transpired, 16 journalists lost their lives alongside the soldiers 
whose experiences they sought to report.  In a way that soldiers sometimes failed to 
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understand, the embedded reporters had anticipated and prepared for the invasion as 
surely as had they.  The preparations took different forms and the training consisted of 
different steps, but the reporters showed extremely high motivation to go into the 
dangerous areas where the soldiers carried out their missions and cover the action armed 
only with cameras and body armor.  The motivation that strengthened the embedded 
reporters’ resolve bore a price for some of them who died of ailments from which they 
might have recovered had they sought treatment.  The importance of battlefront stories to 
advancing the reporters’ careers surpassed considerations of their own health and safety, 
fatally so in some cases.8  
      After the first six months, and especially after the first year, non-hostile losses 
reached relative stability in nearly all areas.  The leading non-hostile cause of deaths has 
been ground vehicle accidents, claiming over 30 lives in a six-month period regularly.  In 
the first 36 months, the vehicle accident toll surpassed 30 five times, exceeded 50 once, 
and fell below 30, to 27, once.  In more recent months, the reported rate of vehicle 
accident deaths has declined for a number of possible reasons.  Since the beginning of 
2006, the DOD has increased the number of soldiers whose causes of death it reports 
simply as non-hostile incidents.  Each news release continues that the incident is under 
investigation, but does not give a hint as to the cause of death.  The Coalition has not 
grown smaller in the last eighteen months, but the number of vehicle accident deaths has 
fallen to fewer than twenty reported per six months.  Some units can credit strict 
enforcement of traffic laws, and the use of seat belts and helmet for this decline, but some 
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of the deaths are likely the result of vehicle accidents.  The unknown cause category of 
non-hostile deaths is one weakness of the icasualties.org database.   
      The DOD has reported a total of 120 soldiers who died in non-hostile aircraft 
crashes, losses that averaged roughly two per month and 12 in six months.  Aircraft 
crashes tend to occur rarely and inflict catastrophic losses, however, so the various six-
month periods of the war have featured aircraft crash losses as low as three and as high as 
forty.  The last large crash to date occurred in August 2007, when 14 soldiers died in one 
helicopter crash.  Thus, the six-month period to which that month belonged lost a higher-
than-average 23 troops, but a single incident accounted for over half of the losses.  In a 
given six months, up to ten Coalition soldiers have typically died from ordnance or 
weapons operation accidents.  Only three have died from this cause within the last year 
and seven over the last eighteen months, so the rate of weapons accidents may be in 
decline or some ordnance and weapons accident deaths may be under official 
investigation. 
      The invasion and occupation campaigns in Iraq have cost a total of 4,145 
Coalition lives, of which 768 died in non-hostile events.  In “these kinds of wars” – those 
fought from the Korean War onward – every casualty counts equally as a part of the cost 
of the operation.  Mounting costs in duration of the conflict and numbers of lost lives lead 
to civilian dissatisfaction and political baggage for the current presidential administration.  
In the present case, therefore, the 768 non-hostile coalition casualties have enabled the 
news media to report new milestones in casualty losses at an earlier date than they would 
have had they only counted hostile losses.  Both the public view of the war and American 
military leaders experienced consequences from rising casualty figures.   
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      The commanders of the Armed Forces recognized an interest in minimizing 
coalition casualties so that their civilian leaders would continue supporting the mission of 
the forces that they commanded.  The numbers of service personnel, the cost in lives, and 
the duration of the conflict all weigh heavily with civilian and military leaders in the 
campaigns of attrition since Korea, “these kinds of wars.”  The flag officers in the 
Pentagon had acknowledged the changes in policy augured by the arrival of Donald 
Rumsfeld as the new Secretary of Defense.  In almost every way conceivable, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom was Secretary Rumsfeld’s war.  He had determined what size force the 
Armed Forces would employ, and he displayed a certain almost-adversarial attitude 
toward the Army, regarding it as behind the times and slow.  As the largest and least-
specialized branch, the Army by nature adapts more slowly to changes in technology and 
new missions than do her sister services. 
      Secretary Rumsfeld championed a smaller, lighter force in the Army and 
confronted an Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, whose sentiments matched his 
exactly.  Shinseki had learned from the Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns the need for Army 
units equipped with lighter and more mobile armored vehicles than their 68-ton M1A1 
tanks.  He recommended wheeled armored vehicles similar to the Marines’ LAV 
vehicles, addressing the need for light-weight armored personnel carriers.  Thus, the idea 
for the Stryker program had taken shape a full year before Secretary Rumsfeld assumed 
his office.  Even as the Chief of Staff discussed lighter forces, the Field Artillery Branch 
had begun developing a giant new howitzer called the Crusader to replace the Paladin.  In 
keeping with his goals of lighter weaponry, the Secretary cancelled the Crusader 
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program.  The Army would be lighter and more agile, which appeared to be General 
Shinseki’s brainchild as well as Rumsfeld’s. 
      The conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom featured a famous standoff between 
Rumsfeld and his Generals reminiscent on a smaller scale of Secretary McNamara’s 
dealings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the early 1960s.  McNamara wanted to 
conduct a completely new kind of war based on data analysis that his Generals assured 
him would fail.  Rumsfeld’s dispute with Shinseki occurred only over the size of the 
forces that the United States should use.  Rumsfeld had determined that a combat force of 
roughly 200,000 troops could take Iraq, whereas General Shinseki had designed an 
invasion using nearly twice that number.  Rumsfeld maintained that his smaller force 
could do the job of capturing Baghdad, to which Shinseki retorted that such a force could 
take Iraq but could not hold it.  Upon General Shinseki’s encouraged retirement, 
Secretary Rumsfeld pulled General Peter Schoomaker out of retirement to serve as Army 
Chief of Staff to run the Army in the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom.9 
      Both of these positions reflected the protagonists’ concern over costs, but in 
different ways.  Rumsfeld wanted to minimize the size of the force deployed whereas 
Shinseki sought to minimize the duration of the campaign.  Each probably thought that 
his prescribed strategy would minimize the costs in casualties.  The remarkably swift 
conquest of Baghdad and the entire country of Iraq in March and April 2003 vindicated 
Rumsfeld’s claim that a smaller force could take Iraq, but Shinseki’s caveat remained 
unaddressed.  Four years into the campaign in Iraq, General Shinseki appears to have 
been right about the higher troop numbers necessary to hold the territory.  The task of 
“winning the peace” by pacifying and securing the country so as to provide a safe 
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environment for a democratic government remained a daunting task.  Ambassador L. 
Paul Bremer recorded that one of his first questions to President Bush upon his 
appointment as the interim supreme authority in Iraq concerned troop levels.  Even in 
May 2003, the State Department and military leaders on the ground had already 
developed a consensus that the United States would need more troops to secure the 
country.  President Bush replied that he planned to add more troops from new UN-
member countries that he hoped to bring into the Coalition.  His “major military 
operations complete” speech on May 1, 2003, then, served the principal purpose of 
inviting new allies to the Coalition.10 
      President Bush’s speech on the aircraft carrier on that day signaled the major 
diplomatic failure of the occupation.  The Americans had completed the conquest of Iraq 
and needed only to secure the country against insurgency and sabotage of the civil and 
religious infrastructure.  President Bush recognized the need for additional troops, but the 
allies he had hoped to gain did not appear.  From May 2003 until the end of 2006, the 
Coalition carried out its missions in Iraq with fewer troops than the Generals wanted, and 
the situation regarding casualties did not improve.  The Spanish elections following the al 
Qaeda bombing of Madrid on July 7, 2004, brought to power a candidate who had 
promised to remove all Spanish troops from Iraq instantly.  Shortly thereafter, the already 
admittedly too small Coalition lost an ally.11  After a peak in casualties in 2004, Coalition 
losses declined gradually until a rise in losses immediately before the 2006 Congressional 
elections in the United States.   
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      The president and Secretary Rumsfeld had always warned the American people 
that the occupation of Iraq would prove long and difficult, but in late 2006 the situation 
had not improved markedly in three years, and, according to casualty numbers, it was 
growing worse.  The Republican defeats in both chambers of Congress in the 2006 
elections prompted President Bush to replace Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense 
and adopt a new strategy.  General Petraeus replaced General Casey as overall Coalition 
Commander in Iraq, bringing with him a reputation as the best counterinsurgency general 
in the Army.  Petraeus proposed an increase in troop numbers, referred to as a troop 
“surge,” to focus more troops in Baghdad and other key places in Iraq.  President Bush’s 
change in strategy, coming as it did directly after political defeats for his party, appeared 
more a political than a strategic decision.  Judging from the situation in Iraq and his 
admittance of the need for more troops as long as three years earlier, it seems fair to say 
that he should have required a new strategy, committed more troops, or replaced 
Secretary Rumsfeld at an earlier date. 
     Petraeus confronted the mission of reducing U.S. casualties promptly and 
presenting tangible progress on the military front.  Significantly, the new strategy 
reversed previous decisions to allow certain political parties to maintain their militias.  In 
April 2004, the simultaneous Battle for Fallujah and the Muqtada al Sadr uprising 
threatened the government that the Iraqis were trying to formulate.  Sunni ministers 
opposed strict measures in Fallujah, and Shia ministers recommended negotiations with 
Muqtada al Sadr.  The United States made certain concessions on both fronts so as to 
preserve the possibility of political progress.12  Soldiers on the ground expressed hearty 
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dissatisfaction with the political leaders who allowed Muqtada’s Mahdi Militia to retain 
their arms.  Petraeus’ plan targeted militias like the Mahdis. 
      By the end of 2007, when the surge had taken full effect, the casualty numbers in 
Baghdad had fallen from 57 in both May and June to fewer than 20 in both September 
and October.  In November and December, hostile deaths in Baghdad fell below ten in 
both months.  This represented the first time that insurgents in Baghdad had inflicted so 
few deaths for two consecutive months since the early months of 2004.  General Petraeus 
proposed troop reductions in the early months of 2008 to correspond with the growth in 
stability throughout Iraq.  Only time will reveal whether his command succeeded in 
stabilizing Iraq.     
       Other than troop number debates and overall strategy issues, the military high 
command addressed specifically non-hostile casualties with a number of regulations and 
technological advances.  In addition to the typical directives about wearing seatbelts and 
helmets in vehicles, the Armed Forces have completed a few innovations in combating 
fratricide.  One top priority concerned preventing fratricide during missions at night.  At 
least three pieces of technology and one tactical standard operating procedure played 
roles in reducing the risk of fratricide.  Convoys traveling at night carried IR Chem-light 
sticks attached to the antennae of their HMMWV (HUM-V) vehicles.  The IR Chem-
lights were invisible to the naked eye, but fellow Coalition soldiers with night vision 
capabilities could see and easily identify friendly vehicles.  In some cases, they also used 
regular orange Chem-lights for night identification.  Soldiers also attached small infrared 
strobe devices to their vehicles’ antennae that flashed IR light. 
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      Both the IR Chem-lights and IR strobes proved most effective in enabling soldiers 
to establish identification when the vehicles did not have their headlights on.  Driving 
with the aid of night vision devices, soldiers kept their vehicles’ small “black-out drive” 
lights on and easily identified one another in the dark, as other convoys could see their IR 
strobes and Chem-lights.  In one situation on November 4, 2005, two convoys met head-
on, headlights ablaze, and did not establish identification.  One convoy fired warning 
shots and killed SSG Jason Fegler of C Company 1st Battalion 506th Infantry.  This 
incident happened in the same area of operations where B Company 1/108th Armor had 
used “black-out drive” lights only, and never suffered a friendly fire incident in five 
months.  C Company 1/506th Infantry had been operating less than one month when their 
soldiers re-learned a lesson in fratricide prevention the hard way.  
      The high chain of command stressed education as a tool against fratricide as well.  
Camp Buehring, Kuwait, served as the first port of call in the Middle East for the 
majority of Army units arriving to commence their one-year tours of duty in Iraq.  A 
week of training in Camp Buehring consisted of final weapons checks and inspections 
and some theater-specific briefings.  On May 13, 2005, a British Corporal briefed a large 
assembly of soldiers from the 48th Brigade of the Georgia National Guard on fratricide 
prevention.  The briefing included photographs of friendly vehicles and distinctive 
markings intended to assist the soldiers in identifying friendly forces.  The presentation 
also included statistics about twelve fratricide episodes involving different Coalition 
countries.  In almost every instance, American soldiers had fired the shots that wounded 
or killed their allies.  The Camp Commander had hoped by using a British soldier as a 
presenter to increase the inter-Coalition awareness of the American soldiers.  The theater-
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level chain of command mandated that every American unit conduct the identical 
fratricide prevention briefing every six months.  Thus, the Coalition forces of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom incorporated fratricide prevention training into their regular regimen of 
instruction.  According to the icasualties.org database, no soldiers have died in inter-
Coalition fratricide episodes since March 2005.  The education program appears to have 
taken good effect. 
     The casualties of Iraq play a significant role in the public consideration of the war 
because Operation Iraqi Freedom has become a war of attrition.  As has been the case 
since the Korean War, the public expresses limited approval for an attrition war 
according to time, costs in soldiers, and the perception of military and political progress.  
The American public desires news of political and military progress in Iraq, falling 
casualty numbers – both hostile and non-hostile – and plans for the return home of troops 
as soon as is practical.  General Petraeus confronted the problem in 2006 that the war had 
stagnated, with no improvements in casualty numbers and extremely minimal political 
progress. 
      Throughout the campaign in Iraq, the specter of Vietnam has affected nearly 
every discussion in topics of strategy, tactics, and civil affairs.  Military and civilian 
leaders attempt to discover whether or not the United States has learned the lessons of 
Vietnam in its conduct of the war.  The reports from the embedded reporters during the 
invasion in 2003 provided a nearly unanimous vote of confidence in favor of the 
American soldiers.  Walter Rodgers, who rode to Baghdad with the 7th Cavalry, called the 
American treatment of civilians “exemplary.”  He avoided too sympathetic a view of the 
troops, casting doubt on one story of American soldiers aiding a wounded civilian, but 
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also reported the commander of his unit canceling an air raid because Saddam Hussein’s 
soldiers were using civilians as human shields.  The soldiers chose to allow enemy troops 
to escape rather than risk killing civilians.13  In cases like this one, the leaders of the 
Armed Forces recognized that they might gain a small tactical advantage by ordering 
aerial and artillery fire.  On the other hand, they might suffer a major blow in public 
relations if the enemy publicized pictures of dead civilians.  
      Evan Wright reported similar patterns of activity in the USMC First Recon 
Battalion.  When the enemy soldiers used civilians as human shields, the Marines 
invariably held their fire.  The major challenge that they faced with civilian deaths 
concerned their own security.  The Fedayeen Saddam, a fanatical militia group that did 
not wear uniforms, employed flags of truce that they did not honor and sometimes 
attacked American positions with cars rigged with explosives.  After firing warning shots 
at vehicles approaching their positions, the Americans engaged with rifles and machine 
guns if the cars refused to stop or accelerated.  Some unarmed Iraqi civilians refused to 
respond to the warning shots, tried to break through the barricades, and Marines either 
disabled their cars or wounded or killed them.  In time, even after the Marines had 
destroyed a suicide car bomb en route to their position, the Marines grew tired of 
shooting at civilians and adopted a new tactic.  Instead of shooting bullets, the Marines 
began firing smoke grenades in front of the vehicles and more of the Iraqi civilians 
cooperated by dispersing.14   
      The trick of using American sympathy for civilians as a weapon is not a new one.  
In Somalia, the militiamen in Mogadishu used women and children to point out American 
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positions and as human shields for gunmen.  American soldiers who refused to shoot 
unarmed women and children risked exposure to enemy fire.  Only the humane sympathy 
of the American soldiers saved the spotters from death in that situation.  Instead of using 
lethal force, the Rangers usually threw “flash-bang” hand grenades that made noise but 
jettisoned no shrapnel.15  A Rules of Engagement (ROE) card for the 101st Airborne 
Division, which each soldier carried in March 2003, outlined this precise situation and 
specified the combatant status of any person giving direct aid to the enemy in the heat of 
battle.  Rick Atkinson, who had embedded with the 101st Airborne for the invasion, drew 
attention to an ROE policy that instructed American soldiers to shoot “unarmed 
civilians.”  Even when the people in question were in the process of giving direct aid to 
the enemy, Atkinson maintained his ideal that Americans should kill no unarmed 
people.16   
      In a few cases, stories of atrocities by American soldiers have affected the public 
perception of the war effort in minor degrees. Dr. Les Roberts of Johns Hopkins 
University released a study that suggested American troops had killed 100,000 Iraqi 
civilians during the first nineteen months of occupation.  The Johns Hopkins researchers 
examined three major areas, asking the people whom they encountered how many 
civilians the American Armed Forces had killed in their areas.  By conducting two thirds 
of their surveys in Fallujah, the most embattled city in Iraq in 2004, the framers of the 
study examined a sample that did not represent the vast majority of the country.  The 
accumulated data placed the number of civilian casualties somewhere between 8,000 and 
194,000, which is, by any standard, an enormous margin of error.  Moreover, the study 
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relied on the word of random Iraqi people without comparing the reports against official 
death records.  Roberts admitted that he hoped to influence public opinion against the war 
in Iraq, but his number of civilian deaths was so high as to defy the credulity of his 
audience.17 
      On November 19, 2005, American Marines in Haditha, Iraq, cleared and searched 
several houses after an IED killed one of their comrades.  Marines claimed that they had 
received hostile fire from the houses, but Iraqi reports contradicted them.  In the course of 
clearing the houses with grenades and firearms, the Marines killed 24 Iraqis, all of whom 
appeared to be civilians.  The Commanders of the Marines began an investigation and 
prosecuted the troops involved.  The Marines responsible for the 24 dead civilians faced 
courts martial and imprisonment.18  Months later, a squad of soldiers from the 101st 
Airborne Division raped and murdered an Iraqi girl in Mahmudiyah, murdering her 
family to cover the crime.  One of their number reported the incident and official court 
martial proceedings followed.  Both events happened on a small scale, and the 
perpetrators paid penalties promptly without an official cover-up. 
 To date, U.S. troops in Iraq have conducted their missions honorably enough that 
the public maintains a positive attitude toward them.  The public and the political leaders 
of both major parties have maintained positive attitudes toward the individual troops who 
have fought the war in Iraq.  Politicians, who have criticized the Bush Administration and 
opposed its policies, have taken pains to express their respect for the troops who serve in 
harm’s way.  Organizations such as the Freedom Alliance and the Marine Corps Armed 
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Forces Foundation amassed funds to pay for the college education of children of soldiers 
killed in the line of duty.  Sea World, among other attractions, granted free admission to 
veterans and their families.  One television commercial showed American servicemen 
disembarking an airplane in the United States.  The civilians in the scene began an 
impromptu round of applause for the soldiers and the Anheuser-Busch Company offered 
thanks to the soldiers.  Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, the public has hoped for as 
few casualties as possible, and as short an operation as possible.  To the extent that 
General Petraeus and the Generals of the future succeed in minimizing casualties, the 
public will likely tolerate a continued U.S. military presence in Iraq.  Should the Iraqi 
government stabilize the country and establish Iraq as an ally to the U.S. in the region, 
the public may in time view Operation Iraqi Freedom as a success.  Should the country 
descend into civil war, the American public will deem the operation a failure. 
      The lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom will inform the American civilian and 
military leaders materially as they wage the next war.  Already American soldiers are 
training Ethiopians and Filipinos to fight proxy wars against belligerents with links to Al 
Qaeda in Somalia and the Philippines.  These campaigns achieved ideal results in that 
very few American troops deployed to the area, none died, and the operations cost very 
little money while serving vital U.S. interests.  The future presidents of the United States 
will not likely emulate the strategy of pre-emptive war to affect regime change in a 
country like Iraq that does not have an apparent leader of the opposition available.  To 
complicate matters, Iraq also has multiple religious and ethnic groups that have seldom 
lived at peace with one another.  Instead, they will supply training, funds and arms to the 
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allies of the U.S., to groups that they hope to make into allies, or to the enemies of 
America’s enemies.   
 Militarily, Operation Iraqi Freedom has proved that the American soldiers are the 
best trained and most formidable of any in the world.  The rapid victory in open terrain in 
Operation Desert Storm had given way only two years later to the debacle in Mogadishu, 
Somalia.  Somalia had taught the lesson that perhaps American soldiers could not prevail 
in urban terrain.  Saddam Hussein had sought to prepare an urban war in March 2003, but 
his forces suffered decisive defeat.  In the years of occupation, the U.S. Armed Forces 
have adapted their training to the changing situation on the ground and countered the 
insurgency with some degree of success.  It is unlikely for the foreseeable future that any 
enemy will fight a conventional war against the United States.  Insurgency, sabotage, and 
proxy combat of the sort that Iran has carried out in Iraq will characterize future 
operations against the United States. 
   The experiences of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom have taught a few definite lessons about public approval for 
wars.  The public will evaluate attrition wars based on length in time, cost in lives, 
apparent progress, and American conduct.  Operation Iraqi Freedom has experienced 
extremes of opinion, positive and negative, based on these factors.  The easy invasion and 
low casualty numbers of 2003 gave way to increasing casualties in 2004.  The successful 
elections and government formation of 2005 yielded to political in-fighting and the 
killings in Haditha and Mahmudiyah.  The passage of time took a toll in 2006, when 
casualty numbers began to increase having not declined significantly in three years.  The 
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surge of 2007 appears to have exerted the desired impact on the military situation, but the 
fortunes of war will likely change again. 
      There is one other possibility, as well: the next war may not be one of “these 
kinds of wars.”  If an enemy attacks the United States on her home soil in an attack 
reminiscent of September 11, 2001, the president may enjoy a mandate for an operation 
similar to the fall 2001 campaign in Afghanistan, during which the military, political and 
public voices of America spoke in nearly complete unity.  The public expressed a high 
tolerance for casualties in a campaign avenging a direct attack.  At the time the next war 
begins, the president will decide whether the public perceives an imminent threat, as it 
did in 2001, or whether the conflict has the potential to become one of “these kinds of 
wars.”  If the experiment in Iraq fails, American presidents and Defense Secretaries will 
take every precaution to avoid another attrition war.  The successes and failures of the 
experiment in Iraq will impact many of the president’s decisions about the next war. 
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        Table 5.1 shows the hostile casualties in each province, compared with the total non-hostile casualties of each month and 
divided in six-month increments.  The most costly province of each month appears in bold print.  Najaf and Karbala are combined 
because they are major centers of Shiite activity and provide an excellent contrast to the Sunni provinces.
Table 5.1: Hostile Casualties in Iraq by Province
Month Anbar Bagdad Salah ad di Ninaw Babil Diyala Basra Dhi Qar Najaf/Karbala Other Unknow Non-Hostile Total Foreign
Mar-03 0 1 0 0 1 0 23 36 4 14 3 10 92 27
Apr-03 3 27 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 11 6 27 80 6
May-03 3 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 33 41 4
Jun-03 2 8 4 0 2 0 0 0 1 6 1 12 36 6
Jul-03 2 12 0 6 2 5 0 0 0 1 0 21 49 1
Aug-03 2 7 2 2 1 2 5 0 0 2 0 20 43 8
6 mos. 12 57 10 8 7 7 31 36 5 35 10 123 341 52
Sep-03 5 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 15 33 2
Oct-03 2 12 8 1 2 4 0 0 3 2 1 12 47 3
Nov-03 21 8 10 24 10 3 0 16 0 1 1 16 110 28
Dec-03 4 7 6 4 1 3 0 0 6 0 1 16 48 8
Jan-04 18 6 5 0 3 2 0 0 0 3 2 13 52 5
Feb-04 2 6 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 23 3
2nd 6 52 47 34 30 18 13 0 16 9 7 6 81 313 49
Mar-04 20 7 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 1 17 52 0
Apr-04 53 32 16 3 9 3 3 0 3 6 3 9 140 5
May-04 25 16 5 3 5 0 0 1 5 4 1 19 84 4
Jun-04 8 15 7 1 1 4 1 0 0 7 1 5 50 8
Jul-04 20 3 15 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 13 58 4
Aug-04 22 10 4 2 5 0 3 0 12 3 2 12 75 9
3rd 6 148 83 49 10 23 11 7 1 20 21 11 75 459 30
Sep-04 37 17 5 5 3 0 2 0 0 1 3 12 85 7
Oct-04 26 15 7 4 3 0 0 0 1 0 2 9 67 4
Nov-04 89 16 3 4 9 2 0 0 0 0 6 12 141 4
Dec-04 24 6 2 18 3 1 0 0 0 1 3 18 76 4
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Jan-05 17 33 6 3 5 0 0 1 0 8 1 53 127 20
Feb-05 10 8 10 6 3 4 0 0 0 1 0 18 60 2
4th 6 203 95 33 40 26 7 2 1 1 11 15 122 556 41
Mar-05 11 13 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 6 39 4
Apr-05 17 14 4 7 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 6 52 0
May-05 27 15 7 4 6 2 0 0 0 3 5 19 88 8
Jun-05 40 17 5 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 14 83 5
Jul-05 9 25 5 2 1 1 0 0 0 4 1 10 58 4
Aug-05 33 12 18 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 10 85 0
5th 6 137 96 40 23 10 8 0 0 0 12 14 65 405 21
Sep-05 15 17 1 1 2 1 7 0 0 0 1 7 52 3
Oct-05 43 12 9 1 5 2 2 0 0 0 6 19 99 3
Nov-05 31 22 10 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 15 86 2
Dec-05 18 28 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 68 0
Month Anbar Bagdad Salah ad di Ninaw Babil Diyala Basra Dhi Qar Najaf/Karbala Other Unknow Non-Hostile Total Foreign
Jan-06 14 12 3 2 0 0 1 0 5 5 2 20 64 2
Feb-06 16 14 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 8 2 10 58 3
6th 6 137 105 34 9 10 4 11 0 5 14 16 82 427 13
Mar-06 15 5 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 6 33 2
Apr-06 29 21 6 2 4 0 1 4 0 1 2 12 82 6
May-06 19 20 1 2 10 0 9 0 0 3 3 12 79 10
Jun-06 29 12 4 3 4 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 63 2
Jul-06 20 9 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 5 46 3
Aug-06 32 16 7 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 7 67 1
7th 6 144 83 23 11 20 2 13 5 0 12 10 47 370 24
Sep-06 25 23 2 4 4 1 4 0 0 2 0 11 76 5
Oct-06 38 42 7 2 2 5 2 0 0 4 0 8 110 4
Nov-06 27 22 4 0 0 5 6 0 0 3 0 10 77 8
Dec-06 40 41 4 1 3 4 1 0 0 8 0 16 118 3
Jan-07 24 18 3 6 4 16 2 0 7 0 0 6 86 3
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Feb-07 35 22 2 0 0 9 3 0 0 4 0 9 84 4
8th 6 189 168 22 13 13 40 18 0 7 21 0 60 551 27
Mar-07 14 34 11 0 0 11 2 0 0 0 0 10 82 1
Apr-07 19 47 3 0 6 15 8 0 0 9 0 10 117 13
May-07 14 57 6 1 18 22 3 0 0 2 0 8 131 5
Jun-07 4 57 6 2 3 9 6 0 3 9 0 9 108 7
Jul-07 13 40 4 1 2 4 7 0 1 1 1 14 88 9
Aug-07 8 32 3 4 0 7 5 0 0 1 0 28 88 4
9th 6 72 267 33 8 29 68 31 0 4 22 1 79 614 39
Sep-07 6 19 3 3 0 11 0 1 0 1 1 24 69 4
Oct-07 2 15 6 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 40 2
Nov-07 0 9 6 1 0 8 0 0 0 5 1 10 40 3
Dec-07 0 3 5 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 10 24 1
Month Anbar Bagdad Salah ad di Ninaw Babil Diyala Basra Dhi Qar Najaf/Karbala Other Unknow Non-Hostile Total Foreign
Jan-08 1 10 6 7 1 9 0 0 0 1 0 5 40 0
Feb-08 0
10th 6 9 56 26 17 4 29 0 1 0 9 3 59 213 10
Total 1103 1057 304 169 160 189 113 60 51 164 86 793 4249
Total Hostile Casualties 3456 306
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        Table 5.2 shows non-hostile casualties by province.  Each time a province's non-hostile losses exceeded the hostile losses for the 
month, the number appears in bold print.  This table employs the same provinces as Table 5.1.
Table 5.2: Non-Hostile Casualties in Iraq by Province
Month Anbar Baghdad Salah-ad-din Ninawa Babil Diyala Basra Dhi Qar Najaf/Karbala Other Unknown Total
Mar-03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 2 10
Apr-03 0 5 1 0 0 0 1 1 6 9 4 27
May-03 1 0 4 3 6 2 2 0 0 11 4 33
Jun-03 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 12
Jul-03 0 6 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 3 4 21
Aug-03 2 5 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 3 4 20
6 months 5 18 10 6 8 4 4 2 9 37 20 123
Sep-03 0 1 4 2 1 0 1 0 0 4 2 15
Oct-03 2 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 12
Nov-03 1 5 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 3 2 16
Dec-03 1 7 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 16
Jan-04 1 2 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 13
Feb-04 3 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 9
2nd 6 8 21 11 13 2 1 5 0 1 13 6 81
Mar-04 2 3 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 2 17
Apr-04 1 4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 9
May-04 5 2 3 1 0 4 0 0 2 1 1 19
Jun-04 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
Jul-04 4 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 13
Aug-04 7 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 12
3rd 6 21 13 11 5 3 5 2 1 3 8 3 75
Sep-04 5 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 12
Oct-04 1 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 9
Nov-04 5 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 12
Dec-04 5 4 0 2 0 0 1 1 3 2 0 18
Jan-05 34 4 0 4 0 6 1 0 0 4 0 53
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Feb-05 2 3 8 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 18
4th 6 52 18 9 6 5 10 3 1 3 13 2 122
Mar-05 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6
Apr-05 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 6
May-05 1 1 1 0 1 4 2 4 2 3 0 19
Jun-05 1 2 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 4 1 14
Jul-05 2 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 10
Aug-05 1 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 10
5th 6 8 7 7 6 5 7 5 5 2 11 2 65
Sep-05 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 7
Oct-05 1 6 3 2 0 0 2 0 0 4 1 19
Nov-05 2 3 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 4 1 15
Dec-05 1 2 3 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 11
Month Anbar Baghdad Salah-ad-din Ninawa Babil Diyala Basra Dhi Qar Najaf/Karbala Other Unknown Total
Jan-06 4 2 0 10 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 20
Feb-06 2 3 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 10
6th 6 14 17 8 14 1 3 5 5 0 11 4 82
Mar-06 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 6
Apr-06 9 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
May-06 7 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Jun-06 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
Jul-06 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
Aug-06 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7
7th 6 25 10 2 4 0 0 2 0 0 3 1 47
Sep-06 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 11
Oct-06 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 8
Nov-06 2 2 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
Dec-06 7 3 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 16
Jan-07 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 6
Feb-07 1 3 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 9
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8th 6 12 19 8 1 2 2 3 4 0 8 1 60
Mar-07 2 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 10
Apr-07 3 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 10
May-07 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 8
Jun-07 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 9
Jul-07 4 5 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 14
Aug-07 5 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 1 28
9th 6 15 22 6 3 0 3 3 2 0 21 4 79
Sep-07 3 13 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 0 24
Oct-07 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 10
Nov-07 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 10
Dec-07 1 6 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 10
Month Anbar Baghdad Salah-ad-din Ninawa Babil Diyala Basra Dhi Qar Najaf/Karbala Other Unknown Total
Jan-08 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 5
Feb-08 0
10th 6 6 28 4 3 1 2 2 0 0 12 1 59
Total 166 173 76 61 27 37 34 20 18 137 44 793
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t        Table 5.3 shows non-hostile casualties by the type of injury.  Electrocution and drowning caused a number of deaths 
early in the campaign, but declined considerably after 2004.  In an increasing number of cases, the Department of Defense did 
not specify the mode of death in non-hostile cases.
Table 5.3: Non-Hostile Casualties in Iraq by Type
Month Vehicle Aircraft Weapons Illness Electrocu Suicide Drowning Other Unknown Total F Fire
Mar-03 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 10 9
Apr-03 8 6 11 0 1 0 0 0 1 27 6
May-03 13 7 8 3 0 0 2 0 0 33 0
Jun-03 4 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 2 12 0
Jul-03 7 0 6 4 0 2 0 0 2 21 0
Aug-03 3 0 3 11 0 0 2 1 0 20 0
6 mos 39 13 33 22 1 2 5 3 5 123 15
Sep-03 7 1 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 15 0
Oct-03 3 0 3 2 0 0 2 0 2 12 0
Nov-03 7 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 16 0
Dec-03 7 0 4 2 1 0 2 0 0 16 0
Jan-04 6 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 0
Feb-04 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0
2nd 6 35 7 24 5 2 1 5 0 2 81 0
Mar-04 7 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 2 17 0
Apr-04 5 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 9 0
May-04 9 0 1 2 2 0 0 3 2 19 1
Jun-04 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 0
Jul-04 9 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 13 0
Aug-04 7 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 12 0
3rd 6 39 3 7 8 4 1 0 3 10 75 1
Sep-04 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 12 0
Oct-04 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 0
Nov-04 9 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 12 0
Dec-04 9 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 18 0
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tJan-05 9 33 1 2 1 0 0 0 7 53 0
Feb-05 13 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 18 0
4th 6 52 40 7 6 1 0 0 1 15 122 0
Mar-05 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 6 2
Apr-05 1 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 6 0
May-05 6 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 19 0
Jun-05 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 14 0
Jul-05 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 0
Aug-05 4 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 10 0
5th 6 27 10 5 4 0 1 3 4 11 65 2
Sep-05 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 0
Oct-05 7 0 3 1 0 1 2 0 5 19 0
Nov-05 9 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 15 1
Dec-05 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 11 0
Month Vehicle Aircraft Weapons Illness Electrocu Suicide Drowning Other Unknown Total F Fire
Jan-06 8 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 20 0
Feb-06 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 0
6th 6 35 11 10 7 0 1 3 3 12 82 1
Mar-06 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 6 0
Apr-06 9 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 12 0
May-06 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 12 0
Jun-06 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 0
Jul-06 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 0
Aug-06 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 7 0
7th 6 17 5 4 3 0 1 0 0 17 47 0
Sep-06 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 11 0
Oct-06 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 8 0
Nov-06 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 10 0
Dec-06 4 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 16 0
Jan-07 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 0
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tFeb-07 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 2 9 2
8th 6 18 8 1 4 0 0 0 5 24 60 2
Mar-07 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 6 10 0
Apr-07 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 10 0
May-07 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 8 0
Jun-07 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 3 9 0
Jul-07 3 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7 14 0
Aug-07 1 19 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 28 0
9th 6 11 23 2 6 0 2 1 6 28 79 0
Sep-07 10 0 0 1 0 1 5 7 24 0
Oct-07 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 4 10 0
Nov-07 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 10 0
Dec-07 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 5 10 0
Month Vehicle Aircraft Weapons Illness Electrocu Suicide Drowning Other Unknown Total F Fire
Jan-08 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 5 0
Feb-08 0
10th 6 19 2 1 4 0 1 1 11 20 59 0
Total 292 122 94 69 8 10 18 36 144 793 21
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APPENDIX I 
MAPS OF THE KOREAN WAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1: The NKPA advance, June 1950.           Map 2: UN advance, Oct-Nov 1950. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 3: Chinese advance Nov. 1950-Mar. 1951      Map 4: Stalemate Apr. 1951-Jul. 1953 
 
Source: Public Broadcasting System, “The Korean War.” The American Experience. 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/maps/koreaintro.html 
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APPENDIX II 
MAP OF IRAQ 
 
 
 
Map 5: Iraq divided by province and color coded by population density 
 
Source: UN Operational Satellite Applications Program, “Governorates with Related 
Place Code and Population,” http://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/: Internet, accessed 5 May 
2008. 
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